


EuroMed-2030

Collection of individual contributions of the experts



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Introduction

The Mediterranean as cradle of different cultures, which have been living on its shores and share a long and rich history, has been a source of friendships and cooperation as well as tensions and misunderstandings. In the times of rapid scientific and technological progress, constantly growing demand for job creation and a heated debate on immigration, it is therefore in the years to come even more important to maintain, foster and upgrade these special ties that exist between the peoples of both shores of the Mediterranean Sea.

In this view, the expert group "EuroMed-2030" was established in January 2010, to assess the trends, tensions and scenarios for the Mediterranean area by 2030. Such initiative was realised under the European Commission's Directorate General for Research and its Work Programme 2009 for Socio-economic Sciences and Humanities (SSH), which includes the heading on "Long term challenges for the Mediterranean area". This forward looking exercise was performed in close cooperation with the Commission Bureau of European policy Advisers (BEPA).

The expert group, consisting of twenty experts with profound understanding of the challenges of the Mediterranean area worked with the objective of conducting both quantitative and qualitative analysis in terms of well-grounded connections between challenges, visions and options for action on which policies could be built in the years to come. This forward looking activity was destined to help to understand, anticipate, and better shape future developments and policies in the Mediterranean region, integrating the long-term dimension in the policy preparation.

The group of experts has reviewed and built on existing studies recently carried out relating to main changes and challenges that Mediterranean area will have to face in the next 20 years. The experts were looking at macro-economic projections (demographic, GDP growth, international trade) for the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean Countries, establishing interdependence between the EU and these countries in economic, social and technological terms, exploring medium term scenarios (2030) for an efficient implementation of future Euro-Mediterranean policies and addressing several policy issues including the Euro-Mediterranean free trade area, migration, energy, transport, environment, water,

agriculture, climate change, technology transfer, marine and maritime issues as well as cultural issues including conflicts, religions and gender.

The independent expert group worked through four meetings, which took place in Barcelona (14-15 January 2010), Rabat (11-12 March 2010), Marseille (3-4 June 2010) and Istanbul (16-17 September 2010). The preliminary results were presented and discussed at a large stakeholders' conference which took place in Brussels on 16^h December 2010. The outcomes of this forward looking exercise have been published in the form of:

- A synthetic and consensual view of the twenty experts report entitled "EuroMed-2030: Long term challenges for the Mediterranean area";
- This report that enables the reader to gain more detailed insight from the individual experts' contributions into the trends, tensions and transitions in the Mediterranean area. Furthermore, it offers some additional insights on specific topics as well as the experts' proposals for future cooperation in the region such as the "Avicenna plan for education", the "Southern and Eastern Mediterranean countries in an enlarged Council of Europe" and the "EuroMed agency for science, technology and innovation".

The collection of individual contributions therefore first looks at the trends, especially in terms of economic and social transformation, water and environment, political reforms and socio-economic instability factors. Then, it focuses on the tensions in the Mediterranean area ranging from conflict/diplomacy and self reliance/dependency to economic growth/sustainable development and jobs/migration. Thirdly, it introduces proposed transitions (Managing conflict, Engaging in win-win projects, Deeper economic integration and Towards a EuroMed Community) as well as additional insights on the topics of research and innovation, desalination, educational systems, identity and cultural values and gender relations. Finally, the experts' proposals are presented. They deal mostly with EuroMed cooperation in the fields of geopolitics and governance, sustainability, demographic change and economic development, cultural cooperation, education, science and innovation.

Domenico Rossetti di Valdalbero
European Commission, DG Research
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This group has been animated by Domenico Rossetti and Pierre Valette (DG Research and Innovation) and it benefited from very useful insights of Vasco Cal (BEPA), Paraskevas Caracostas and Perla Srour-Gandon (DG Research and Innovation).

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The views presented in this report are the personal opinions of the experts and do not reflect the positions of the European Commission.

All the documents about EuroMed-2030 (presentations, synthetic report and the Executive summary in English and French) are available on: http://ec.europa.eu/research/social-sciences/index_en.html

1. Trends

1.1 *Economic and social transformation: Beyond innovation – conservatism approach*

by Ibrahim Saif

INTRODUCTION

Non market mechanism is a process by which resources are allocated based on government or societal rational instead of the usual price mechanisms. In such cases the main goal is to maximize welfare, as loosely defined, versus profit maximization approach which should motivate the private sector.

If we are to expand the definition of the non-market mechanisms it may include the local community knowledge, practice and tradition. The question is whether this tradition is conducive to the economic transformation that several Middle Eastern countries have embarked on since the early eighties. Furthermore, can we engage in an economic and social transformation process while preserving some of the prevailing traditions? If the answer is yes, are these sets of traditions consistent with the modernization process that many Middle Eastern countries are trying to achieve.

We argue in this intervention that it is not always the case that modernization, innovation is conducive for economic growth in its general sense which includes social capital, or even, to use the neo-classical terminologies, it is useful for productivity gain.

There are cases where the process of modernization has not been as useful to the local communities and it entails wasting resources, of course there are cases that lead us to conclude otherwise, hence it clearly depends on the case at hand. Conclusion can only be based on a review of several projects and cases when local community were consulted and decisions were taken in a participatory manner. This is compared to cases when the central government or international community decided the sets of priorities.

In the following section we will present how the economic transformation was initiated at the macro level and the pillars of such programs. Then we will focus on the concept of sustainable development as perceived from the environmentalist, followed by few cases where modernization process was not successful and explain the policy implications that emerge out of the analysis.

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION

In the late 1980s, several Middle Eastern and North African Countries (MENA) shifted at varying paces toward the adoption of economic policies designed to achieve the “Washington Consensus”; pillars that called primarily for macroeconomic stability, further integration with the world economy, and an expanded role for the private sector. In both countries, the driving forces behind the initiation of the economic reform process were primarily unsustainable external debt, rising budget deficit, double-digit inflation rates, and rising poverty. However, after more than twenty years of launching “reform initiatives,” rising social distress in several countries indicates that the success of this process remains mostly unsatisfactory.

Analyzing the changes that have occurred at the economic, social and political levels in these countries provides an opportunity to rethink development status in the MENA region. Decades of reform have led to a production of prolific literature¹ assessing reform initiatives such as those advocated by the Washington Consensus. However, assessments of the economic, social and political impacts of reform are hindered by the inability to track down their process and sequence accurately. Particularly overlooked is the fact that there has been an increasing divide between rural and urban and the introduction of new modes of production in areas where the pre-requests to absorb the new changes are limited.

The reform process was also marred by the fact that the first wave of economic reform measures dictated by the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) gave little attention to the institutional setting present in a country. What emerged was a “trial and error” method that led to prioritizing necessary factors for achieving “internationally” accredited development.

Recently, developmental efforts have been more concerned with trying to achieve what is necessary to advance greater, and more efficient, private sector participation in economic growth. In 1998, James Wolfensohn, former president of the World Bank Group, proclaimed at the Opening Ceremony of the Second Mediterranean Development Forum, that "we've also learned that it's necessary in order to have growth, which is a prerequisite to human development, that we must be partners with business, with the private sector ... the private sector is not a gloss, it's not an institutional group that we can forget, it's a group that is central to the activities of development."²

Governments have been increasingly engaged in designing policies directed toward the encouragement of private sector investment. For example, we observe a growing trend in restructuring the tax system in favour of a value-added tax, along with the streamlining of corporate and personal income taxes. It is argued that these changes would encourage investment over consumption. However, reforming the legal and regulatory framework to favour investment by private capital, whether domestic or foreign, is of great significance. At the global level, these steps are considered essential to attract and hold investment in a highly competitive global economy.

In the MENA region, an increasing number of countries have committed to private sector-led growth. Egypt and Jordan are prime examples. Egypt has officially stated that its national policy objectives are aimed at achieving private-sector led and outward-oriented economic growth, by maintaining a stable macroeconomic environment, creating a business-friendly environment, attracting foreign direct investment, and developing capital markets. Since governments are committed to building a "business friendly" environment, it has been argued that one of the most important incentives for achieving "good governance" is to attract private sector investment. When assessing governance, we have observed the prioritization of the development of the business environment over human welfare at the societal level.

This background, and the "private sector lens" and the notion of we know better has guided the process of transformation and policy making in the region over the last few decades. As can be seen non-market mechanism is some thing that hardly been thought off is such a framework.

THE SUSTAINABLE AND ENVIRONMENTALIST APPROACH

Clearly if we to introduce this notion the sustainable development, the overall policy framework will be different, since this perspective dictates a number of policy choices and constraints that are normally overlooked by the "private sector lens" described above.

After decades during which the warnings of environmentalists were dismissed by representatives of governments and of corporations as irrational hysteria, we have now arrived at a time of heightened environmental awareness and sustainable development.

Until recently, development planners took available resources for granted, in the sense that they did not consider, by and large, the dependence on resources, and the impact on them, as a constraint on development. This narrative hold as evidence the massive environmental damage caused by the various models of rapid growth followed around the world.

In the MENA region the debate concerning environment is fairly recent. Institutions that are concern with environment has recently been established and so far environmental concern are of little importance in many countries. There is no long term planning to deal with issues such as water, pollution for example. As a result the impact of such ignorance has confused analysts and policy makers failed to establish the link between environment deteriorating and the internal migration, i.e. rural urban and other related issues.

Indeed with a high level of poverty and unemployment, most of the MENA countries followed the neo-classical recipe which as outlined above was concern about financial and monetary stability. Indeed in many cases reform measures has undermined agricultural sector, in particular, with its contribution and the number of worker declining rapidly over time.

It is only recently when this issue took primacy, when at the international level, a number of elements of the environmental critique of development, and of new theoretical moves in development studies, came into play. For example, they emphasised indigenous knowledge, showing the influence of anthropological studies of human interactions and practices with respect to nature. New programs included 'participation' components, such as 'resource mapping', and empowerment, such as emphasis on decision making institutions at village

level. The stress on civil society became evident in the increasing numbers of and expanding roles of environmentally oriented NGOs. Rights based approaches too can be identified, raising questions of rights to resources.

But sustainability issues seem always to be two steps ahead of the solutions created to tackle them. Policy is always reactive, and the costs of preventative and precautionary action are deemed to be too high from a political perspective. Consider, for example, the changes in the world food economy that has evolved over the last three decades. Consumers now demand fruit and vegetables out of season, and this demand, coupled with the export-orientation pushed by development agencies, has resulted in the conversion of agricultural lands in developing countries to produce crops to be sold in distant markets. This has resulted in serious environmental damage, which, as the state has 'rolled back' during the same phase, has no clear agent to address them. Besides, these long distance exports obviously also leave a huge carbon footprint, contributing to global climate change.

The opening up of new markets to fast food companies, retail chains and soft-drinks manufacturers has resulted in the spread of mass production of meat and poultry with its corresponding risks (sars, bird flue, etc.), rapid deterioration of land and other resources, and negative impact on the volume and quality of water.

It is not easy to accommodate the consumers' desire and the sustainability issues. Powerful multinationals is expected to downplay the sustainable approach. Because they see a lucrative business opportunity in new technologies. But while there is growing consensus that sustainable issues need to be addressed, there is little consensus on how this is to be done.

We must admit that the debate in the MENA region is still in its infancy and no serious changes are envisaged in the near future. The region is saddled with other concern that will push back the issue of sustainability to the back burners. As such the process of modernization will continue and alternative approach will find support in the official rhetoric and through few NGOs, but it will not be executed except through including that into the neo-classical agenda and may be through the international support for such approach, if there is to be such support. One last observation, in response to the question raised, as to whether traditionalist, oppose and hinder the process of development, we found little

evidence to support such claim, to the contrary local knowledge, and tradition can be useful to achieve the desired goals set by the 'modernizer', the two simple cases from Jordan and Sudan, outlined below, shows that market is not always right, the questions remain how can we accommodate local, non market mechanisms in the process of market transformation. This is challenging and calls for case by case analysis and a revision of some of the orthodox approach which seems to dominate debate so far.

CONCLUSION

Back to the statement stated about how realistically we can advocate non-market mechanism to advocate economic policies that are sustainable and environmentally friendly, manifested by the slogan Innovation-conservatism, the recent trend in the MENA region has shown that it is moving closer to the market oriented economy and abandoning non market traditions.

Irrespective of the distortions that besets the version of the economic and social transformation the region has adopted, i.e. the absence of democratic institutions and good governance. The outcome of such move is at best disappointing. For example, high level of poverty and unemployment, low productivity, internal immigration is all indicates the failure of the current policies.

Moreover those who are valuing the old traditions were overtaken by the new economic policies which advocate competitiveness and market values more than any other values.

Additionally, conservatives, as loosely defined, cannot find there way to execute their vision. For several reasons, they are scattered, advocating long terms objectives that goes beyond the immediate concerned of the incumbent politicians and also they lack, in most cases, the resources to translate their plans into actions.

To the contrary pro neo-liberal policies are in an advantageous position to implement their version of modernity, they can afford to make mistakes and blame others for not achieving their desired goals.

Only government and some international community can create a balance under which both new values and traditional ones can coexist.

THE EFFECT OF MULTINATIONALS ON RURAL COMMUNITY/POVERTY IN SUDAN:

In its six years development plan (1978-1983) Sudan stressed on achieving an equal distribution of income through extending benefits from development to rural people. Modern agriculture and agro-industries were considered to be the driving mechanisms for such a strategy. The modernization required foreign capital which was imported partly through contracts with multinational corporations.

Multinationals were involved in three programs. One consisted of mechanized rain fed schemes which covered 7 million acres of land. The other two included large scale commercial production and fattening of sheep and cattle and irrigated sugar cane plantation and refining. In the three programs, multinationals held large area of land, none of which was used for the development of traditional sector.

While the government aimed to increase rural welfare through modernization the result was the contrary. First, income inequalities widened. It was estimated that labourers in the modern sector received an annual income of 50 times higher than that in the traditional sector. Second, the increased mechanization reduced employment in the sector. Finally, lack of legal protection of agricultural labourers subjected them to abuse and exploitation.

Moreover, the land used for the agricultural modernization schemes was traditionally used by nomadic people as grazing land. The schemes caused the displacement of the nomadic people and the rise of conflicts between nomads and the new land farmers. Nomads were pushed to less suitable grazing land. They were also prevented from using traditional migration routes which allowed for a most favourable pattern of year-round grazing. In many cases this caused desertification and resulted in rural-urban migration. Finally in areas where irrigation programs were undergone, diseases such as bilharzias and malaria appeared for the first time amongst the indigenous people.

A CLOSED FACTORY IN JORDAN...WHY!

The German Agency for Technical Cooperation initiated with the help of Ministry of Planning a project to rehabilitate grazing land and soil in the northern Badia (Desert) of Jordan.

The project included a dairy product factory. The factory was to help the rural community by purchasing milk from shepherds and employing local labour.

Although well studied, the project failed to accommodate traditional knowledge of dairy production and the needs of the local community. The Ministry of Planning insisted on limiting its production to cheese from sheep milk. However, the season for sheep milking lasts only four months a year, while the locals needed a factory that would work year round. Additionally, the planners ignored how scattered the shepherds are and the lack of means of transportation by which they would reach the factory to sell the milk. Traditionally, private factory owners reach the shepherds to buy the milk from them; a way that has been developed over years of non-market interactions. Thus, despite the better prices that the Ministry of Planning offered for the milk, the local shepherds preferred to keep to their traditional modes of production. As a result the project failed and the factory has been closed since 2004.

¹ W. Easterly, "The ghost of financing gap: evaluating the growth model of the international financial institutions," *Journal of Development Economics* (1999); W. Easterly, "The lost decades: explaining developing countries' Stagnation in spite of policy reform 1980–1998," *Journal of Economic Growth* (2001); M. Goldstein and P. Montiel, "Evaluating fund stabilization programs with multi-country data: some methodological pitfalls," *IMF Staff Papers* (1986); T. Killick, *1995 IMF Programmes in Developing Countries: Design and Impact* (London and New York: Routledge, 1995); P. Conway, "IMF Lending Programs: Participation and Impact", *Journal of Development Economics* (1994); and L. Dicks-Mireaux, M. Mecagni and S. Schadler, "Evaluating the effect of IMF lending to low-income countries", *Journal of Development Economics* (2000).

² World Bank, <http://www.worldbank.org>, (accessed on December 28, 2008).

1.2 Water and environmental perspectives in the SEMCs

by Rafael Rodriguez-Clemente

SETTING THE ISSUE

Water and environment is one and the same subject. Water is life, and in this sense, the access and availability of drinkable water is as basic as human right as the life itself. Living entities are, in average, 70% of water, some organic material and some minerals. Water is the basic food.

Water is also a structuring part of nature; most natural cycles, from climate variability, biodiversity location, geochemical mobility of elements to erosion and sedimentation, are based in the water cycle, which does not recognize political borders. Water is a facilitator of transport. Water is the primary commodity of agriculture and of almost all the industrial processes. Water access at home is a service necessary for cleaning, cooking, etc. Water is a valuable good whose possession guarantees economic prosperity. Water is also a waste once used in any activity.

Water is a right but also an economic instrument. Rights are something that organized societies guarantee to their subjects; so, the governments, at any level, have a primary duty to guarantee affordable good quality water to the citizens. But at the same time, water is a component of many economic transactions and its possession or access represents a strong position in many economic deals. It is a limiting factor in the social and economic developments of societies, so it is a subject or market and politics. In fact, the UN World Summit on Sustainable development (Johannesbourg, Nov. 2002) in its conclusions and recommendations DID NOT mention water as a “human right”, instead it made reference to “water as a need”, “basic requirement”, etc, to avoid the conflict between public access (right) to private management (efficient, the public management is suspected of corrupted...). The “valuing” and, mainly, the “pricing”, of water touches both economic and political interest, has deep cultural and ethical roots and can easily become a point of

tension. On top on this, does the environment, i.e., the surrounding of the human sphere, have right to the water, as the human does?

Water is a polyhedral matter perceived very differently depending of the point of view, with two common characteristics: it is needed and, once used, is a waste, except, perhaps, in the geochemical and geological cycles.

In some societies the groundwater belongs to the land owner (Roman law). In others is viewed as a “common heritage” or God's Gift (Muslin tradition) for everybody (the right to quench thirst). So, even if there is a social perception of the need to access to water, there are many difficulties to build a social consensus for a management scheme.

So, the landscape of the relation between humans and water is marked by conflicts: Rights against market, politics against markets, public good against efficiency of administration, prices against free access, regions against neighbour regions, quality against contamination, limits of use against economic development, economic demands against natural environment rights...

How can all these situations, which produce a perception of scarcity in its availability, be fitted in a single management scheme?

At the end of this contradictory balance it appears that water use has limits, beyond which the balance between the benefits obtained from water and the burden of the social, economic and political costs becomes negative. Which and where are these limits?

Perhaps we need to resituate the perception of water by the societies in the place that it had in the ancient times: The survival of societies in the Mediterranean Area depended of a precise management of the scarce water resources. This dependence is at the heart of the typical physical landscape in the entire arid Mediterranean Area, even the oasis of the desert are creations of the men by using their knowledge of the water regime. Moreover, the biodiversity that we observe nowadays in the Mediterranean relies on the water access and its management. In short, the water culture is the basis of the human culture. Water culture is in the foundation of human behaviour, including the “political culture”. Therefore, the problem of tackling the water issues in the Mediterranean and by extension the

environmental issues is a cultural one. The water social perception is the fundament of the water policy in all countries. The amount of information available on water issues and technical solutions proposed to support the water management are enormous, so we don't face a problem of ignorance, even if more work is needed to assess the impact of climate and social changes, but a serious problem of public awareness and appropriation of a perception of water as a UNIQUE resource that must be treated with respect and concern.

WORLD WATER DATA AND THE SITUATION IN THE MEDITERRANEAN COUNTRIES

Table 4.1: The distribution of water across the globe

Location	Volume, (10 ³ km ³)	% of total volume in hydrosphere	% of freshwater	Volume recycled annually (km ³)	Renewal period years
Ocean	1,238,000	96.5	–	505,000	2,500
Groundwater (gravity and capillary)	23,400 ¹	1.7	–	16,700	1,400
Predominantly fresh groundwater	10,530	0.76	30.1	–	–
Soil moisture	16.5	0.001	0.05	16,500	1
Glaciers and permanent snow cover:	24,064	1.74	68.7	–	–
Antarctica	21,600	1.56	61.7	–	–
Greenland	2,340	0.17	6.68	2,477	9,700
Arctic Islands	83.5	0.006	0.24	–	–
Mountainous regions	40.6	0.003	0.12	25	1,600
Ground ice (permafrost)	300	0.022	0.86	30	10,000
Water in lakes:	176.4	0.013	–	10,276	17
Fresh	91.0	0.007	0.26	–	–
Salt	85.4	0.006	–	–	–
Marshes and swamps	11.5	0.0008	0.03	2,294	5
River water	2.12	0.0002	0.006	43,000	16 days
Biological water	1.12	0.0001	0.003	–	–
Water in the atmosphere	12.9	0.001	0.04	600,000	8 days
Total volume in the hydrosphere	1,286,000	100	–	–	–
Total freshwater	35,029.2	2.53	100	–	–

¹ Excluding groundwater in the Antarctic estimated at 2 million km³, including predominantly freshwater of about 1 million km³.

This table shows great disparities: between the huge volume of saltwater and the tiny fraction of freshwater; between the large volumes of water contained by the glaciers and the water stored in the aquifers; and between the amount of groundwater and the small volumes of water in rivers, lakes and reservoirs.

Source: Shiklomanov, forthcoming.

Table 1 The distribution of water across the globe




Figure 1 Physical and economic frame in the Mediterranean respect to water availability

The Mediterranean shores represent 5.7% of the world continental surface, with 46.000km of coastal line. It suffers frequent droughts and floods, with periodicities of about each 10 years, causing erosion and water scarcity.

The Mediterranean environment is the richest in the world in biodiversity, but the most vulnerable: 10% of all the known species in just 1.6 % of world surface; 7% of marine species in less than 0.8% of marine surface. It represents 60% of world population “poor in water” and emits 8.3% of global carbon dioxide, increasing.

In the Mediterranean area, 70-80 % of all available water is used in agriculture, which is the source of the main export products of the region. However, these products are very rich in water (oranges, tomatoes...), so, paradoxically, the Southern Mediterranean countries are exporting (virtual) water. The countries of the South have up to 40% of their active population working in agriculture.

The marine and coastal environment supports an enormous contamination, 80% of which comes from the continent. 60% of residual waters of cities with more than 100.000 inhabitants are thrown to the sea without treatment, most urban waste are uncontrolled. The Mediterranean Sea support 30 % of the world maritime traffic. The World Bank calculates that the environmental damage in the shores of Southern and Eastern

Mediterranean oscillates in between 3% of the Tunis GDP to 5% in Syria, Algeria and Egypt. The Mediterranean countries represent 13% of the World GDP, but decreasing.

To end this brief description, it must be said that the Mediterranean countries, in all models of scenarios of impact of the climatic change, are presented as one of the regions of the World that will suffer stronger impacts, especially in water availability.

The demographic frame of the Med Countries

Population of 442 million in 2000 (269 in the North, and 173 in the South and East, with a high concentration of urban population (64%)). By 2025 the population in the N will be the same, while in the S and E will double. In MENA countries the average household use is 50-70 l/day/person of water, in MED-Europe is 220 l/person/day.

The tourism impact

The Mediterranean shores support 220 million tourists/year. Each tourist uses some 800 l/day of water, while a normal dweller in the Maghreb countries uses some 40 l/day. In Costa Brava (Spain) the population in Mid-August is around 1,1 million, while in winter is 150.000 (ten times more water and waste treatment needed).

The common feature of the Mediterranean area is that water is one of the limiting factors for sustainable development, increased quality of life, and peace.

THE MANAGEMENT OF WATER SCARCITY

The competing needs

The essential water problem of the Mediterranean region is that population, and its demand for higher living standards, are increasing, while the present supply of economically accessible and affordable water is limited. The only country with a significant overall surplus

of water supply in the Mediterranean region is Turkey, but not in all regions. The decline in water supplies, present or future, lies in the over-exploitation of underground aquifers not recharged by rainfall or water seepage and the over-utilization of rainfall and river resources. Further, the traditional large-scale use of water for agriculture ($\pm 80\%$ of water use in the Mediterranean countries) is increasingly under pressure from alternative users (industry and domestic users). For example, the production of a ton of steel needs over 50 tons of water. Also, increasingly along the Mediterranean coast and in the Middle East, the population is concentrated in urban centres where water use (and wastage and pollution) is high as their citizens attempt to achieve standards of living closer to Western styles. This means that after 2015/2020, available water supplies will increasingly fall below demand. It is therefore necessary to find ways of increasing supply while limiting demand so that water does not become a source of internal or external violence in the countries to the south and east of the EU.

Why have we arrived to this situation?

Basically for two principal reasons¹:

“First, countries have delayed tackling many important water reforms, such as reducing subsidies that encourage inefficient water use. The changes have been too politically unpalatable; in part because accountability to the public has been weak. The voices of some groups – women who carry water from standpipes, children who get sick from poor sanitation, and environmentalists who campaign to make water management more sustainable – are not sufficiently heard in the decision making processes.

The second reason for slow progress is that some of the most important factors affecting water outcomes lie outside the responsibilities of traditional irrigation, water supply, and environmental agencies. Factors such as trade, energy pricing, real estate, credit, and social protection, have a real impact on farmers’ decisions about what to grow and how to irrigate and on investors’ decisions about development of new commercial schemes. If policies outside the water sector give farmers and businesses little incentive to use water well, water sector reforms will not be enough to address the problem. Water is not just a sectorial issue

to be dealt with by the region's excellent irrigation, water supply and water storage technicians. Rather it is a shared development challenge, one that requires attention from a range of perspectives. The overwhelming majority of water use is based on economic demand rather than physical need. Regardless of how well water ministries function and water policies are designed and implemented, other factors related to different economic demands distort signals to users and lead to inefficient water outcomes. Even where countries have made important legal and institutional reforms in water ministries and service providers, if the new policies are inconsistent with other macroeconomic and sectorial policies, the incentives for inefficient use of water and public funds for water will continue. Non water policies drive decisions in every part of water management—from a minister deciding whether to build a dam to an individual deciding how long to leave the tap running inside the home. Combined, these individual decisions affect both how efficiently the water resource is allocated and how efficiently public funds are spent on water management and services”.

THE CONCEPTUAL AND POLITICAL APPROACH TO WATER MANAGEMENT IN THE MEDITERRANEAN COUNTRIES

The Integrated Water Resources Management paradigm

In all Mediterranean countries the water management has always been a major matter of political and social concerns; however, the actual situation of demographic growth, unsustainable economic growth and climate change, makes this debate most acute than ever and has forced the definition of a new conceptual frame for water management, i.e., the Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM) as the most promising perspective to cope with this intricate problem. This new concept supersedes the previous management process applied in the area, notably²:

- Surface Water Management (traditional model)
- Unitary Water Management (basins management)

- Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM, the model of the WFD, ecosystem management)
- Most probably, the logic of integrating the entire factors related to water availability will force an evolution to management models which will incorporate other concerns:
- Integrated water and territory management, and finally
- Integrated river basin management: water, territory and energy (ecosystemic water management)

This sequence of models should proceed according with the level of public appropriation of the concepts, so different places could adopt different models, all targeting a more appropriate management of a scarce but necessary resource. At this moment most of the Mediterranean countries target the application of the IWRM model.

The IWRM approach co-ordinates water resources management across sectors and interest groups, and at different scales, from local to international. It emphasizes involvement in national policy and law making processes, establishing good governance and creating effective institutional and regulatory arrangements as routes to more equitable and sustainable decisions. A range of tools, such as social and environmental assessments, economic instruments, and information and monitoring systems, support this process³.

The four key principles of IWRM can be summarized as follows⁴:

Principle No. 1 - Fresh water is a finite and vulnerable resource, essential to sustain life, development and the environment.

Principle No. 2 - Water development and management should be based on a participatory approach, involving users, planners and policy-makers at all levels.

Principle No. 3 - Women play a central part in the provision, management and safeguarding of water.

Principle No. 4 - Water has an economic value in all its competing uses and should be recognized as an economic good.

Key IWRM strategies need to consider:

- 1) the need to improve the economic efficiency of water use, as an attempt to regulate demand and reduce the pressure of increasing water scarcity;
- 2) at the same time, there is a need to ensure a balance between efficiency and equity, guaranteeing to all access to safe water in adequate quantities, and that water allocation is not biased in favour of some consumers;
- 3) the ecological and environmental sustainability of water use strategies must also be ensured, with the aim of preserving equal development opportunities for future generations.

The European Water Framework Directive model

These issues were in the basis of the European Water Framework Directive⁵ which resulted after a very long debate where all the needs, previous experiences and interests, were considered. Its basic principles are:

- protecting all waters, surface and ground waters
- covering all impacts on waters
- good quality ('good status') to be achieved, as a rule, by 2015
- water quality defined in terms of biology, chemistry and morphology

- management of the River Basin
- the challenge of shared river basins
- river Basin Management Plans
- cost Recovery and Equitable Charging
- public Participation

This directive is being implemented in all the EU countries with variable success. Nevertheless, it has become an uncontested world reference for IWRM, and the point here is to evaluate how these principles can be used for a Mediterranean wide common water policy.

THE FUTURE PERSPECTIVES ON WATER AND ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT IN THE MEDITERRANEAN COUNTRIES

The urgency for action

The actual circumstances of climate change, increasing population pressure on the Mediterranean shores, search of food security, unsustainable agriculture and increasing pollution of water resources, continental and maritime, makes necessary a strong political action of all countries riparian of the Mediterranean sea.

The Barcelona Process, and its continuation, the Union for the Mediterranean initiative, identified water and environment issues as some of the first priorities. In fact, the Marseilles Declaration⁶ of the UfM considers Water and Environment as two of the Fields of Cooperation to be pursued during 2009. The Program Horizon 2020 of De-pollution of the Mediterranean, previously approved in the Barcelona Euro-Med Summit of 2005, being a key element of political and technical cooperation covering both water and environment issues. However, the way forward to obtain visible results in water and environment

management and a real public perception of improvement, needs a consistent political frame, the adoption of a realistic technological approach, and a public action of information on the real threads related to water and environmental issues, as well as a recovery of the best elements of the traditional Mediterranean Water Culture.

The political frame

The recent Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Conference on Water (Jordan, 22 December 2008) makes a realistic analysis of the situation by acknowledging:

- 1) the degradation of resources both from a quality and quantity point of view;
- 2) the necessity to design and implement strategies and plans to achieve sustainable water resources management through integrated approaches comprising all kinds of water and all its uses;
- 3) the growing gaps between water consumption and availability of resources, in particular in the light of the priority given to supply side policies;
- 4) that the widening of such gaps, without a coordinated action, is likely to be worsened by the effects of climate change, economic development and demographic growth;
- 5) that water supply measures (traditional or alternatives) might be considered once the projected impact of water savings prove insufficient;
- 6) the imbalances in access to water supply and sanitation, bearing in mind that equal access contributes to poverty eradication, the improvement of health, economic development, hygiene, sustainable land use development, education, protection of the environment and of ecosystems;
- 7) the need to prepare a comprehensive and detailed assessment of water resources in the Mediterranean and of management policies and based on homogeneous and coherent information;

- 8) the necessity to promote the development of science-based technologies that will provide inter alia for efficiency in water use and supply measures;

Taking note of the different challenges evoked, the Ministers agree to define the Long Term Strategy for Water in the Mediterranean, as decided by the Heads of State and Government.

The Strategy will:

- 1) tackle problems that go beyond the means of any one country, organization or initiative, in particular those related to the impact of climate change and environmental needs, that call for a co-ordinated approach and increased cooperation;
- 2) build on integrated approaches, taking into consideration every kind of water, the needs of different users, by means of integrated management at basin level, as a tool to allow countries in the Mediterranean to respond to these challenges collectively and individually;
- 3) include two main goals: conservation of water quality including the prevention of further deterioration of water resources and the balance between the quantity of water used and the quantity of water available including mitigating and preventing the consequences of droughts and water scarcity;
- 4) include both measurable qualitative and quantitative objectives, as part of a voluntary commitment to achieve these goals;
- 5) consider the most appropriate instruments to reach the objectives of the Strategy, with a view to achieving economic growth, social prosperity, equitable access and adequate supplies of water, and environmental protection, notably through improved efficiency of all water uses, appropriate governance arrangements, legislation and institutional arrangements, effective national and local planning, innovative financial mechanisms, tariff policies, standards, labels, alternative solutions, keeping in mind the differences in national situations and the need to increase the citizen's awareness

by promoting the wide participation of civil society aiming at building the culture of water;

So, the political frame is there, but this being necessary is not enough to guarantee results and public appropriation of this political scenario.

Technological Proposals to implement IWRM: The research agenda

The technological evolution is parallel to the water management. During the initial stage of water resource use, the main and almost only activity is to tap the natural resources, initially surface waters and later groundwater, if drilling and abstraction technology is available, but when resources begin to dry up, management becomes an important issue. If the water scarcity is persistent, the next step would be to assess the state of the basin surface and land use. The technologies must be adapted to a new concept: the river basin management, seen as the basic territorial unit for water planning and management purposes. Spain was the first country to introduce this legal concept of water management, which has since been adopted by other countries including the USA and others. It has also been used by the European Water Framework Directive (2000/60/EC) for the entire EU.

The research on water management has been a priority objective of the successive Framework Programs of the European Commission in their International Cooperation Programs with the Mediterranean Countries. A recent survey by N. Riveill⁷ on the results and impact of several research Projects dealing with IWRM financed by previous Framework Programs showed the following features:

- Strong difference of perception of the problems between users, including citizens and water managers, and scientists. The former make an approach based in their values and cultural backgrounds, while the latter try to understand the nature behaviour and its impact in societal organization.
- These differences of perception provoke a lack of communication between the stakeholders, and the scientific message (such as environmental concerns, warning on contamination, or underground water exhaust, among other) can take several

years or decades to be assumed by the large public. There is a lack of impact of the running scientific work.

- The cultural or historical basis of the water perception and its traditional management, sometimes obstruct the relevance of research, the political character of the allocation of water resources, or the gender issues related to water use and management. However, sometimes the lack of impact of research is due to absence of capacities of implementation of the recommendations.
- Finally, the social sustainability and the gender issues use to be absent in the research projects, while it has been observed that when integrated in the analytical frames of research, the results are better accepted and open possibilities of action.

A debate on what can be done to favour the public acceptance of IWRM engaged in the MELIA Project⁸ resulted in the following recommendations:

- Select the technology that best fits the local conditions, and do not to consider the technologies successful somewhere to be necessarily successful in another place.
- Enable all actors to be involved in the experimental platforms development. Scientist and Administration have to work together. The public should be able to follow the technologies adoption debates.
- Promote broad dissemination of successful scientific results to the public, end users and all concerned agents (Translate scientific outputs into simple common language).
- Promote the participatory approach in decision taking.
- Increase of training opportunities for technical and non-technical staff.
- Need of institutional and economic support to enhance public awareness on regular basis, not on an ad-hoc basis.

- Promote lobby groups to ensure that policy makers properly understand the problems of IWRM, and adopt the appropriate means to handle it.
- Use unconventional channels to convey the message to as wide audience as possible (e.g., use Football teams, actors, etc.).
- Show the consequences of not taking any action.
- Develop a communication strategy with media involvement.

Public appropriation and awareness of the IWRM

Information acquisition and dissemination are critical components of IWRM and the Mediterranean Water Strategy. Carefully crafted awareness campaigns and information dissemination is necessary to ensure the meaningful participation of actors, especially those who are not formally part of decision making bodies – such as NGOs and individual stakeholders. Conflict management is also facilitated by the timely and accurate dissemination of information on different water needs, but also of data on water availability. One of the tools available for information dissemination – both for scientific and popular communications – is the use of monitoring and assessment indicators, which need to cover social, economic and environmental aspects of water management⁹.

However, only by an extensive use of the media, notably TV, can the public opinion be mobilized and counteract the pressure of the different lobbies that defend their corporative interests. The lack of public concerns about the direct impact of some economic practices, such as the intensive use of fertilizers or insecticides in the agriculture, or the lack of waste water treatment in urban or industrial use, in the environment, the water supply or/and the water cost, makes it difficult to pass the necessary water and environment legislation and the building of public consensus around it. Only a constant pressure on the media can obtain tangible results, as has been observed in the citizen's behaviour but not yet in the agricultural and industrial sectors.

THE MID-LONG TERM CHALLENGES ON WATER AND ENVIRONMENT IN THE MEDITERRANEAN COUNTRIES

As conclusion of the arguments exposed above, the following challenges appear as the main actions to be taken especially for water management in the Mediterranean Area:

- Change of the cultural perception of water and its impact on nature and human life.
Public appropriation of the need to change water management
- IWRM and conservation of a sustainable environment not depending on other policies, but framing them.
- Changing the agricultural model in the Mediterranean
- International governance of water resources

¹ J. Bucknall, V. Jagannathan, N. H.-Nielsen and M. Pradel, "Making the Most of Scarcity: Accountability for Better Water Management in the Middle East and North Africa", Arab Water Council Journal, Volume 1 No. 1, March 2007.

² J. López Martos, "Integrated water management", Presented at the 3rd MELIA Workshop. Istanbul, November 2008.

³ M. Scoullou and B. Tomasini, "Handbook on freshwater in the Mediterranean", GWP-Med&MIO-ECSDE, Athens, 2003.

⁴ Project INCO-CT-2004-509158 "Nostrum-DSS", Deliverable D6-5, "Thematic Report on Governance for IWRM".

⁵ Directive 2000/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2000 establishing a framework for Community action in the field of water policy.

⁶ Directive 2000/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2000 establishing a framework for Community action in the field of water policy.

⁷ N. Riveill, "Assessment of FP 4, 5 and 6, research projects on water management in the Mediterranean Area", EC-RTD General Directorate Report.

⁸ Project MELIA, INCO-CT-2006-517612 (<http://www.meliaproject.eu>) "Conceptual frame on Water technologies".

⁹ Project INCO-CT-2004-509158 "Nostrum-DSS", Deliverable D6-5, "Thematic Report on Governance for IWRM".

1.3 Challenges to political reform in MENA countries: Autocracy / democracy

by Saloua Zerhouni

Since the 1990s, scholars have been trying to account for the processes of, and prospects for, reform and political liberalization in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). Democratization was the paradigm through which reforms were interpreted. The scholarship analyzed the roles that economic wealth, institutional legacies, the rise of civil society organizations, and other structural factors have played in these attempted processes.

With the endurance of authoritarianism in most of MENA countries, much interest was given to the impediments to democratization and the relevance of democracy to the region. In their studies, scholars suggested a wide array of theses to account for the failure of Arab countries to follow dominant worldwide trends whether in the field of economic or political reform. The Middle East remains behind most other regions in economic development and democratization. Huntington emphasized the role of oil wealth to the vitality of authoritarianism¹, while others point to the incompatibility of democracy and Islamic culture.

In the following, I will first point to some theoretical considerations that should be taken into account while analyzing the processes of reform in MENA countries. Before speaking about the lessons that Arab countries might learn from the Asian Model, I will introduce briefly previous discussions on the relationship between democratization and economic development. Finally, I will present some recommendations.

THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS

During the past two decades, most Arab countries engaged in processes of political and economic reform. Democratic openings have been associated with various variables for each case study in the region (the nature and evolution of the state, levels of socioeconomic

development, political culture, popular uprising²). Despite the variations in patterns of political change and in the course and nature of political liberalization, it is increasingly clear that the outcome has not been the establishment of democratic regimes. The failure of democratization in the region should not be associated with what some scholars refer to as 'Arab exceptionalism'. It rather relates to a set of factors such as "the interwoven political and economic logic of the governing regimes"³. Politically speaking, the reliance of most Arab authoritarian regimes on selective patronage in order to survive clearly motivates the resistance to diminishing the regime's discretionary power. The economic logic that these regimes adopt creates unemployment and despair, and for some analysts, fuels radicalism in the region. In this context, progressive local actors as well as international forces support authoritarian rulers instead of championing political liberalization.

There are at least two theoretical points that I would like to raise here. First, in order to better understand the processes of change in different MENA regions we ought to start replacing mono-causal accounts (i.e. Islamic culture inhibits democratization or economic development will bring about more political liberalization) with multi-causal explanations. Second, while analyzing these processes, we need to make a distinction between the causes that might bring democracy (how democracy comes into being?) and the factors that keep a democracy stable or the conditions under which democracy thrive. As Rustow once suggested the factors "that keep a democracy stable may not be the ones that brought it into existence"⁴.

There are other theoretical points that need to be considered. When speaking about resistance to democratization in MENA, this ought not to mean that there is a status-quo in the region. The opening up of authoritarian regimes has contributed to introducing some important reforms in the field of human rights and public liberties. There is also more space for political participation especially at the local level and we can also notice the emergence of a freer press and media in general. It seems that the transition paradigm is no longer useful for understanding the changes that are taking place at various degrees in different MENA countries. More recent analyses suggest that the transition paradigm failed to explain and capture the complexities of Arab experiments with democratization. Carothers for example states quite clearly that "the transition paradigm was a product of a certain time, -- the heady early days of the third wave- and that time has now passed."⁵ Moving away from

the transition paradigm is necessary for scholars, democracy activists and policy makers so that they can start thinking of new frameworks and eventually a new paradigm of political change.

DEMOCRATIZATION AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST:

THE CHICKEN OR THE EGG DEBATE

Any discussion about the relationship between democracy and economic development starts by referring to Lipset's influential essay "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy."⁶ Lipset's key thesis is that "the more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances it will sustain democracy."⁷ In his essay, he identified a set of factors notably national income and education as drivers of democratization. To this day, these social determinants remain crucial to democratic prospects. Although there is a debate about whether economic development *causes* democracy, a vast array of studies support Lipset's thesis that economic development *sustain* democracy.

In MENA countries, the relationship between democratization and economic development has been an intriguing question for both scholars and policymakers. Despite the strength of Lipset's thesis, it is clear that the association of democracy with high economic development does not find evidence in Arab countries. The well economically developed Arab states are, with the exception of Kuwait, the furthest from democratization. Higher GNP levels in countries such as UAE, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, do not translate into greater competitive elections and more citizen participation.⁸

The debate about the relationship and the proper sequencing of political and economic reforms resembles that of the 'chicken and the egg', which one came first? Two very different views dominate the debate: The first one gives priority to economic reform and the other one prioritizes political reform. The position of the development community oscillated between the two. From the 1970s through the early 1990s, priority was given to economic reform and authoritarian regimes were considered to be well equipped to carry out this process. By the mid-1990s, the success of some new democracies in carrying out their economic reform had contributed to a change in the position of the development

community. Democracy became the most appropriate context within which economic reform and development could be undertaken.

The lesson that the Middle East can learn from the developmental experience of the past thirty years is that “regime type is too blunt a variable to predict reform or developmental outcome and that no preconception about a correlation between the two is warranted.”⁹

The experience showed that both authoritarian and democratic regimes have the capacity to undertake reform and to guide development. Many authoritarian regimes, such as China, were able to identify their own political success while embarking in a process of economic reform. New democracies, such as the post-communist countries, were able to carry out a comprehensive process of economic reform. Among the MENA countries, Tunisia presents the case of an authoritarian regime that has embraced the developmental logic. Political liberalization was not a precondition for the economic success of this country.

Multivariate analysis of prerequisites of democracy identifies economic development as a powerful factor for a ‘premature’ democracy to survive.¹⁰ However, the nature of the relationship between democracy and economic development suggests that neither is a precondition for the other. That said, economic conditions are not irrelevant, they are important for shaping social forces mobilized for or against political reforms. Even if the stated goal is economic development, most MENA countries have to introduce some measure of political reform. Democracy and economic development are linked in many aspects but their relationship is not deterministic.

LESSONS TO DRAW FROM THE ASIAN MODEL

Transition processes, like developmental processes, are dynamic and not uniform. Transformation processes vary across countries and sectors, and even similar states may follow different paths of reform. That said, the experience of East Asian countries may provide MENA countries with a comprehensive process of reform, a guideline on how to carry out the process of transformation that might bring further development for their countries.

As developed in the literature, the Asian model of democratization shows that the prerequisites for democratic transition are indeterminate. In addition it appears that there is no consensus on the causes of Asian democratization. While some scholars relate democratization to economic development, others argue that there is no significant relationship between the two¹¹. In his study of 18 countries out of the more than two dozen countries on the continent of Asia¹², Lee argued that among the recently democratized countries in Asia, there were more low or middle-income economies (78%) than upper-middle- or high-income economies (22%).

The cultural dimension was also stressed by different scholars in their examination of the causes of democratization. While some findings suggest that 'Asian values', and more precisely Confucianism, are incompatible with liberal democracy (Chong-Min and Doh Chull); others challenge the civic culture argument. Asian culture is remarkably diverse and includes Buddhism, Catholicism, Confucianism and Islam. Within each religion, there are many variations, which makes speaking about 'Asian values' difficult if not very heuristically very problematic. Because of the diversity of 'Asian values', it is very difficult to determine which culture is most conducive to democracy in Asia. Of course the very idea of associating one particular culture with democratic values is very essentialist and essentially outdated. That said, some findings suggest that countries with an Islamic culture seem to have opted for democracy in Asia, a reality that contradicts the worldwide conventional¹³. Lee points to political protest as one of the main causes of democratization in Asia.

From what was mentioned above, it seems that the debates on the causes of democratization in Asia are similar to those raised in the MENA countries. Thus, developmental states that seek to follow the Asian Model have to understand first their own social and economic structures and choose appropriate processes of social and economic transformation. We need to remind ourselves that modernization does not necessarily lead to global homogeneity especially if we take into account political, economic and cultural specificities.

SOME RECOMMENDATIONS

Regional cooperation and integration could be a vehicle for strengthening processes of economic and political reform in MENA countries. The European example of economic and political union since the 1950s is a model to follow and to apply for EU relationships with its neighbors in the south of the Mediterranean.

Transition is not solely an endogenous process, it is also a function of external forces. Skepticism concerning the role of external forces in promoting democracy in MENA countries should be clarified. Democracy had been subordinated to other geostrategic considerations (Algeria, where Islamic fundamentalists would have taken power), or in the absence of external interest in the outcome. The development community should become more concise in stating its policies and goals. If the goal is to establish democracy in the region, then, it should be pursued for its own sake not as a means for achieving economic reform.

The debates concerning democratization and development should become more provocative. A serious reconsideration of what democratization mean and what development is about should be the basis for the development of new frameworks of analysis. Transitions have been understood mainly in terms of regime change towards a Western-style liberal democracy. Arab countries represent a wide variety of cases; the processes of transformation are unique for each country. 'Unique' should not be confused with 'exceptional', the ideal of democracy is relevant to the Middle East. Western writing on the topic should take into account the specific circumstances and severe challenges that Arab countries are faced with. If the experience of East Asian countries was exceptional, paths to democratization differ from one country to the other.

Scholars and policy makers should also rethink the meaning, content and methods of development. There are numerous definitions and conceptions of development¹⁴. Since the Second World War, a multiplicity of labels has been associated with a variety of approaches to development. Despite the efforts undertaken by international forces to implement development, success has at least been disproportionate, both within and between countries. So far, developmentalists failed to capture the reasons behind the limited impact of their programs and approaches.

¹ S. P. Huntington, "The Third Wave, Democratization in the late Twentieth Century", Norman, University of Oklahoma Press, 1991.

² For Sadiki, popular uprisings in the 1980s in Algeria and Jordan provide evidence that democratic transition can be the result of social disorder. See L. Sadiki, "Popular Uprisings and Arab Democratization", in *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 32, No. 1 (2000).

³ E. Bellin, "The Political Economic Conundrum: the Affinity of Economic and Political Reform in the Middle East and North Africa", *Carnegie Papers, Middle East Series*, No. 53 (2004).

⁴ D. A. Rustow, "Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model", in *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 2, No. 3 (1970).

⁵ T. Carothers, "The End of the Transition Paradigm", in *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 13, No. 1 (2002).

⁶ S. M. Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy", *American Political Science Review*, No. 53 (1959).

⁷ Lipset, *op.cit.*

⁸ For Sadiki, Lipset's correlation between high economic performance and democracy is relevant to the extent it explains the unsustainability of competitive or semi-competitive politics in 'the not well' economically developed Arab countries.

⁹ Bellin, *op. cit.*

¹⁰ S. M. Lipset, "The Social Requisites of Democracy Revisited", *American Sociological Review*, No. 59 (1994).

¹¹ J. Lee, "Primary Causes of Asian Democratization: Dispelling Conventional Myths" in *Asian Survey*, Vol. 42, No. 6 (2002).

¹² The first group of countries examined consist of Bangladesh, Indonesia, Mongolia, Nepal, Pakistan, the Philippines, South Korea, Taiwan and Thailand where democratic transition took place between 1986 and 1999. The second group includes Cambodia, China, Hong Kong, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar (Burma), North Korea, Singapore and Vietnam where democratic transitions has yet to appear. Elections held in some of these countries were not democratic.

¹³ J. Lee, "Primary Causes of Asian Democratization: Dispelling Conventional Myths" in *Asian Survey*, Vol. 42, No. 6 (2002).

¹⁴ There is no consensual definition of development. For the past fifty years, different concepts have been used such as 'reconstruction and development', 'economic development', 'empowerment', 'sustainable development' and most recently, 'anti-development' and 'post-modern development'.

1.4 Impact of socioeconomic instability factors on legal and moral rights

by Abdelrahman Tamimi

INTRODUCTION

The term instability refers to uncontrolled socioeconomic fluctuations facing either an individual or a group, and it is strongly linked in a reciprocal cause and effect relationship with legal and moral rights. The purpose of this paper is to shed lights on socioeconomic instability factors that affected the legal and moral rights at national and regional levels, and to investigate how these rights might affect the region development, political, economical and social stabilization. So instability and legal rights are inevitably interdependent.

DEFINITIONS OF THE MORAL AND LEGAL RIGHTS

Legal rights (sometimes also called civil rights or statutory rights) are rights conveyed by a particular polity, codified into legal statutes by some form of legislature (or un-enumerated but implied from enumerated rights), and as such are contingent upon local laws, customs, or beliefs. In contrast, natural rights (also called moral rights or unalienable rights) are rights which are not contingent upon the laws, customs, or beliefs of a particular society or polity. Natural rights are thus necessarily universal, whereas legal rights are culturally and politically relative.

MAJOR TENSIONS

The major tensions are facing the region can be divided into two main categories: the tensions at country level (political and socioeconomic tensions) and tensions which are classified as trans-boundary (regional level) such as; climate change, trans-boundary water management...etc. the domestic tensions have impact on practicing the legal and moral

rights, this impact can influence negatively or positively the entire region in other words can be a constructive factor for cooperation or a reason of conflict.

Tensions at national level

Nature of state

It means the nature of the general legal obligations undertaken by States toward their peoples. Those obligations include both what may be termed obligations of conduct and obligations of result. History of nation-state building in Mediterranean region reveals variation in the level of civilization of the States and in the social structures .

Social equity, justice in food and water access, the human rights protection, the ownership of resources, and the public participation in state building highly depend on the nature and vision of the state; the Islamic values and secular democratic state have different Understanding, these differences lead to different social and political values and rights, which also open the door for social and political conflicts.

Visions of Reform

There are too many visions competing for the future of the region society, despite the diversity of Views and blueprints offered by contending social groups, they can be reduced to two main visions: open market and privatization (risk to access basic needs?), and state based system (poor management and services?)

Fragile states

State-building is an important process in fragile societies. However, conflicting interests and motivations often hamper state-building efforts. At the bottom end of society, local government structures and traditional institutions are often interlinked. It is in this domain that state-building and civil society activities are coming together and are conflicting both

from a civil society point of view as well as from a state-building point of view¹. The state-society relation that is at the basis of state-building is constantly subject to pressures of change. According to theories of state-building, state formation and maintenance involves a long process of bargaining and struggle between the state, groups in society and among these groups – i.e. that effective states are based on an evolving relationship between the state, citizens and among citizens. It is assumed that the underlying notion of state-building reflects questions and challenges in the area of governance, accountability, the role of the state and civil society, the legitimacy of the state and its ability to issue binding rules in a (post) conflict situation with different locations and structures of power.

Socioeconomic tensions

Tensions in the south Mediterranean examines the profound socio-political changes taking place in the region, and the social and political forces behind them.

The following tensions are the major problems under discussion in the south of east Mediterranean these tensions are the main issues have a serious and long term impact the development and entire society stability.

Poverty and shrinking the middle class

Due to the lack of governmental to the education, the reduction of the public sector capacity to create new jobs and increasing the cost of basic needs, in most of the countries of the region the middle class thinned and reduced its capacity to play active role in socioeconomic changes. Additional to that the large gap and bad distribution. The unemployment problem and the consequent social crisis (poverty, education, health and social polarization – the shrinking or the virtual disappearance of the middle class).

Unplanned rapid urbanization

The rapid urbanization process in most of the countries is an output of mismanagement of land use, immigration from rural areas to the cities, and bad of service distributions. The major results of the urbanization (swelling) are: creation of large cities with poor services and forming several marginalized poor areas within the cities, most of Arab countries become a single city country.

Population growth and structure of the demographic pyramid

The population growth And the structure of demography are the major obstacles for future development, market in MENA countries are worrisome. Within this context, the unemployment rate is much higher for new entrants to the labour market, for the young, and for the educated people. According to the result of ILO annual "World Employment Report 2004-2005," current job creation is not enough to absorb all of those seeking work in MENA countries. It is obvious that the job creation is a major problem in the region. In this respect, the critical question is, will relatively high economic growth be able to create enough jobs for the rapid growing young population? It is estimated that in the next decade the expansion of MENA's labour force will be the highest in the world. According to the World Bank's Report, in the next two decades the labour force will be expanding by close to 80 million new workers. For this reason, MENA countries have to "create 100 million new jobs by 2020, essentially a doubling of the current level of employment." The main challenge for the MENA region will be to address the unemployment situation, particularly the high unemployment among youths.

The deep poverty and the gap between people affordability and services cost lead to deprive the poor people from basic legal and moral rights for human development access to sufficient water regarding quality, quantity and economy is vital. A human rights approach to development is one of which: putts people first and promotes human centred- development, stresses liberty, equality and empowerment. Recognizes the inherent dignity, promotes gender equity and promotes equal opportunities and choices for all. Also, promotes mutual

respect between peoples as a basis for justice and conflict prevention at national and regional level.

The gap between the socioeconomic changes and adaptation policies

Social change is regarded as an adaptive response to some tension within the social system. When some part of an integrated social system changes, a tension between this and other parts of the system is created, which will be resolved by the adaptive change of the other parts. An example is what sociologists have called cultural lag, which refers in particular to a gap that develops between fast-changing technology and other slower-paced sociocultural traits. Lacking the capacity for adaptation sometimes harms the moral and legal rights of the people such as (access to water and food, genderetc.)

Degradation of land and desertification

The core challenge of this tension is how to reduce the socioeconomic impact such as Immigration, human security and access to food ...etc. Social processes are universally acknowledged to be important –social groups have been identified in dual roles as agents and victims of desertification and the socio-economic factor is known to influence the ways in which a territory's production bases are affected and how quality of life there is jeopardized by the expansion of poverty

Due to the failures of government to adapt policies to protect the land and take the measure to reduce the impact of desertification, the people basic rights to have food security become at risk.

Brain drain and lack of scientific research

The migration of scientists, disenchanted by factors ranging from a lack of investment in research to social and political instability in the region, is threatening the future

technological and scientific development of region. Several studies found that political, economic, social and personal factors are to blame for the brain drain. These include the slow development in south countries, a failure to make adequate use of new technologies in the productive sector, low salaries, and the relative lack of opportunities for scientific research.

In many cases the property rights, the dignity of scientist and the freedom of research are not will protected in other words; in most of developing countries moral rights of professional people not practiced and no appreciation for achievement.

Social polarization

One of the central findings of the project funded by EU (Polarization and Conflict) establishes an important link between economic discrimination of ethnic or social groups and the occurrence of war, emphasizing both economic and social polarization as key elements bringing violent conflict, conditioned by the existing political institutions. Additionally, research has indicated that polarization and the subsequent risk of conflict are maximized when society is split into two equally sized groups. This applies to distributions of income, as well as to ethnic, religious or ideological divisions within a society.

Rising expectation

The term revolution of rising expectations was used to describe the hope of the new generations for a better future. Tension is likely when, after a long period of rising expectations accompanied by a parallel increase in their satisfaction, a downturn occurs. When perceptions of need satisfaction decrease but expectations continue to rise, a widening gap is created between expectations and reality. That gap eventually becomes intolerable and sets the stage for rebellion against a social system that fails to fulfil its promises.

Psychological changes

That means what people desire most and least from one side and what powers that advance or frustrate the desire from the other side. The desires can be facilitated or obstructed by powers – corporations, economic institutions, social institutions, science and technology, religion, the law, and world events. Tension arises from failing to satisfy desires.

Tensions at regional level

Within the context of socioeconomic and political context the following are topics can have a huge impact on practicing the legal and moral rights, and this impact can be spread out to region or the world:

- Displacement and eviction (including urban migration/rural)
- Environmental degradation/climate change (Climate change is increasingly been called a 'security' problem, and there has been speculation that climate change may increase the risk of violent conflict). Several researchers integrate three disparate but well-founded bodies of interest – on the vulnerability of local places and social groups to climate change, on livelihoods and violent conflict, and the role of the State in development and peacemaking, to offer new insights into the relationships between climate change, human security, and violent conflict².
- Gender and tenure/inheritance
- Land reform
- Privatization of land and public services
- Islamic tools & techniques
- Discrimination and demographic manipulation
- Governance

In Mediterranean historically and in people's collective consciousness, land and landed culture are the source of some of the oldest forms of human production and social values: agriculture, religion, dignity, social solidarity, cultural identity and arts. At the same time, land has been the object of conflicts and wars. Recently land has become a subject of conflicts and disputes because of its exchange value and embedded resources, such as the oil, as agricultural land and as a geopolitical vantage. Such tension and policies are degrading lives and livelihoods for land-based people. Moreover, where privatization has dispossessed farmers and concentrated land ownership in fewer hands, the pretext of greater productivity has backfired, reducing increasing dependence on importation to compensate the consequence drop in food security. In this regard, there are several new effective factors that are affected the region peoples' identities, moral systems, cultures and economies, and this time because of the dramatically changing relationship with their lands. For instance, the disorganized misuse of local and international power, neoliberal development policies, evictions and displacements, industrialization and the rampant privatization of public goods and services are mortgaging the future of the peoples. This is reflected mainly in the ethnical conflicts and civil wars that are the symptoms of deeper competition over the land. Despite the social need and function of land, and water the "human right to land" remains a relatively virgin field in the human rights literature, isolated instead to popular claims of indigenous peoples and the peasant social movements or reduced to a singular legal dimension as relates to the right to property. The region needs a more-responsible local and international discourse on the land and water aspects of ongoing and prospective conflicts. Common is the failure to address the material dimensions and consequences, dismissing accumulated resentments characterizing minority-majority (dominant-subordinate) dynamics, accordingly has led to the outbreak of tragic conflict.

A better articulation and appreciation of these material dimensions of conflict could lead to preventive and remedial measures; whereas, rights to land and public resources are central to the cause and resolution of such conflicts. Land rights, particularly in the context of region's developing countries, are inextricably linked with the right to food, the right to work and a bundle of other recognized human rights. In many instances, the right to land is bound up with a Community's identity and livelihood. The following points outline the contributions that could bring to the efforts globally to pose solutions to current and prospective problems

to affective Access to land and water. (Whether the inter-state and sub-national tensions over trans-boundary waters will lead to greater conflict or increased cooperation remains a hotly debated issue. Most work on the subject situates trans-boundary water conflict and trans-boundary water cooperation at opposing ends of a continuum.)

- Meet the growing need to confront encroaching privatization and State deregulation, particularly of the public goods and services with moral force and legal authority;
- Address the corresponding need for rights-based arguments against avaricious international policies that augur a future of severely restricted access to land and water, with gravely damaged environmental and climatic systems;
- Bring to light the role of State and civil society in posing alternatives to the deterioration of the agricultural land, particularly under the privatization of water and absence of legal land tenure guarantees;
- Reinforce the compatible activities and attempts to improve policies affecting land tenure as a measure of combating poverty
- To provide opportunities for the international Human Rights System, including its political and implementation bodies, to call the international community to be more consistent with the States' obligations to respect, protect and fulfil the right of constituent peoples to self-determination, particularly concerning access to and social functions of public resources;
- Reinforcing legal and other human rights efforts to develop norms on the human right to land (or human rights dimensions of land), applying generally; to assist in the further development and application of methodologies for monitoring land and water rights (consistent with, but beyond the human rights-voided MDGs), including the development of economic indicators to quantify the poverty-deepening consequences of land and water rights violations;
- Supporting the human rights treaty bodies in monitoring the implementation of State obligations

CONCLUSION

Political and socioeconomic tensions have a big impact on the ability of people to practice their legal and moral rights; however this impact can spread out to be regional or global impact. Legally and morally deprived societies are more vulnerable for internal social conflicts and instability which can affect the entire region such as communities have lack of access water, they unwilling to share water management with others. However, the legal and moral rights are integral with general human rights and depend on each other: the realization of other human rights, such as the right to food, the right to adequate housing, the right to gain a living by work, and the right to take part in cultural life also depend on access to adequate water and sanitation.

¹ D. De Boer, S. Pfisterer, "Peace, Security and Development in the Era of Globalization. The Integrated Security Approach viewed from a Multidisciplinary Perspective", Maastricht school of Management, 2009.

² J. Barnett, N. Adger, "Climate change, human security and violent conflict", Political Geography, Vol. 26, No.6 (2007).

1.5 Europe: Alternatives

by Bahri Yilmaz

THE BARCELONA PROCESS / EURO-MEDITERRANEAN PARTNERSHIP (EMP) / UNION OF MEDITERRANEAN (UFM): FAILED OR NOT? WHAT WENT WRONG?

The Barcelona Process / Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) / Union of Mediterranean provide foreign policy instruments in order to handle the southern neighbourhood of the European Union. The EMP aims at creating an area of peace, stability and prosperity in the region. This massive, eastern-oriented enlargement induced the European Commission to introduce a Wider Europe - European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) to establish a secure and coherent neighbourhood along its new borders in the east and south.

Although the ENP aims at including both the eastern and southern dimensions of European neighbourhood, empirical data show that the pro-eastern policy preferences of the newly admitted member states along with Germany cause the ENP to move closer to the east at the expense of the South, therefore negatively affecting the present and the future of the EMP.

Besides Turkey and perhaps Israel, the rest of the non-member Mediterranean countries have no hope of being full members of the EU. Therefore, it is expected they will hesitate or reject introducing the domestic reform measures imposed by the EU. This vicious cycle may be partly broken by the EU through more generous financial assistance from the EU budget for MPCs.

Maruell Asseburg pointed¹ out in her article correctly that because of two reasons the emphasized principle of co-ownership of the Barcelona Process (consultation and decision making among equal partners) cannot operate efficiently and therefore may have to face two main difficulties: firstly, it is not the easiest way to cooperate as an equal partner on the same ground; if one of them is the donor country another one is the recipient country. In other words, there is a remarkable imbalance between the EU/27 and only 10

Mediterranean states concerning their negotiation power. This means that EU institutions are playing a dominating role in the reshaping of relations between what are in fact two unequal partners.

They prefer to cooperate in the ownership-principle: "The EU should acknowledge each nation's modernisation priorities and generally support their implementation instead of issuing instructions for reform." The empirical results show that most of the MPCs have a comparative advantage and possess international competitiveness in the primary products and labour intensive commodities. In contrast, the EU15 has remarkable comparative disadvantages in these two production groups.

Under these circumstances, if the EU would continue to protect its unproductive and uncompetitive sectors, especially agricultural products, against non-member countries, a fruitful and beneficial economic cooperation between EU members and the MPCs cannot be established and if trade liberalisation between two partners would only be based on industrial products, the EU will be the main beneficiary and gain enormous benefits of trade liberalisation and establishing of the Free Trade Area in the region in 2010.

The EU presidency is the same presidency of the EMP and the EU Commission can have a great influence on action plans and the distribution of MEDA funds among the EMP. Because of this fact it seems necessary to establish a permanent joint institution with a secretary general or a co-presidency, which should represent interests of both sides. Another important aspect of Euro-Med relations is that the Arab group coordinated by Egypt made clear that they are not interested in seeing any close relationship between reform policies and financial support.

The empirical results show that most of the MPCs have a comparative advantage and possess international competitiveness in markets for primary products and labour intensive (textiles) commodities.² In contrast, the EU15 has remarkable comparative disadvantages in these two production groups. Under these circumstances, if the EU would continue to protect its unproductive and uncompetitive sectors, especially agricultural products, against non-member countries, a fruitful and beneficial economic cooperation between EU members and the MPCs cannot be established and if trade liberalisation between two partners would only base on industrial products, the EU will be the main beneficiary and gain

enormous benefits of trade liberalisation and establishing of the Free Trade Area in the region in 2010.

The central instruments of European Neighbourhood Policy are bilateral action plans agreed to by the EU and each partner country, which set out an agenda of political and economic reform with short-and mid-term priorities. Financial support then depends, at least on the paper, on the partner countries performance. This approach is also indented to create a “ring of well governed countries” around the EU.

The Arab-Israeli conflict remains a major impediment to closer cooperation particular in the Mashreq. There are several reasons why the unresolved conflict constitutes a serious barrier to improvement of political and economic relations in the region.

Several Arab regimes are continuing to hide behind the conflict with Israel, with the elites in power rejecting internal reforms by pointing to the state of the war and conflict. Therefore, authoritarian rulers in the southern Mediterranean region show little interest in the implementation of political and economic reforms. The ongoing conflict legitimises the authoritarian regimes and a continued misallocation of resources. None of the Euro-Med policies such as ENP or the Mediterranean Union introduces any instrument for conflict resolution or conflict management.³

The South-South cooperation that Barcelona process aimed can not be realised due to unresolved Western Sahara conflict. The Agadir Agreement established a free trade zone between Egypt, Morocco, Jordan and Tunisia in 2004 have not increased the trade flows significantly. The EU remains the most important trade partner of nearly all its southern Mediterranean neighbours.

WHAT ARE ALTERNATIVES FOR EUROPE? PARTNERSHIP WITH WHOM?

The Role of the USA in the region⁴

The USA is a closer allies and protector the state of Israel in the region. Another important policy aim of the Washington is to protect the energy sources and supply of oil produced in

the Arab - OPEC countries, including the Gulf States, Saudi Arabia and now Iraq (besides Libya and Algeria). US leadership supports Israel militarily and economically without any restrictions and is only interested in security matters and fighting against anti-terrorist activities. Washington's strategy to sustain its dominance of Middle East/Eastern Mediterranean region rests on two pillars: maintaining the uninterrupted flow of Middle East' energy resources to the U.S - Atlantic Alliance and preventing any single power or constellation of hostile powers from the dominating region.

The USA and the EU agree that democratic transformation of the Arab world or wider Mediterranean region should be implemented. But they are two different approaches for resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict. Occasionally, American and Israeli commentators claim that only democratic states can make peace; it would be premature, therefore, to resume serious peace efforts in the Middle East reforms in the Middle East unless major Arab states turn democratic.

The American and European approaches can be described as follows: the USA tend to cite the democratic deficits of governments that oppose Western interest in the region and threaten them with punitive measures, sanctions and may be even the possibility of an externally imposed regime change by using military force such as in Iraq.

European policy makers will likely try to support reform minded forces within the countries in question and nudge existing regimes towards the path to reform through dialogue, material support and forms of conditionality. In other words, European aims at democratization and regional economic co-operation, the establishment of a free trade zone, regional security cooperation. The US debate, in contrast, all too often ignores the centrality of the Arab-Israeli conflict and peace process in the region.

As the flagship of the Atlantic alliance in the EU, the British government will continue to cooperate with Washington in order to establish security and to foster modernization in the region.⁵

India and the Middle East and Mediterranean region (WEST ASIA)⁶

The exceptionally fast growth of big economies like China and India has resulted in a new found interest in the economic and political consequences of this growth for the Middle East.

India has intensified its economic and political relations with the Middle East through the so-called 'Look West' policy. As a result of this new strategy the interest of India mainly focused on Gulf States and increased its trade volume rapidly. India became the second largest trade partner of Gulf Cooperation Council after the USA. It is estimated that 4 million guest workers from Indian are working in the Gulf States and most of them are unqualified labour force. The remittances of Indian workers from the Gulf region amounted around US\$ 24.6 billion which is equivalent 3.1% of India's GDP. In addition to trade and energy, India has become interested in cooperation on information technology, education, culture and tourism. India signed an agreement on military cooperation with Oman. India heavily depends on import of oil and natural gas from the region and two-third of its energy import originates from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iran and Iraq. Due the rapid economic growth of Indian economy, the demand for energy will increase in the coming years.

Besides the traditional good economic and political relations to the Arab world India has also continuously intensified its relationship with Israel and officially opened diplomatic relations with Tel Aviv in 1992. India has been keenly interested in strategic partnership between USA, Israel and India. It is obvious that for Indian government in the relations with Israel security matters come first. India wanted to buy the Israeli antimissile system Arrow but due to Washington's objections it was not purchased. Furthermore Israel and India extended their cooperation to the IT, Bio and Nanotechnology, space and satellite research activities.

India follows a double strategy toward the countries in the region. In spite of importance of the region and various foreign policy initiatives taken by Indian governments until now there is not any indication that India shows a great interest in democracy building, the support of civil society, the rule of law, and human rights in the Middle East and Mediterranean region. India follows a low profile policy in the region and West Asia does not play an important role in the Indian foreign policy.

China and the Middle East and Mediterranean region⁷

China has a massive interest in stability of Middle East because of two main reasons: Firstly, economic reasons: In relations of China to the Gulf States, Saudi Arabia and Iran the energy security is playing a dominating role. China is strongly depended on imports of oil from the Middle East. Another reason why China intensified its economic relations with the region is to export its consumption and investment goods to the region and to increase its share in construction activities. In 2006, around 80,000 Chinese workers were employed in the region. Contrarily, China is an attractive investment destination for Gulf States' petro-dollars. Israel exported military equipment to China in 1990s but it had to officially stop those following pressure of the US government in 2003.

As far as foreign policy is concerned, Beijing has three basic objections: The recognition of "one-China Principe" by partner countries; China is advocating the principals of sovereignty and non-interference in order reduce the pressure of internal reforms put from outside and to defend itself against accusations of human rights violations and the repression of almost 20 million Muslims living in the province Xinjiang. Obviously it will try not being involved in any discussion on the democratization process and human rights issue in the region.⁸ Beijing has recognised the security and military interest and the role of USA in the region. Even in the case of the American invasion of Iraq, Beijing hesitated to make official and harsh critics to Washington. It means that Chinese government is aware of the limits of its political capabilities; especially the decision makers in Beijing know its own dependency on the USA for the security of oil transportation from Middle East to China. As a matter of fact, they will avoid any military confrontation with the USA.

THE SPECIAL CASE OF TURKEY: FUTURE SCENARIOS FOR TURKEY'S INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Scenario I: Full membership

Scenario II: Turkey will not become member of the European Union

- “Accepting Turkey to the EU is out of Question”.
- *Angela Merkel (CDU) German Chancellor, May 11, 2009, in a conference with French President Nicholas Sarkozy*

Option 1: Privileged Partnership:

- Turkey is fully integrated in the European Economic Union but not in the Political Union
- “Turkey should cooperate with the Union in economic and security matters without being full member of the EU. This could happen best within a privileged Partnership.”⁹

Option 2: Member of the Mediterranean Union:

- President Sarkozy originally advanced the idea of a ‘Union of the Mediterranean’ during his election night press conference on 6 May 2007. He later developed the idea at a speech in Tangier on 23 October 2007, according to which just the coastal states of the Mediterranean, including Turkey would aim at a “political, economic and cultural union”¹⁰
- The proposal encountered criticism at the highest levels. Turkey immediately rejected the idea that this might be considered an alternative to acceding to the European Union.

Scenario III: Candidate forever!

- The negotiation process between Turkey and the EU will continue for ever without reaching any final decision.
- “Turkey is not ready for accession; the EU is not ready for Turkey’s accession either. We have the strong a strong interest in avoiding Turkey’s slipping to the East and to religious fundamentalism...”
- “Stopping Turkey’s accession process will be the end of an intelligent policy”¹¹

Scenario IV: No Europe

- Turkey comes closer with the Middle East and strategic partnership with the USA in the security realms.
- In this respect the attention of Turkey’s foreign policy is moving from West over Russia to Middle East.

CONCLUSION

The Single European market is Turkey’s traditional and most important trading partner and Turkey has been predominantly integrated in the EU Market and joined the European Customs Union, without becoming a full member in the EU. The shares of the EU in total export and total import were more or less 50 percent in 2008. Almost 70 percent of FDIs are originating from the EU member states. More than 3 million EU citizens with Turkish background and/or Turkish workers are living in different European countries. Around 4 million European tourists visit Turkey to spend their holidays and thus make a significant contribution to country’s balance of payments.

If we take all these economic relations between Turkey and the EU into account, for the time being and in a foreseeable future, Russia or other countries cannot replace the present EU’s

place in the Turkish economy. Policymakers in Ankara have grown increasingly concerned with diversification of economic relation with the neighbouring countries. The economic relations with other regions will have a complementary character rather than a substitutive one.

No one can know today whether Turkey will ever become a member. Who knows what the EU will look like after 15-20 years? At the same time Turkey could also take an entirely different route from what is now predicted. Perhaps the next generation in Turkey might not want to join the EU, even after all the criteria have been fulfilled.

However, Turkey should bring its "Europeanization process" starting officially in 1839 to a final destination. What we request and expect from the European Union is, the same 'fair chance' that other candidate countries have received in the negotiations process without any prejudices.

¹ M. Asseburg, "Barcelona Plus 10", SWP Comments 55, 2005.

² B. Yılmaz and E. Ö. Öztürk "International Competitiveness and Foreign Trade Specialisation in the Enlarged European Union and MPCs Division of Labour in the Mediterranean Neighbouring Countries and a Comparison with seven new Member Countries, Turkey and the EU 15", Go-EuroMed Working Paper, 2007.

³ M. Asseburg, "European Policies in the Mediterranean and the Middle East"; European Conflict Management in the Middle East: Toward a More effective Approach.

⁴ V. Perthes, "America's Greater Middle East and Europe", SWP Comments (2004); D. Schwarzer and I. Werenfels, "The Union for the Mediterranean: A missed Opportunity, SWP Comments (2008); I. Weipert, "Neue Reformpolitik durch neue Strategien?", Discussion Paper, SWP (2006).

⁵ On March 2005 British Minister of Foreign Affairs stated that "I am determined that the UK play our full part in uniting Europe and United states in a single common purpose, supporting modernization and reform in the Middle East". See "Straw democracy speech full" BBC News, 10 March 2005.

⁶ C. Wagner, "Indien and Westasien: Die vorsichtige Balance" in Regionale (Neu-) Ordnung im Nahen-und Mittleren Osten, SWP (2007).

⁷ G. Wundacker, "China als Akteur im Nahen/Mittleren Osten:Interessen, Instrumente und Ansprüche",in. Regionale (Neu-) Ordnung im Nahen-und Mittleren Osten, SWP (2007).

⁸ H. G. Hilpert, "Asien der Nahe/Mittleren Osten:Wirtschaftliche und Energieinteressen" in Regionale (Neu-) Ordnung im Nahen-und Mittleren Osten, SWP (2007).

⁹ K.-T. zu Guttenberg (CSU), German Minister of Defence, October 28, 2009.

¹⁰ CEPS Policy Brief No: 155 March 2008.

¹¹ G. Westerwelle (FDP), German Foreign Minister, May 5, 2009.

2. Tensions

2.1 *Between conflict and diplomacy in the Mediterranean*

by Roberto Aliboni

INTRODUCTON

The Mediterranean is an area of conflict and prone to conflict, although – as we will see later on in this paper – it is not the most conflict-ridden area when taken on a global scale.

It must be noted that the greater Mediterranean area (for example, the area recently singled out by the Union for the Mediterranean – UfM) is not homogeneous from a conflict point of view. It encompasses diverse and separate areas: despite analogies, the Balkan conflicts are not related to those in the Near East-North Africa (NENA) area; the Maghreb conflicts, while having links to those in the Near East (and the greater Middle East), are fundamentally indigenous and different from them; and finally, the conflicts in the Eastern Mediterranean, the Aegean Sea and Cyprus, are not related (or only tenuously related) to conflicts in the Near East, North Africa or the Balkans.

In this paper, the focus is on the Near East and North Africa (including the Maghreb), that is, the regions that have long been associated to the European Union (EU) first under the umbrella of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) and now in the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP).

Conflicts in the Near East and North Africa have always presented direct and indirect threats and/or risks, i.e. security concerns, for both the international community and the countries in the Mediterranean neighbourhood. From an international perspective – that of the United Nations and the great powers, chiefly the US – security concerns arise more from the area stretching from the Central Mediterranean channel eastward, considered less the Mediterranean and more the Middle East. From the EU perspective, the area in which

security concerns are more relevant is the “Mediterranean”, that is its southern neighbourhood.

It is with respect to this area (encompassing Israel and nine Arab countries, Mauritania, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan, Palestine, Lebanon and Syria – with Libya reluctantly negotiating a position out of the chorus) that the EU undertook a complex and articulated initiative in 1995, the Barcelona process, with a view to changing the root causes of conflicts in the NENA countries and securing order and stability in Europe.

This initiative, while not void of merits, failed to reach its central goals. It has been modified twice, through the ENP and, most recently, the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM). However, the perspectives and results of these new frameworks of Mediterranean governance look as dubious and uncertain as the EMP. Why do EU Mediterranean initiatives fail to establish cooperation and solve conflicts? Why does Mediterranean conflict prove so impervious to diplomacy?

To respond to these questions and try to set out some perspectives and recommendations, we need to address briefly the nature and dynamics of conflict within the Mediterranean area; the EU response in terms of communitarian governance and the factors that have determined the failure of EU initiatives; the emerging dynamics that are altering the Mediterranean context.

CONFLICT IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

International relations, economic development, welfare and domestic order are fundamentally affected by inter-state and intra-state armed or violent conflict. However, they are also significantly affected by non-violent conflict or deprivation rooted in economic (strong inequalities, underdevelopment, poverty), socio-cultural (various kinds of discrimination), environmental (desertification, pollution) and political (authoritarian regimes, failed states) factors. Existing conflicts generate human losses, destruction, economic underdevelopment and insecurity both in the countries concerned, in their neighbourhood and abroad. The stronger and more diffuse the conflict, the stronger and

more diffuse the external implications, spill-over effects, interferences. Hence, the international and regional interest in their resolution (magnified by ever-increasing globalization and international integration) or at least containment (management).

Armed conflicts with external implications are widespread globally, as shown by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP).¹ So are non-violent conflicts that have consequences abroad. The Mediterranean area is no exception, although armed conflict is relatively less important than in other regions according to UCDP data. In 1998-2007 the NENA area did not register any inter-state armed conflict. Intra-state armed conflict is present in the area with two persistent major conflicts (Israel-Palestinians and Turkey-Kurds) in addition to a number of minor conflicts fluctuating over time.

However, these relatively few conflicts are particularly impervious to resolution and the overall potential for conflict – beyond the current conflicts – is very high (states of belligerency; frozen conflicts; unaltered root causes of conflict). Finally, the very important imbalances between the North (EU) and the South of the basin magnify respective security concerns and perceptions; in the North-South perspective, spill-over effects tend to be especially significant and resented.

Besides imbalances in economic conditions, institutional and political imbalances need to be taken into consideration. The root causes prevailing in Mediterranean intra-state conflict (we cannot go into detail here) are: two structural factors, i.e. the “ethnic-cultural make up” of the area (minorities and communities) and the existence of “weak states” (weak legitimacy and/or identity); and two political/cultural factors, i.e. “weak nation states” (weak nation- and democracy-building) and “exclusionary nationalist-ethnic policies”.² These root causes foster important external consequences as they either involve neighbours in conflicts or trigger consequences such as refugees, terrorism, trafficking and other trans-borders crime activities.

THE EU RESPONSE AND ITS WEAKNESSES

There have been both international (UN, great powers, etc.) as well as regional responses to these conflicts. The North-South dualism of the Mediterranean area has stirred a strong and articulated response from the EU in particular. The EU response deserves special consideration from the point of view of the EuroMed30 exercise.

The EU is interested in responding to armed and non-violent conflicts as well as the implications or spill-over effects of both. It responds to existing major conflicts for more specific political reasons and interests (e.g. its historical involvement in the conflict over Palestine; its long-standing engagement towards Turkey and its geopolitical destiny). More in general, the EU responds to other (minor) conflicts and their implications with the aim of preserving its “acquis” and political identity (the stability acquired after fearful continental conflicts; its democratic and liberal regimes; its wealth and welfare). While political interests may vary over time and circumstances, the need to preserve its acquis is a factor that has shaped the entire external policy of the EU after the end of the Cold War, its policies towards central-eastern Europe and the Balkans (enlargement) and its policies towards the Mediterranean.

The EU has evolved less as a political federation than as a community. For this reason, its foreign and security policy is underdeveloped. As a consequence, its responses to major armed conflicts and minor intra-state conflicts in terms of conflict resolution and partly conflict management are weak and limited. In contrast, it has developed notable capabilities in other external policies (including the ESDP) and this has allowed for good responses mostly in terms of conflict prevention and, partly, conflict management.

The EMP and the Barcelona process were mainly responses in terms of conflict prevention, aimed at fostering political reforms and economic development (with a view to contributing sooner or later to conflict resolution as well). Sometimes they proved effective in terms of conflict management. They failed, though, to provide solutions to existing conflicts basically because they reflected the EU’s security needs and perceptions, while neglecting those of the partners (particularly Arab partners) in at least two respects: the EU asked for Israeli-Arab cooperation in the EMP community, while it was unable to contribute significantly and substantively to the solution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict because of its weak CFSP; it

also asked for domestic political reforms which were, however, seen by Arab partners as an unacceptable factor of instability and internal conflict. A security community must assure equal security to all its members; if security is perceived as unequal by members, the community cannot survive. And indeed it failed, so that the EU has been obliged to move from the EMP community-like framework to the ENP's variable geometry of bilateral relations.

ALTERATIONS IN THE EURO-MEDITERRANEAN CONTEXT

The successive shifts from the multilateral EMP community-like approach to the bilateral ENP and, most recently, to the intergovernmental UfM attest to the EU's awareness of the shortcomings of its Mediterranean policies. At the same time, the impression is that the new frameworks are not suitable either: the Southern partners are happy with the ENP which, however, is probably even more unable to generate conflict resolution than the EMP; on the other hand, the UfM's ability to deal with conflict is probably even poorer than the ENP's, as illustrated by the fact that all the UfM was able to do after the Gaza crisis was suspend itself.

Strong tension has thus arisen in the Euro-Mediterranean framework between the conflicts and the diplomacy intended to deal with them. Where do we go from here? To respond to this question, the changes that have taken place in the Euro-Med context in the first decade of the new millennium need to be taken into consideration. We can list the most relevant of them very briefly:

- 1) The 2004 EU enlargement and its offshoot, the ENP, substantially modified the EU's Mediterranean perspectives, as well as its policies and objectives. Both had two effects on EU-Mediterranean relations: they decidedly de-emphasized the regional dimension of relations and, conversely, emphasized the bilateral dimension; they upgraded the importance of EU Eastern relations with respect to Mediterranean relations. The EU is definitely more concerned with Russia than with the Mediterranean today.
- 2) Just as there are trends shifting EU attention from the Mediterranean to European East, so there are symmetrical trends shifting Mediterranean Arabs' interests towards

the greater Middle East and, more in general, toward global relations. These trends attest to the Arab Mediterranean countries' greater self-reliance and independence from the EU than in the 1990s, when the Barcelona process was set in motion. Their economies' fundamentals have strengthened; the regimes have succeeded in outliving the pressures of the Bush administration; cooperation with the Arab Gulf countries has increased and brought the Arab Mediterranean countries, especially in the Levant, closer to the Middle Eastern core.

- 3) The Mediterranean has become more global economically, with important new actors coming in, such as the GCC countries, China, India (while a full Russian comeback is likely to come soon); this is contributing strongly to diversifying the Arab Mediterranean countries' perspectives with respect to the EU.
- 4) The last factor of change in Mediterranean relations regards the shift in EU security perceptions following the September 11 attacks, the subsequent attacks in Europe and the extraordinary increase in immigration that has taken place since the beginning of this century. Both terrorism and immigration have been securitized all over Europe. While the EU Mediterranean policy has retained its early security driver, namely promoting political and economic reform in the Arab countries with a view to eliminating the causes of spill-overs, there is no doubt that the need to control such spill-overs and domestic security more directly through preventive and forward measures tends to be at least as important as reform promotion today. This is changing the EU's role in the region and the perception of that role by the EU's Southern Mediterranean partners.

The EU's search for security through control creates problems for its neighbours, but it also creates opportunities for cooperation in pursuit of common interests such as the fight against terrorism. In fact, there is more cooperation today than there was at the time of the highly idealistic EMP. But, like previous trends mentioned, this also contributes to a more independent, if not distant, relationship between the EU and its Mediterranean partners, as it attests to an intergovernmental rather than any community-like perspective.

A FORWARD-LOOKING PERSPECTIVE

To make cooperation possible in Euro-Mediterranean relations, a politically more effective EU would be required. The lingering weakness of the EU as an international political actor not only prevented the EMP's goals from materializing but reinforced opposing trends. In fact, while trends towards renationalization are strengthening in the EU, so are trends towards intergovernmental relations in Euro-Mediterranean relations. This is not to say that Euro-Mediterranean cooperation is lacking, but its substance is a long way away from what the EU expected in the mid-1990s: from communitarian to intergovernmental; from multilateral to bilateral; from regional to global; from EU-centric to polycentric, with new powerful actors on the stage.

Against this backdrop of tension between conflict and the diplomacy carried out by the EU in the past fifteen years, it would be a mistake to try to reform or improve that diplomacy. Entirely fresh diplomatic avenues, more in tune with new trends, have to be pursued instead.

First of all, in an environment in which the emerging drivers are apparently international, intergovernmental and global in character, while the EU may still affect a good policy of conflict prevention on its own and in the ENP framework, diplomacy to solve conflicts should be based primarily on efforts to strengthen effective multilateralism at the regional and global level. In this sense, the UfM must be reinforced and made more effective, relations with the Arab League should be strengthened, the role of the United Nations in the region should be enhanced and the web of international conventions and agreements magnified and strengthened. Also, the role of transatlantic cooperation in the Mediterranean must be reconsidered.

Second, the EU members should agree on reinforcing and expanding the internal and external dimensions of the Justice, Freedom and Security area, attenuating if not replacing the members' bilateral approaches, which would reinforce the EU's role. They should also adopt a more liberal approach on immigration, coupling stronger police cooperation with a generous EU policy towards refugees. Today, cooperation is developing mostly bilaterally (with regard to terrorism): this needs to be preserved, yet it has to be channelled by the EU (that is de-nationalized).

Third, the new actors should be regarded as opportunities rather than only as competitors. The EU should look at them and globalisation as factors that can enhance effective multilateralism and help solve conflicts regionally. Here again, a revamped transatlantic cooperation would be important.

Fourth, the Mediterranean format should become more flexible and open; on the one hand, EU policies should take the Levant's strong links with the Gulf into account; on the other hand, demands for a more particular bond between the EU and the Maghreb should not go unheeded.

¹ UCDP is a data base, whose results are regularly published in the SIPRI Yearbook. See L. Harbom and P. Wallensteen, "Patterns of major armed conflicts, 1998-2007", Appendix 2A to chapter 2 in SIPRI Yearbook 2008, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, (2008); Appendix 2B provides UCDP's definitions, sources and methods for the conflict data.

² R. Aliboni and P. Miggiano, "Conflict and Its Sources in the Near East and North Africa: A Conflict-Prevention Perspective", Kurasat Istratijiya, No. 81, Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies Cairo (1999) and, for the conceptual background M. E. Brown, "The International Dimension of Internal Conflict", MIT Press (1996).

2.2 *Self reliance - dependency*¹

by Sébastien Abis

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Agricultural and rural development and sustainable development are related in the Mediterranean region, where the population is continuing to grow on land that is struggling to feed it. In 2007 and 2008, the world rediscovered the strategic importance of agriculture in connection with two matters of major concern – the ability to feed a steadily growing global population and the difficulty in guaranteeing sustainable outputs in a context of accelerating climate change and depletion of natural resources. The Mediterranean region is no exception to this universal agricultural concern. Indeed it is a precipitate of all of the tensions surrounding agriculture and, more specifically, its role in rural areas, which are still densely populated but also poorly developed in most Mediterranean countries.

Climate constraint (water scarcity, land limitations, variability in temperature...) have always been features of Mediterranean agricultural systems, which have developed ingenious production systems for coping with them and adapting. Today, the resilience of these systems is being put to the test, since climate change will lead to different conditions for food production throughout the region, which may also eventually affect regional food consumption. Since all regional climate models agree on classing the Mediterranean region as one of the most severely affected by climate change in the world, attempts to assess the future of Mediterranean food production must consider the complex interaction of the factors determining the use of land and water, the choice of crops, and social dynamics. Changes in climate also modify the environment and water resources, which in turn have an impact on food production. More frequent and severe droughts are known to aggravate the risks of land degradation, soil loss and desertification. In per capita terms, relative water scarcity will increase in the Mediterranean basins, including those where water systems are already under intense stress.

Provisions of water, land and energy in Mediterranean are quite variable. When it comes to these subjects, the increasing contrasts and disparities should be carefully considered. Self reliance may be called an outdated concept given this reasoning mainly concerns the Mediterranean basin, and because the dependencies keep worsening at medium term. Dependencies towards other parts of the world in order to provide food security, towards the Mediterranean countries or even the Euro-Mediterranean region since multilateralism and transnational cooperation are the key elements to meet the increasing challenges on natural resources.

A REGIONAL CONTEXT UNDER PRESSURE

It may be useful briefly to remind ourselves why agriculture and food are such key strategic issues in the Mediterranean area. Several things in combination demonstrate why agriculture is a real geopolitical issue in this region.

Demographic trends and rural livelihoods

In 2030 demographic growth will lead to the requirement to feed some 550 million souls in the region. Presently, some 40 per cent of the concerned populations in the Southern Mediterranean area still live in rural areas. As the Mediterranean is becoming increasingly urban, the ratio of the rural population to the total is steadily in decline. However, under the effect of demographic growth, the rural world is not being depopulated in the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean Countries (SEMCs). Despite the population exodus, the rural world will increase in absolute value, mainly in the East of the basin (Egypt).

Furthermore, we can also expect dramatic socio-demographic mutations in coastal regions from Agadir to Istanbul. Uneven development of rural areas in the south of the Mediterranean. Indeed, a major obstacle in some countries is the stark difference in development between the rural hinterlands (lack of access to clean water, poor education, inadequate health services and inadequate infrastructure) and the coastal towns which are open to globalisation. We need to bear in mind the sheer scale of this division which leads at one and the same time to migration, frustration and new symptoms of radicalization in

societies which are split between urban populations increasingly tied in to the standards of modern life (despite the poverty prevalent in the suburbs), and rural populations who are often forgotten by their governments, scratching out a miserable existence unchanged for a century or more.

Agro-economic situation

Agriculture is still an important part of the national economies of the SEMCs (12% of GDP on average and peaking at 15 to 20% in Egypt, Morocco and Syria), in which two forms of agriculture exist side by side: on the one hand there are high-output agrifood enterprises that are fully integrated into the globalisation process, on the other hand, there are a vast number of small-scale family operations. One-third of the active labour force (some 35 million people) works on agriculture.

Inequalities are also apparent in the Mediterranean agricultural and agrifood trade. The EU's share of the world's agricultural imports has remained stable but its share of exports has risen substantially over the past 40 years. Precisely the opposite trend has been observed in the SEMs. They went from being net exporters in the sixties to net importers in the seventies. The agricultural trade balance of the SEMs continued to deteriorate during this period, which at a time when the price of agricultural raw materials was soaring, inevitably caused problems. It must be emphasised that Algeria, Egypt, and Morocco are actually among the world's 10 biggest wheat importers.

The other feature of Mediterranean agricultural trade is that, while the EU still remains the main trading partner of the SEMCs, the latter are more and more opening up to the outside world, as was shown by the 2004 trade figures: that year, 72% of their imports were from outside the European market and 48% of their exports were to other parts of the world.. The market is subject to a constant change, with the rising influence of Brazil, Ukraine, Canada and Australia- and of course the 'agricultural' presence of the United States.

Environmental issues

A series of ecological and political events linked to the many effects of global warming have particularly affected the Mediterranean. The first signs include an increase in extreme meteorological events, the spread of deserts, a growing competition for scarce water resources and the degradation of the natural environment. These phenomena make more complex the already vulnerable situation of Mediterranean agriculture; it finds itself having to try to square the circle of increased and better quality production, while at the same time trying to conserve natural resources.

But of course, the main source of tension in the Mediterranean Region today is the “blue gold”. Water is very unevenly distributed there and the overall amount of it is diminishing. Today half of the world’s “water-poor” population (having less than 1000m³/inh/year) is to be found in the Mediterranean region, which has only 3% of the planet’s water resources and is home to 7% of its population. Of the total resources, 75% are to be found on the Northern shore (southern Europe and the Balkans), 13% in the Middle East (10% in Turkey alone) and just 10% in the Arab countries on the Southern shore. In a context where agriculture already absorbs about 80% of water resources in SEMCs- and a fair amount of it is lost due to lack of efficient water distribution systems - there is a growing and significant gap between the affluent and the poor in terms of access to water. In these countries, much more than in Europe, water quality has become a factor in social discrimination. Nearly 30 million Mediterraneans, 7% of the total population of the basin, have no access to a potable water source. Rural populations, who tend to be poor, are often the first to be faced with this enormous problem.

Whereas the chemical and biological properties of soils mainly depend on the nature of the bedrock (dolomites, limestone, etc.), the climate, vegetation and anthropic activities are also clearly factors which influence soil formation. Soil depth, on the other hand, is attributable to climate, since high temperatures and low humidity considerably reduce the bedrock degradation process. Due to the aridity of certain Mediterranean countries, considerable expanses of soil are highly improbable, prohibiting any form of agriculture. In Algeria, Jordan, Libya and Egypt, for example, the acreage of arable land accounts for less than 5% of the total area of the country, compared to 34% in France and 29% in Italy. This aridity is

compounded by the problem of gradient: half of Turkey is at an altitude of over 1000 m, for instance, and half of Spain over 600 m; over 80% of the land in Albania and Slovenia is mountainous.

So, all in all, a large proportion of the land in the Mediterranean region is subject to major natural constraints, which are an obvious obstacle to agriculture, and the land gap between the northern and southern shores is very real. The Northern Mediterranean countries with their areas of arable land and permanent crops that are greater in both absolute and relative terms, have an obvious advantage. But circumstances can evolve, and some countries – Egypt and Syria in particular – have improved new areas of land with a view to turning them into agricultural land.

However, population growth is reducing the per capita acreage of arable land and making it imperative to increase productivity in order to offset this drop in ratio. Moreover, the duality of agricultural landscape is intensifying. The increase in numbers of microfundia practising subsistence farming is a reality. These small farmers are unable to compete and are extremely vulnerable when agricultural markets open up. They have no access to the urban markets in coastal areas. These small farms are cohabiting with large-scale agro-firms.

Changes in food and consumption patterns

Since the end of the twentieth century, the Mediterranean diet has been officially recognised by the World Health Organization (WHO) as the world's foremost food model. UNESCO has recently been preparing to place the Mediterranean diet on its list of Intangible Cultural Heritage. But there is a paradoxical situation: as the Diet tends to be acknowledged all over the world, it is a pity to notice that it is also in decline.

And yet, for some years now we have been witnessing a radical change in Mediterranean consumption patterns. The region is more and more suffering from dietary disorders, which on the southern shore go hand in hand with economic development and the urbanisation of society. We are seeing a deterioration in the quality of food, leading to an increase in overweight and obesity, particularly among young people (in the Maghreb, 20% of the

under-fives are obese). This particular form of malnutrition is becoming a serious public health issue. It would therefore be as well to clearly state the points at issue in the debate on Mediterranean food, for a distinction must be made between food security (food in sufficient quantities) and food safety (food that is fit to eat). Compared to countries in other southern areas (sub-Saharan Africa in particular), the SEMCs does not face serious under-nutrition, which affects nearly 10 million people. Nevertheless, it is very important to underline that with both financial and food crisis, it is within the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) that the percentage of undernourished people has increased the most in the world. On the other hand these countries are severely hit by food-related diseases (of microbial or dietary origin), which are responsible on average for 55% of death, compared with 35% in other developing areas.

At this point the boom in major retailing and distribution emerges as the backdrop to all of these issues. Over the past fifteen years major retailing has become firmly established in countries to the south of the Mediterranean. The situation in the Maghreb speaks volumes, in that a landscape with no large shopping centres has now been replaced with an urban environment built up around increasingly attractive retail outlets. This phenomenon is due in part to the rise of an urban middle class, in tune with modern consumption habits, and the relative increase in populations' standards of living.

INCREASING TENSIONS AND NEW EMERGING CHALLENGES

Water scarcity

In order to get around water scarcity, the people of the Mediterranean developed efficient systems of water engineering, which they used mainly for watering their crops. But it was in the 20th century that irrigation was most developed, at least in terms of covered areas. This revolution in hydraulics, which was based on a supply policy, i.e. a policy of using a variety of facilities (such as dams, pipelines, etc.) to mobilise water, came about in various political and economic contexts.

In Europe (France, Italy, Spain), the massive recourse to irrigation is to be explained by the Common Agricultural Policy and its productivity slant. The SEMCs based their independence on efforts to acquire food autonomy by launching major water engineering schemes designed to boost agriculture in an arid environment. This was the case in particular in Egypt, Syria and Morocco, where agriculture is often inconceivable without irrigation. Turkey has lagged far behind in this field but is now catching up with its programme for developing south-east Anatolia involving the eventual construction of 21 dams to irrigate 1.7 million hectares with water from the Euphrates and the Tigris.

This dependence on irrigation is confirmed in the SEMCs, given their more arid climate. This need for irrigation is clearly illustrated when water supply is divided into blue water (surface or groundwater supplied by irrigation) and green water (precipitation water that is absorbed directly by the plant): in the southern and eastern Mediterranean countries with the exception of Turkey the share of blue water by far exceeds the share of green water, unlike the situation in the northern Mediterranean countries, where blue water accounted for 17% of agricultural water demand in 2005 and green water 83%. Global warming entails considerable uncertainty for the years that lie ahead: although the intensity of its effects on sea water temperature has not yet been measured precisely, it is bound to affect the profile of animal populations.

Irrigation is no doubt reaching its limit after years of rapid development. And water scarcity reduces the capacity of agricultural production in the SEMCs. The natural resources exploitation index (the ratio between the volumes abstracted and the renewable water resources available) gives a worrying indication of the pressure that now weighs on water resources. Most of the SEMCs have an exploitation index of over 50%, for instance, but it is the situation in the east of the basin that is reason for the greatest concern. With the exception of Lebanon and Turkey, both of which have water resources, the indexes are already very high (over 75%) and, to judge by trend scenarios, are liable to rise further. These quantitative limits are compounded by signs of deterioration in water quality. The increase in the volume of water abstracted from groundwater aquifers, for example, makes these aquifers more sensitive to marine intrusion. This is the case in particular in coastal regions such as islands, especially in Cyprus.

Trends point to ever greater pressure on water resources in the Mediterranean Region, which calls for a shift from supply-based to demand-based management, with inevitable changes in water charging practice. Distribution of the resource between different sectors is also likely to be a problem in the future, in that there will be growing competition for water between agriculture, households and industry. It would also be as well to examine the ecological, and therefore the economic cost of transferring the water required to produce agricultural products (so-called virtual water), to which some countries, relying entirely or almost entirely on exports, clearly give insufficient attention at a time when resources are running out.

The context of growing shortages in part of the region and the uncertainty in connection with climate change make it all the more necessary to adapt water management and sectorial policies, to manage the various uses of water more efficiently, and to use resources more economically and to optimal advantage in order to meet the needs of the populations and current and future development needs. From this point of view, irrigated agriculture, which is the primary water consumer, holds the greatest potential for economising water consumption in the Mediterranean region. Of all water consumers in the Mediterranean, irrigated agriculture consumes the largest volume: having to contend with a precipitation deficit and growing export demand and/or demand in the southern and eastern countries, it is one of the main driving forces behind water demand: it accounted for 64% of overall demand (45% in the North and 81% in the South and East). The temperature and rainfall models will increase both quantitative and qualitative pressures on water resources. The Mediterranean region, which is already subject to considerable water stress, is liable to be particularly exposed to a decrease in mobilisable water resources on the three shores (estimated at 10% to 40%) and to an increase in water needs for agriculture. Situations of water shortage and drought would affect the southern and eastern Mediterranean countries more specifically, which is precisely where water needs will increase in the years that lie ahead in order to supply drinking water to the populations as well as water for agriculture. Climate change will make arbitration even more necessary with a view to distributing water resources amongst the various users.

The strategic and prospective analyses carried out by the Mediterranean countries with a view to examining ways and means of developing irrigated acreage and facilitating

arbitration on the distribution of water resources within the agricultural sector or amongst the various sectors of use – thereby integrating environmental needs – must take account of the opportunities provided by developing “non-conventional” water resources such as the reuse of treated waste water.

Land under stress

Over and above the phenomena of eviction from the land, there are many factors which affect the soil: erosion due to gradient, wind, crop-growing practices, heavy rainfall or overgrazing, but also pollution phenomena caused mainly by the massive use of pesticides and fertilisers. The surplus of phosphorus that is released by chemical and organic fertilisers alters the organic and structural balance of the soil. And then there is the process of soil salinisation, which is unfortunately taking on massive proportions on the southern shores.

This is happening because groundwater that is subject to marine intrusion or dam water that is exposed to active evaporation in hot climates, which concentrates the salt content, is used for irrigation. It also happens when irrigated land is not well-drained, since salts then accumulate with time. Erosion and salinisation phenomena can gradually cause soils to lose productivity and can even result in desertification, which is the disappearance of plant cover. This process is said to be affecting 80% of the arid land in the southern and eastern Mediterranean region

Complexity of climate constraints

Climate change in the Mediterranean is one of the most threatening phenomena in a region that is already marked by aridity, and its consequences could prove to be tragic.

This could cause a rise in sea level and an increase in heat waves, which would make the Mediterranean basin one of the regions most affected by global warming. What is more, as far as water supply is concerned, rainfall, which is already scarce in the south and east, is liable to become even scarcer and more sporadic. River discharge could drop, making

agricultural production more difficult. Many rivers in the Mediterranean region are in fact supplied by both snowfall and rainfall: snow cover builds up during the winter and melts in the spring, thus releasing water into the rivers or groundwater aquifers. As temperatures rise winter precipitations could come more as rainfall, thus reducing the layer of snow cover.

As a result, rivers could reach their low-flow levels earlier in the year, thus affecting irrigation schemes. Likewise, there could be more frequent flooding. Rain-fed crops would be the first to suffer from these climate developments due to less frequent and more sporadic rainfall – and these two phenomena are likely to be confirmed, particularly in the Northern and Eastern Mediterranean countries. As regards irrigated crops, higher temperatures could boost metabolism and thus bring better yields, particularly in more temperate zones, but in certain zones where temperatures could become excessive, particularly on the southern and eastern shores, growth could be arrested at crucial stages in plant development. Higher temperatures accelerate the reproduction cycle of insects and fungal parasites. The cycle can even be triggered earlier in the season. As a result, parasite pressure on agriculture is liable to increase. The same goes for animal farming. Furthermore, the trend to climate change can increase animal water and heat stress and multiply zoonoses.

The deterioration in the water situation could be exacerbated by the effects of climate change, which are already being felt. Rainfall, which is already limited on the southern and eastern shores, seems to be becoming rarer and more sporadic. Water stress is all the more worrying since river basins or underground aquifers are sometimes shared by rival countries. Water management policy is indeed a major issue in the Mediterranean, in the basins of the Jordan, Euphrates, Tigris and Nile. In the absence of binding international water law, and in a context of water stress, cooperation is the only way to facilitate access for as many people as possible to drinking water and irrigation water.

New challenges on rural areas

There are three determining factors in the complex equation of Mediterranean rural areas.

- 1) A factor constantly observed – growing regional distortion between coastal cities that have opened up to the world and benefit from both public policies and private structuring investments on the one hand and rural areas on the other, which are often enclaved and do not feature in national development priorities. This gap between urban and rural worlds cannot be conducive to development or stability in the Mediterranean basin.
- 2) A challenge – that of rural regions, where farming is still the primary activity. It is thus absolutely imperative to optimise agricultural performance in terms of both productivity and sustainability. But the agricultural sector alone will not suffice to boost rural development in Mediterranean countries; progress must be made in terms of diversifying jobs and sources of income.
- 3) An unknown factor – that of the geographical direction of migratory flows. In a context where living conditions in cities are becoming harder and many believers in the urban mirage have been disappointed, the circumstances conditioning rural-urban migration are gradually evolving. An inversion of migratory flows is not to be excluded, especially if the professions of the future that are emerging in the rural world are promoted and developed.

Food insecurity

Food security has for obvious reasons long been a political concern in the Mediterranean region. It is now no longer a question of self-sufficiency but of access for populations to foodstuffs, and that access can be ensured through production and/or trade. In the countries in the north of the basin local production contributes largely to supplies, whereas in the SEMCs, with the exception of Turkey, supplies are provided to a very large extent through trade and even in some cases through food aid. The balance of calories produced and calories consumed in each individual country shows that the South needs to use

external supplies to a very large extent in order to reinforce food security. These State-level considerations must not hide the fact that even when adequate supplies of food are available this does not necessarily guarantee that every individual has access to food. That access depends mainly on each individual's economic and social capacity.

It was thought that the risk of food insecurity would decrease at the beginning of this century as the result of trade, at least in this region of the world. But the "hunger riots" which broke out in 2007 and 2008 were an unfortunate reminder of how fragile food supplies still are in certain countries. Egypt and Morocco have been the theatre of uprisings that have revealed the precarious state of affairs, despite the fact that these essentially urban social movements have been limited compared to what has happened elsewhere in the world. Mechanisms for subsidising staple foods are the result of food policy choices intended to secure internal stability: Although these systems have had their weaknesses in certain areas to the extent that uprisings have occurred, they are nevertheless efficient, if costly; the recurrence of crises could eventually become a serious problem, particularly if the agricultural trade balances continue to deteriorate in the SEMCs.

Despite the efforts to modernise farming, output cannot keep pace with the needs of a rapidly growing population, so that the deficits in the South and East are growing. The scarcity of natural resources is aggravating this situation. Cereals account for the largest volumes of imports. This trend is of course connected with dietary patterns in the SEMCs, but also with the fact that developing the share of animal proteins in daily food intake increases cereal needs tenfold (approximately 7 plant calories are needed in order to produce one animal calorie). The North African countries (from Morocco to Egypt) are very dependent on cereal imports: in 2007-2008 they absorbed almost 20% of world wheat imports, whereas they account for only 2% of the world population.

Despite an important decrease in food aid, it must be borne in mind that the SEMCs are very dependent on agricultural imports: they seem to be more in a position to obtain food through trade, but on condition that wide variations in the prices of agricultural commodities do not make those commodities inaccessible for the most vulnerable countries. The main risks are budget risks. From the food security point of view, the risk is primarily nutritional, since the populations tend to buy subsidised products to cover their

calorie needs – to the detriment of a balanced diet. Furthermore, the development of illegal trading hits the poorest population segments hardest.

It is already observed that undernourishment has increased sharpest in North Africa and the Middle East since 2005 (13.5% of the population in 2009). Given this reality it is imperative that solutions should be found at the local, national, infra-regional (Maghreb) and regional (Mediterranean or Euro-Mediterranean) level.

ACTION PRIORITIES FOR THINKING THE FUTURE

Adaptation measures in agriculture

Supply policy does not offer any major opportunities for expansion in order to cope with these problems, despite the progress that has been made in seawater desalting techniques (particularly in Algeria, Israel, Spain, and Cyprus) and in techniques for reusing waste water (in Egypt and Israel). The future of water in the Mediterranean region must now be approached from the angle of better demand management. The time has come for a new hydraulic revolution based on water savings. In the SEMCs, where water shortage is flagrant, irrigation is the field that offers the greatest opportunities for water savings.

The transition to more economical irrigation techniques is all the easier if a pricing system prompts farmers to economise. But this presupposes two imperatives: first, farmers must be properly connected to markets so that they can sell their produce in good conditions and thus be duly remunerated, which in turn will mean that their water control investments pay off; and secondly, water management must be shared, namely through irrigator associations. The water issue remains first and foremost a question of agricultural development. Taking the Mediterranean basin as a whole, it is conceivable that countries turn to crops that are more water-economical or more water-efficient.

Although Mediterranean agriculture is essentially rain-fed, the sector consumes the lion's share of available water resources. Despite a centuries-old tradition of agricultural water schemes and infrastructures, the resource is unevenly distributed in terms of both space and time, a fact which limits its availability and means that its various uses are in competition

while making stringent water demand management policies imperative. Water can be economised both at plot level and in supply networks, but it is also advisable to plan measures to restore a balance in how water is allocated amongst the countries of the Mediterranean Basin through international trade in bulk commodities, maybe on the basis of the concept of virtual water, although it remains controversial.

It may well be the climate, the essential uniting factor of the Mediterranean, which will bring the different shores closer together, for the Mediterranean as a whole has to meet the challenge of the predicted climate change. The challenge of adaptation, so essential in agriculture, should lead to reappraisal of North-South relations in a new light of solidarity. In framing these actions, a high priority should be given to women empowerment and rising rural community awareness.

To the south of the Mediterranean, the land resources situation (already precarious: 90% of land suitable for agriculture is now being farmed) is being made more complex by the development of desertification, which affects about 80% of arid or dry land. The countries in this area are among those hardest hit by the consequences of climate aridity and now desertification is gaining ground in the steppe regions to the North of the Sahara. Governments are trying to implement policies that combine computerised surveillance of the ecosystems with innovative techniques for combating desertification. There can therefore be no doubt that the process of desertification, in addition to producing a series of negative ecological, economic, sanitary and social effects, also has a distinct geopolitical dimension. Not only does it exacerbate hunger and poverty, it also causes migration and conflict. The fight against desertification involves a four-pronged attack designed to preserve the natural heritage of the regions affected, to reduce the risk of drought, redefine territorial development strategies and to support local development projects that bring together civil society players. It is imperative in this context to establish reference standards in conjunction with measures to set up (or perpetuate) national monitoring and evaluation systems, to assess the direct and indirect impacts, particularly in the socio-economic field.

Food security at the core of the Euro-Mediterranean cooperation

If the aim of a renewed Euro-Mediterranean cooperation is to work on projects which are capable at one and the same time of affecting the everyday life of the populations concerned (in a practical demonstration of solidarity) and of dealing with subjects which are at the centre of regional concern, the question of food security in both senses of the term (both quantity and quality) should become one of the main issues to be explored in the Euro-Mediterranean context. There are two complementary strategic challenges for secure development in the region: to guarantee supplies in a climate of rising agricultural prices, and to optimise food quality in a zone of constantly increasing malnutrition. The objectives are to avoid new food riots, reduce the death rate from poor diets and try to contain certain problems of public health.

The Union for the Mediterranean can be thought of as a call for cooperation in this region, focusing on real demonstrations of solidarity and actions which federate. In this context, the control of food security must be sustained in both senses of the term (quantitatively and qualitatively) as the principal thrust of this initiative.

From the quantitative point of view, it is difficult to dissociate the ongoing reform of the EU's Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) from the rising cost of raw materials, and therefore the risk of socio-economic turbulence that this implies throughout the Mediterranean region. We need to consider a major overhaul of the CAP mechanism, so as to develop a commercial and territorial approach at the Euro-Mediterranean level. It is not just a question of enlarging the CAP to take in the Mediterranean, but of working out a Euro-Mediterranean agricultural and environmental policy capable of securing the supply of primary agricultural products to the area, while at the same time encouraging competitiveness and sustainability. This goal could be a major, medium-term political project for Europe, and at the same time one which would be a tangible sign of our solidarity with the countries in the Mediterranean space. Food security in the Mediterranean cannot, however, be based solely on securing food imports. It is imperative that such measures be accompanied by adaptation strategies at several levels. The first is to enhance agricultural and rural policies in the SEMCs, because these issues are not past topics but real strategic challenges for development and stability. Moreover, actions will be needed to build up cereal strategic

stocks at the Euro-Mediterranean level, including the Black Sea area. And, last but not least, there will be no rural development in the Mediterranean region without dynamic agricultural policies, and there can be no agricultural development without rural vitality.

On the qualitative side, the concept of food security as an objective has two distinct but complementary dimensions. The first is technical: there is an absolute need to improve product hygiene. This means better storage, packing and transport conditions, and the compulsory adoption of international certification standards. The second is more concerned with eating habits: these need to be reoriented towards those typical Mediterranean products recognised as being good for health, and towards wide adoption of good dietary practises which become in time a complementary life insurance policy. We need to promote the Mediterranean diet as such, and support quality products. We might even have an overarching appellation for marketing purposes in order to guide consumer choice, and have real public health campaigns to educate tastes, and to get the message across that everything is linked in the long chain which leads from farmer to consumer.

Moving towards a new 'green revolution'

Mediterranean farmers, who are partly responsible for the severe and sometimes irreversible degradation of natural resources and are very often its first victims, have no option but to move steadily towards sustainable agriculture. If it wants to be viable, Mediterranean agriculture just like world agriculture will have to overcome the threefold challenge of demographic growth and food security, protection of the environment and natural resources, and the growing scarcity of fossil fuels, which thus requires developing renewable energy.

The Mediterranean's agricultural and rural problems are multidimensional and Euro-Mediterranean mobilisation is needed to solve them. Agriculture is the basis of Mediterranean identity and decisive for the region's societies. Convergent action in this sphere could result in close co-operation, mobilising people and resources on the basis of solidarity, human sympathy and mutual benefits for both sides of the Mediterranean. Given the growing tyranny of aridity, responses must be urgent, massive and collective, and must

probably also take place at several levels including that of multilateral cooperation. If Mediterraneans want to coexist in their diversity, they must join forces to plan and manage their resources together. There must be “unity in adversity”.

Still, we have to be honest: we are currently in a leopard-skin Euro-Mediterranean Area. Nevertheless, can we not explore the idea of planning for 2030, a new “green revolution” for the Euro-Mediterranean Area?

On one hand, the goal will be to put agricultural and food issues at the core of the cooperation, with a clear geopolitical perspective, and to promote the standards of Mediterranean Diet (as an integrative concept for development, not just as a gastronomic behaviour). In some way, the aim is to 'green' the plates, given the role the Mediterranean Diet can play in terms of adaptation on climate change, of economical opportunities and social spirits. Furthermore, when associated with a tourism policy focused on rural territories, the promotion of quality (which could be enhanced for certain products by a labelling policy) might be very well received by the large number of tourists who visit the Mediterranean region.

On the other hand, this new green revolution has to promote the use of renewable energy, and more specifically the solar energy, which is an essential element to achieve sustainable development at a national and a regional level, thus providing important new ways to diversify and secure energy supply for the agro-food sector. One key challenge would be to support technological research and projects dealing with the possible win-win association between solar energy and water desalination that can provide reliable fresh water supply and therefore, address the challenge of water scarcity.

The Mediterranean Solar Plan is a project currently in progress in the framework of the Union for Mediterranean. A Food Safety Strategy, based on Mediterranean Diet concept, should be set up if all the countries called for solidarity in agricultural and food concerns at the Euro-Mediterranean level.

¹ This paper is mainly based on the analysis produced in the framework of CIHEAM, which included more particularly its Mediterranean Observatory and the annual reports “Mediterra” (more information on www.ciheam.org). It is focused on food insecurity and water issues, rather than energy outlook, given our discussions in Barcelona last January.

2.3 Economic growth - sustainable development

by Houda Ben Jannet Allal

TENSIONS BETWEEN THE CURRENT METHODS OF PRODUCTION AND CONSUMPTION AND A “CLOSING THE GAP” SCENARIO BETWEEN NORTH AND SOUTH MEDITERRANEAN COUNTRIES, WHICH IS UNSUSTAINABLE

The Mediterranean today is an 'uneven playing field' between European and other countries. It is an area torn between opportunities for regional integration and the latent risk of economic and cultural rifts detrimental to the inhabitants of the region. It mirrors North/South disparities, where control of natural resources and protection of the environment have become a fundamental challenge and an underlying cause of conflict. Talk of the Mediterranean is in vogue and the sustainable development issue is becoming an important priority. The summit in Paris on 13 July 2008, held under the auspices of the "Barcelona Process - Union for the Mediterranean", has imbued Euro-Mediterranean relations with a new political momentum. This first summit represents an important step forward for cooperation within the region, at a time when the global economy is facing high concerns.

As far as growth and sustainable development issues are concerned, four key points need to be underlined for the Mediterranean region:

- in the last 37 years global population in the South Mediterranean region has more than doubled (x 2.3 between 1970 and 2007) and income has increased by a factor of more than five;
- In the next 23 years the global population is expected to grow by at least 133%. To stand still in unit terms, global gross domestic product is also expected to increase by more than 200% by 2030;

- Social progress rests on economic progress which, in turn, depends on energy. Energy demand is expected to continue to grow at a steady 3.2% a year between 2007 and 2030. It will more than double during this period;
- CO₂ emissions will almost double between 2007 and 2030 in the South Mediterranean Region.

As a matter of fact, the South Mediterranean countries are following the same path for production and consumption patterns than the North Mediterranean countries. The target is to close the gap and to join the group of industrialized countries. This of course leads to increasing needs and also related expected tensions.

In particular, water and energy will always be intrinsic to economic and social development. The region is more and more facing water shortages and water may cause the highest tensions in the coming decades. As for energy, the major issue may not be the volume as the region as a whole is not running out of hydrocarbon resources. In fact, total oil and gas reserves continue to rise. Rather the issue is cost - not only monetary cost, but the price society is prepared to pay in terms of social needs and environmental impact for the energy it must have if progress is to be sustained.

On this basis current trends do indeed look unsustainable. So the future requirement is clear - to provide water and energy in an efficient way and without negative environmental impact. This can't, and won't, be done overnight. One should think of it in 25 and 50 year chunks.

ENERGY

The OME scenarios indicate the following for the period 2007-2030:

- Under the business as usual scenario, energy demand in the South and East will be four times higher than in the North of the Mediterranean and 90% of the Total Primary Energy Supply of the South in 2030 will be fossil-fuel based.

- This trend scenario suggests increased risks and impacts and that development will come to a halt, with the following forecasts:
 - Between 2007 and 2030, energy related CO2 emissions could increase by about 100% in SEMCs. In 2030, SEMC emissions, while being 1.5 times lower per capita compared to emissions in NMCs, could represent 50% of emissions in the region, as against 35% in 2007.
 - Energy dependence could considerably increase both for SEMC importers (rising from 78% in 2007 to 88% in 2030) and for NMCs (going from 68% to 73% in the same period).
 - There are likely to be increased social and economic risks linked to rising supply costs and their repercussions on the energy bill of countries, families and businesses.
- But still important disparities will remain between North and South in terms of energy consumption. By 2030, energy demand by inhabitant in the South will still be lower than the level in the North in 2007. Under a closing the gap scenario where we assume that a South Mediterranean inhabitant consumes in 2030 the same volume of energy than a North Mediterranean citizen in 2007, the TPES in the South in 2030 would be 1.9 times higher than its level under the business as usual scenario!

Access to energy, energy security and environmental constraints represent a considerable challenge for the region's economic and social development. Such development may simply be curbed or even rendered impossible by energy insecurity and a deterioration in the local and global environment. It will only be possible to respond to the challenge by embarking on a structured programme of Euro-Mediterranean cooperation focused on a new energy system model compatible with sustainable development, with the aim of "meeting the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs".

The OME and OME/Plan Bleu alternative scenarios indicate that with existing technologies and more voluntary efforts towards energy efficiency measures and renewable energy technologies development, substantial saving can be achieved both in terms of energy

resources and CO₂ emissions (30% as compared to the business as usual scenario by 2030). There is thus no alternative to a new energy system within the Mediterranean – a sustainable system based on much wider accessibility in the South of the Mediterranean and on sobriety in terms of energy efficiency and renewable energy development in countries in the North, but also those in the South and East of the Mediterranean basin. It is, however, impossible to ignore that the present energy system poses a problem of access to modern forms of energy for a large share of the population, precludes any real possibility of development and escape from the poverty spiral for at least one in five inhabitants, and, moreover, is based on modes of consumption whose carbon and pollution load is already a cause for concern.

Hence, the new energy paradigm called for involves devising an "energy system" which incorporates not just the energy sector (the supply side) but also energy consumption (the demand side) and which guarantees development compatible with achieving an optimal energy service in terms of resources, financial and social costs and local and global environmental protection (Bernard Laponche, 2007). Replacing "energy supply" with an "energy service" will bring new actors to the foreground, namely: businesses, communities, families and professionals from the construction, transport, manufacturing, agricultural and services industries. Cities and local communities will thus become the facilitators and driving force of these new policies.

Mobilisation and capacity-building of the actors involved (public institutions, local authorities, the private sector and civil society) would be indispensable in confronting the governance challenge, within the context of an energy system that adheres to a shared ethical vision of sustainability. This shared ethical vision would, however, be incomplete without consensus and solidarity allowing everyone to benefit from development. Hence, actions on the demand side (reduced energy consumption but with same-service provision) and on the supply side (production and supply of energy products to satisfy consumption demand) need to be placed on an equal footing. This assumes massive public and European-level investment – and consequently a realignment of budgets – in key transition sectors, including transport, construction, energy efficiency and renewable energies, but also education, research, training and culture.

The reappropriation by citizens of the energy issue is without doubt the aspect of this new energy paradigm that is most interesting and has the most bearing on the future. This does not mean that the solution is simple but that compatible development within the Mediterranean is a major issue, requiring respect of very rigid limits without which survival will not be possible. We are now seeing prospects emerge that did not exist before and which dictate the need for a shift in paradigm. It is this that has led us to rediscover Progogine and Schroedunger – the potential and the responsibility of human beings as actors shaping history and as custodians of this planet (René Passet, 2004).

WATER

Water in the Mediterranean region is rather a rare and unevenly distributed resource and is thus an important issue for all Mediterranean countries. Climate change and decline of the precipitation deteriorate naturally a situation which will be soon vital.

Water demand has doubled in the second half of the 20th century. Nowadays, the agriculture sector is the most important consumer of water, but the municipal sector will also certainly be an important consumer in the future due to the high population and socio-economic growth in Southern countries. In many countries of the region, water withdrawals are approaching the limits of available resources.

Most of the countries are likely to confront shortage of potable water in the next decades and some are already confronted to this situation mainly due to limited resources and increase of population and needs. For many years, water shortages, which are cyclical or structural, are observed. According to Plan Bleu, in 2025 the Mediterranean “poor” water population, i.e. countries with less than 1,000 m³/habitant/year, amount to 250 million of which 80 million have “scarce”, i.e. countries with less than 500 m³/habitant/year. In 2008, the Mediterranean region accounted for 60% of the population of the world’s “water-poor” countries (cf. figure 4). In addition, still 20 Million Mediterranean inhabitants, mainly in rural areas, have no access to drinking water (Plan Bleu 2008).




Figure 2 Renewable fresh water resources

Numbers are per inhabitant in Mediterranean elementary river basins for the years between 1995 and 2005.

Water supplies are vulnerable in most of these countries, on the one hand because of an overexploitation of the renewable groundwater, and on the other hand because of exploitation of non-renewable resources (fossil water). Moreover, degradation and pollution by men have added the tensions on the natural resources. These human actions alter the system and quality of water, which limits the possibilities of various uses. These stresses on water will affect an increase health risks, conflicts of use between users, sectors, countries and vulnerability of supplies due to the raise of costs (particularly through the water treatment).

Pas studies (Plan Bleu, DLR ...) show that increase of supply, which was the main response of water policies in Mediterranean countries, has reached its limit. In view of this situation, management of water demand could be an effective way to reduce losses, irrational uses (waste ...) and to improve the efficiency of resource uses.

In addition to efficient water management, water desalination is a second option to reduce tensions. Desalination using renewable energy resources is the most sustainable solution as desalination is heavy energy consumer and large scale desalination using conventional

energy may. This can contribute to supplying a share of water needs in a sustainable manner.

These goals, compared to conventional approaches are “win-win”: they improve security of water supply, limit the environmental impacts, the risks of conflict, the cost of access to water and have potential for enhancing economic growth and stability in the region.

MASSIVE CHANGES WILL BE NEEDED: 'FOCUSED' EURO-MEDITERRANEAN PARTNERSHIP, THE WIN-WIN-WIN SOLUTION

Avoiding or facing the above mentioned tensions require a transition that will involve massive changes in technology and in political and social awareness. Not only technology is needed but also skills in order to redefine core competencies in the coming decades to take account of these challenges and threats. In this context, technology transfer, research and education have a fundamental role to play. Technologies and capabilities are prerequisite. Adapted financial resources are of course also needed. Transfer of technology need to be promoted between the two shores of the region and regional research and development programmes need to be developed in order to accelerate development and deployment of adapted technologies. This must be accompanied by the adaptation of education and capacity building activities so that capabilities and required skills will be available in the region to effectively allow the required changes to happen and also to sustain. What the region is short of today is the capacity to put resources, capital and technology together in ways which are sustainable. This needs to be changed.

The region has no other choice than evolving from a region of hydrocarbon dependency to a mixture of hydrocarbon and alternative energies use. Vast quantities of liquid hydrocarbons (oil and gas) could be left behind in the ground, just as solid hydrocarbons (coal) are being left behind today. As for water, there is no other choice than efficient use and management of resources and promotion of sustainable water production technologies.

This is the context in which much of the debate about sustainable development is taking place globally. But to put it in a nutshell, we will not arrive at solutions unless we think about

social needs and environmental impact. The regional cooperation has an important role to play and the North and South Mediterranean countries have common interest to build together a sustainable future in the region because of their interdependency.

This implies a strengthened euro-Mediterranean partnership primarily devoted to the sustainable development of the region. While there is no a standard and unique solution, the North Mediterranean region should show the example by achieving its targets in terms of renewable energy and energy efficiency targets.

It is unlikely that a new paradigm for development be developed in 27 years and there are luckily many ways forward to approach a sustainable development in the Mediterranean region, but certain parameters are clear. What is needed is foresight, then action, adaptation and innovation. The response must be integrated, it must be regional and it must be balanced in terms of social, economic and environmental solutions.

To sum up, sustainable development in the Mediterranean region is a long-term, strategic issue which will involve all the countries. It is essential to achieve high standards in all three elements of the triple bottom line agenda - economic, environmental and social performance.

The financial – and now economic and social - crisis, the energy crisis (despite the very temporary fall in oil prices), concerns over security of supply and the need to move towards low-carbon economies to adapt to climate change, have only served to underline the need for and interest in rationalisation and the launch of complementary policies geared to energy efficiency and energy sobriety within the region. This complementarity could be expanded to include intensive cooperation not only in respect of energy savings and renewable energy, but also on infrastructure and issues relating to a common energy policy.

The Mediterranean countries are today faced with the need to jointly forge a "green New Deal" in the Mediterranean which hinges on energy sobriety, to pave the way for a radical change in the modes of consumption and production, thereby enabling all citizens within the region to live a different and better life. Is this a utopian vision? Not at all. Rather, it is the most realistic option – one which calculates the risks not so as to acknowledge our powerlessness, but to tailor our responses to the nature of the challenges which face us. The

Barcelona Process has laid the ground work for greater dialogue and cooperation. It must now evolve further to achieve full integration. The Euro-Mediterranean partnership needs to show by means and actions its commitment to sustainable development. This may be seen as an opportunity for leadership and innovation. No doubt that competitive advantage will go to those who can anticipate the pace and breadth of the changes implied by sustainable development. In contrary, sustainable development raises issues which, if ignored for long enough, have the potential to destroy development.

2.4 *Jobs – migration*

by Joaquín Arango

INTRODUCTION

Demographic disparities in the Mediterranean basin are marked. Contrary to popular belief, they are not so significant in terms of fertility and life expectancy, where a process of convergence, albeit unfinished, has been taking place. But they are sizeable and relevant as far as age structures are concerned, and these disparities result in considerable differences in labour force structures. These disparities are tributary of the larger differences in fertility and mortality that existed in a not distant past. They determine radically different manpower needs in the Northern shores of the Mediterranean and in those in the South and East rims. The latter face the daunting challenge of providing jobs for a plethora of youngsters which suffer high levels of unemployment and underemployment, large rapid growth of the active population threatens to maintain them in the coming future. Countries in the Northern rim are afflicted by rapid population ageing and labour shortages. Between the two sets of population and labour force structures there is a high degree of, and a potential for, complementarity.

It can be posited that migration flows could exploit such potential, and that the complementarity that exists between the demographic and labour force structures of the aforementioned countries could make the migratory exchanges beneficial for both sides, yielding a win-win scenario. Historical experiences provide examples that corroborate such a possibility. Yet, the existence of complementarity does not secure by itself the occurrence of significant migration flows. And there are formidable obstacles that militate against the materialization of the above possibility. In fact, migration flows across the Mediterranean, which were very large in the past, have tended to lose weight in recent times. After examining the population and labour force structures and their potential for complementarity, the paper reviews some of the obstacles that may frustrate its translation into larger migration flows. It then suggests that such complementarity could be fostered if it

was extended also to skill mixes, and that education and training, aided by international cooperation in this domain, could contribute to it.

CONTRASTING STRUCTURES

The contrast between the respective population structures of the EU-27 and the SEMC is indeed stark, despite the decline in fertility rates recently experienced by the majority of the latter. Yet, the very high fertility levels that prevailed in the South and East shores of the Mediterranean until less than a quarter of a century ago produced very large cohorts, which are now responsible for the young population structure that presides over the demographic reality of the SEMC in our days. The high number of young women in reproductive age also results in a considerable number of births despite the decline of fertility. But the dominant feature is the relative size of the active population. In itself, the present population structure in these countries offer what is known as a 'demographic bonus' or 'demographic dividend', i.e. an structure characterized by a high proportion of young adults and a relatively low dependency ratio that could be highly favourable to economic development, should the remaining conditions on which this depends be also favourable. Yet, if other conditions make economic growth sluggish, such population structure makes it utterly difficult to provide jobs for the plethora of youngsters it contains, and the 'demographic dividend' becomes a demographic burden.

All in all, this is the reverse picture of the one that obtains in the countries of the Northern rim. In the EU-27, persistent low fertility and very high levels of life expectancy result in very rapid ageing of the population. Deaths already outnumber births in 10 of the EU's 27 member states, and others will follow suit. The active population is bound to shrink in the near future. According to recent forecasts by Eurostat, the EU's active population will start declining by 2012, even with yearly flows of 1.5 million immigrants. Should flows remain at that level, in the following decade would the active population would shrink by 14 million. The Commission estimates a reduction of 52 million people of working age by 2050.

The needs that stem from the respective demographic and labour force structures of the EU and the SEMC structures are basically complementary as well. The North needs, and will

increasingly need, people of working age; the South/East has many such people for whom it does not have jobs. In the latter, the number of jobs will have roughly to double in the next twenty years to meet the aspirations of the active population. This implies that the number of jobs should increase at an annual rate not below 3 per cent. In order to achieve this, economic growth should be much more vigorous than it is nowadays. It can be predicted that employment will continue to be a crucial challenge. In such a context, out-migration appears as an important necessity for the countries bordering the South and East shores. In addition, labour migration is highly valued in terms of the remittances it brings, which rank among the highest in the world. Out-migration from certain countries in the region is certainly sizeable, not only towards Europe but also towards the oil-producing countries in the Gulf region, but it absorbs only a little proportion of the labour supply. To be more than a partial solution, it ought to be more substantial.

Conversely, in many areas of the North labour shortages are already chronic and widespread. In the future, in the absence of large immigration, they would constitute a serious bottleneck for economic growth. In theory there are alternatives to immigration, but they are unlikely to happen. The need for skilled workers is generally recognized, but less skilled ones are also required. Present demographic trends have another powerful implication, and this is the threat of insolvency of the pension systems that stems from the combination of shrinking cohorts entering the labour force and the constant increase in the number of pensioners. The ratio between active persons for every inactive one in the EU is gradually declining, and bound to reach hard to sustain levels in a not too distant future. While it is generally recognized that immigration is no panacea for such ills, it is no less clear that they could be alleviated by immigration flows larger than the present ones.

A POTENTIAL FOR COMPLEMENTARITY

The complementarity that exists between the labour force needs of the EU countries and the SEMC could make migration particularly beneficial to both sides, leading to win-win scenarios. This, in turn, could improve the public evaluation of migration in the North, making it more acceptable.

The idea that migration can be simultaneously beneficial for countries that are primarily at the sending side and countries which find themselves at the receiving end is enjoying growing consideration in our days. A number of international institutions – including, *inter alia*, the World Bank, the OECD, the International Organization for Migration, and the United Nations through the Global Commission for International Migration (GCIM) and the Global Forum for Migration and Development (GFMD) – are increasingly devoting time and efforts in that direction.

A number of examples in the past could corroborate such a possibility. Historical experience suggests that when there has been complementarity between sending and receiving sides, migration has worked to the advantage of both. Prominent examples of win-win scenarios in this respect are both the great transatlantic migrations of the second half of the 19th century and the initial decades of the 20th and the European South-North migration of the third quarter of the 20th. On the contrary, when the costs of migration are socially perceived as higher than its benefits, restrictive policies are likely to set in. And in frameworks that severely restrict mobility, not only flows will be limited but a significant part of those that nevertheless take place will be seen as largely unwanted, giving way to a vicious circle of increasing restriction and more unwanted migration.

REASONS FOR SCEPTICISM

All the above considerations notwithstanding, there are reasons that warrant a degree of scepticism about the likelihood of realizing the win-win potential inherent in complementarity. The fact that such potential is not been presently exploited constitutes in itself a powerful indication. Certainly, the existence of complementarity between the demographic and labour force structures of adjacent countries does not suffice by itself to result in increased migration flows. It would if the occurrence of migration would be presided over by a hydraulic logic. But hydraulic reasoning is hardly congenial with social phenomena. Many factors detract from any automatism in this regard. If the connection between complementary endowments and migration were so simple and mechanical, migration flows between the two regions would be much larger already.

Indeed, migration flows across the Mediterranean, very large in the past, have tended to lose weight in recent times, both in absolute and in relative terms. They were very large and prominent in the course of the third quarter of the 20th Century, in a context which put together countries with labour shortages and countries with a labour surplus. France, Germany, Belgium and The Netherlands were the main destinations for such flows, and Turkey, Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia stood out among the sending countries. Despite increasing barriers, flows continued to be sizeable during the 1970's and the 1980's. Italy and Spain became important additional destinations during that period, mainly for Moroccan migrants. All in all, for a long time migration flows across the Mediterranean were the largest and most relevant for Europe. To a certain extent, they are still significant - especially those linking Morocco with Italy and Spain - but they are losing weight in relative terms as far as the immigration received by Europe goes.

OBSTACLES

Indeed, there are important obstacles that stand in the way of increased migration between the two sides concerned. One of them has to do with what can be called the globalisation of migration. A second one is the fact that there are alternatives to migration for EU countries to meet their labour force needs. A third one stems from the fact that the complementarity between different endowments of labour supply and demand becomes less relevant if it does not encompass skill mixes as well. The fourth has to do with politics, more precisely with the existence of adverse feelings and attitudes towards immigration. And a fifth one stems from immigration policies which are hardly adequate for the realization of the win-win potential.

Migration flows are becoming increasingly global, and this means, inter alia, an increasing number of source countries. Distance, and therefore neighbourhood, still matter, no doubt, but they are less decisive than in the past in deciding migration destinations. The contribution of other regions to the increase of the population of migrant origin in the EU has been larger in recent years than that of the SEMC countries. Differential visa policies are part of the explanation, as citizens from other regions - above all Eastern Europe and Latin America - have benefited from either exemption or easier access to tourist and other types

of short-term visas. In some cases, immigrants from other regions have also been preferred in the operation of quotas or temporary programs. The recent enlargements of the EU have resulted in more intense migration within the EU. Regionalism is being eroded by globalization.

In particular, flows from sub-Saharan countries across the Maghreb and into Europe have gained volume, and especially significance, in recent years. As a result, Maghrebian countries are becoming immigration and transit countries, in addition to sending ones, and this has significant implications. One of them is the fact that Maghreb countries are increasingly perceived in Europe as transit countries, and a new role seems to be assigned to them in the migration sphere. They are increasingly seen as partners that share a number of interests. The ensuing intensification of cooperation entails compensations, but so far they do not seem to have comprised the opening of legal channels for migration or easier access to visas. As far as the relation with source countries is concerned, the focus of attention of the EU is partly shifting towards western Africa, and aiming at readmission agreements and cooperation in the control of flows in exchange for financial compensations. Maritime flows from western Africa are likely to persist and to intensify, as logistic, legal and political difficulties to stop them are staggering, and western Africa is bound to become a critical area in terms of migration. This may detract from the priority hitherto accorded to North Africa as a source region.

The political climate which surrounds migration in Europe is hardly conducive to the conversion of migration needs into actual migration. Two trends can be discerned in our days in this domain: negative attitudes towards migration and restrictive admission policies and they are closely connected. Immigrants from the South/East Mediterranean are often the focus of adverse attitudes against immigration. Indicators of integration leave much to be desired, and they are often used to fuel anti-immigrant feelings. In turn, the latter provide the soil on which increasingly restrictive policies tend to prosper. Obviously, complementarity would have better chances to give way to larger flows in a more liberal migration environment, but the likelihood of such liberalization is minimal. And insofar as the present state of things remains unchanged, prospects for win-win migration scenarios belong largely in the realm of wishful thinking.

Restrictive policies are especially directed to unskilled migrants. EU countries are more open to admit skilled migrants. As a result, the complementarity between labour force needs would be greater if it were extended to skill mixes.

OPPORTUNITIES FOR COOPERATION

Admittedly, the obstacles that stand in the way of increased migration will be hard to overcome. This is certainly the case of attitudes towards immigration, immigration policies, and of the impact of globalization on flows. Yet, more possibilities might be found for other strategies. Measures aiming at fostering the matching of skill mixes may be among the most feasible and promising. The labour force complementarity between the EU-27 and the SEMC could be increased through adequate skill formation, especially if directed to the mid-skill level. In turn, international cooperation in education and training could contribute to it, thus contributing to exploit the potential for complementarity inherent in disparities. Additionally, international cooperation in skill formation could provide compensation, by way of increasing returns, for the loss of human capital that migration may imply for source countries, an issue that has been traditionally referred to as brain drain, contributing to the win-win scenario. Such cooperation might encompass exchanges of information about skills and labour force outputs for different educational profiles. A partnership approach, such the one that inspires the 'EU global approach' to migration, would be most appropriate.

JOB-CREATION AND EDUCATION ARE CRUCIAL

Even if strategies to increase complementarity are adopted, prospects for increased migration across the Mediterranean look dim, despite the complementarity of needs, on account of the magnitude of existing obstacles. In view of such prospects, job creation in the in the South/East countries may easily appear as an alternative to migration. Yet, opposing job creation to migration is a false dilemma. Even in the unlikely scenario of greatly increased migration, it would absorb only part of the increase in the active population. Unemployment rates are generally high, especially among youngsters, and labour force

participation, especially for females, are low. Employment is, and will continue to be, the foremost development issue in the region. In the coming years, employment needs will be formidable. In order to meet them, national economies will need to become more efficient and diversified. A host of reforms will be required, including a better structure of the labour.

In this context, education is crucial, both in order to increase human capital and to raise the qualification and employability of migrants. Considerable progress has taken place in this area, but maybe more in quantitative terms than in quality. The employability of young, educated people remains a major challenge.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Exploiting the potential for complementarity inherent in the contrasting demographic and labour force structures of the EU countries and those of the SEMC through larger migration flows could be mutually beneficial for sides, since they would tend to opposing manpower needs. Yet, powerful obstacles prevent the win-win scenario that would ensue from taking place. In fact, such potential is not being realized in the present. On the contrary, migration flows across the Mediterranean are losing weight in relative terms. Materializing the potential for complementarity requires change in several areas. EU countries could regard complementarity as an opportunity and consequently reconsider its stand on migration, in line with the comprehensive view of migration espoused by the European Commission. The demographic complementarity should be reinforced by making the respective skill mixes more complementary. Strategies aiming at adequate skill formation could be fostered through international cooperation in education and training.

Yet, migration alone, even if greatly increased, would constitute only a palliative for the formidable employment needs that South/East Mediterranean countries face and are going to face in the near future. Reforms that would increase the ability of the national economies to create employment and increase human capital through improvements in education constitute a foremost priority. More efficient economies and better educational systems could take advantage of demographic opportunity window inherent in the large proportion

that young adults make in the population structure and of the relatively low dependency ratio they have to maintain.

3. Transitions

3.1 *Managing Conflicts in the EuroMed Area*

by Amine Ait-Chaalal

The Euro-Mediterranean region is and will be confronted with numerous challenges over the next 20 years. One of the most important tasks is to create the circumstances that will permit this region, which is so critical to world stability, to evolve towards a more peaceful future. This text seeks to identify necessary actions at the levels of the European Union and of the EuroMed in order to reduce existing tensions. Consequently, without the fulfilment of these aims, any later favourable development appears illusory, or at least strongly compromised.

FROM DESTABILISATION TO AN APPEASED EUROMED REGION

The EuroMed region is currently destabilised by a series of political, economic, social and cultural factors. At the geopolitical level, the Israeli-Palestinian and the Israeli-Arab questions underline the urgent need to progress towards a serious peace process.

Those destabilizing factors are:

- 1) Legacy of history
- 2) Diverging expectations and disappointment over the EuroMed Partnership launched in 1995
- 3) Recent events.

1) The historical legacy refers to the intensity and density of past experiences in the region, which remains very present in the collective consciousness and references on both shores of the Mediterranean area. From the crusades, through colonisation and wars of liberation to modern issues of immigration, fundamentalism and terrorist attack: relations have often been marked by tensions. To ignore this complex legacy would be counter-productive and it must be treated without taboo if the Euro-Mediterranean dialogue is to progress substantially.

2) The various forms of EuroMed partnership that have been implemented since 1995 have raised different and divergent expectations from the two sides. These expectations have not been met and have given way to disappointment and mistrust. The most emblematic of these divergences are over visas and immigration.

From the Southern side there were strong expectations that the treatment of immigrants would be more humane and that visa applicants would be treated with more respect and less suspicion. In reality, attitudes towards immigrants seem to have become less tolerant, in large part driven by domestic political agendas and the resurgence in many countries of Europe of extreme right parties. Deliberately spectacular measures have been applied, in some instances touching families with young children living and working in the EU for many years. In the case of visas, some requirements of European consulates from applicants are frequently seen as arbitrary, procedures are not harmonised, even across countries of the Schengen area, and measures sometimes appear needlessly vexatious. Such practice contributes to disillusionment in the populations concerned and, paradoxically, constitutes a recurrent obstacle to the mobility of people working for the promotion of dialogue in the EuroMed region.

3) Numerous events of the last decade have contributed to reinforce the tensions and the mistrust. Many of these tensions arise out of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the Arab perceptions of EU weakness and of G.W. Bush administration unconditional support to Israeli government's policies. Among such events are: the second Intifada, the construction of the Israeli wall on Palestinian territory, the blockade of Chairman Yasser Arafat at Ramallah, the war with Lebanon in July- August 2006, the war of Gaza in December 2008 – January 2009, the interception of the humanitarian convoys intended for Gaza in 2010, the

construction of Israeli settlements in East Jerusalem and the West Bank (in contradiction with many UN Security Council Resolutions and the Advisory Opinion of the UN International Court of Justice of 9th July 2004). On a larger scale, the US-led wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the exactions committed at Guantanamo, Bagram and Abu Ghraib jails, the use of torture have had traumatic consequences in Arab hearts and minds.

On the other side, the tragic and traumatic attacks in the US, Madrid and London, the apparent spread of fundamentalist networks in Europe, the problem of different cultural practices foreign to host countries and difficult to accept (or even to understand), the crisis of the Danish caricatures, the fears of migration flows, the use made by some political parties of those fears contribute to a sense of confrontation.

In this context, is the thesis of a “clash of civilizations” convincing? In reality there are other ways of looking at what is happening. This view of a clash could be replaced by an alternative confrontation between traditional-conservative groups and open-modernist groups inside societies on both sides. From this vision emerges a different outlook for cooperation, understanding and exchange. Both the EU and Southern countries are confronted with divergent conceptions of the future (with a continuous spectrum between the traditional conservative and the open-modernist groups).

The conservative vision proponents are reticent or even opposed to dialogue between the two shores because cooperation will constitute, in their view, a threat to traditional values and principles. The open vision proponents are in favour of dialogue because they envision many opportunities for fruitful exchanges and cooperation.

Therefore the first step in managing conflict is to improve the existing structures of dialogue and cooperation, while respecting the characteristics of each partner. This necessity of improvement exists for official dialogue at the political level between governments, but it should also be promoted and intensified by involving other participants such as business people, artists, journalists, students, young people, NGOs. In this regard, given the presence of substantial communities of Southern Mediterranean origin now living in the EU countries, renewed dialogue with the Southern shore of the Mediterranean could also improve the internal dynamics of the European societies. In this respect it is important to underline the role of the media that have a powerful influence on public opinion. European countries have

a central principle of the freedom of the press, recognised as essential to democracy. This principle should be exercised with a sense of responsibility and respect, especially in situations sometimes open to tensions. Unfortunately, on both parts, this is not the case and the media often reinforces stereotypes for the sake of sensationalism, and even political manipulation.

THE NEED FOR DECISIVE ACTIONS IN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE CFSP

The capacity to exercise more decisive political action on the international stage would make the EU a more convincing political partner for the Southern Mediterranean countries. A firm and visible position in the framework of the Common foreign and security policy (CFSP) is needed. Much is expected of the recent appointment of Mr. Herman Van Rompuy as the first permanent President of the European Council and of Lady Ashton as the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. In this context, the creation of a genuine European diplomacy, the European External Action Service, should strengthen the credibility of the European action.

Four areas where action by the EU can avoid or mitigate conflict are:

- 1) Cyprus (with a significant impact in terms of relations between the EU and Turkey)
- 2) Balkans with the need to stabilise Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo
- 3) Western Sahara;
- 4) Israeli-Palestinian and Israeli-Arab issues, that are priorities for stabilising the Mediterranean.

THE MIDDLE EAST

The EU is present in the Middle East process, but not enough. Its involvement in the framework of the Quartet, alongside the United States, Russia and the United Nations, is significant and meaningful. The Moscow Quartet's communiqué of 19 March 2010 is an

important contribution to the (re)construction of a viable and credible peace process and demonstrates the need for concerted action by international players on this complex issue. Unilateral action by the United States is no longer a reasonable option, hence the importance of strengthening the EU action in an effective manner.

Unfortunately, the effectiveness of the Quartet is at present limited by the lack of credibility in the Arab countries of the current representative of the Quartet in the region, Mr. Blair. He is clearly perceived as imposed by the then-US president Bush as a reward for his unconditional support of the US-led Iraq war. If the Quartet, and therefore the EU, is to act effectively and convincingly in the region, the question of representation needs to be reconsidered and Mr. Blair should be replaced by a much more credible representative.

Stabilisation in the region has not to be envisaged only in political terms, but also in terms of the security and military aspects. The EU has been an important economic actor within the Mediterranean region for a long time and has regularly increased its visibility through its economic and financial instruments. It is not yet a significant political actor, although it has the tools, the means, the reasons and the potential. It remains to be seen if it has the political will. Much will depend on whether the EU has the ability and the means to develop an effective military capability. Realism requires that this option would be exercised in coordination with NATO. Nevertheless if the EU wants to be credible it must also be able to deploy a political (and ultimately military) role with sufficient distance vis-à-vis the United States.

THE EUROMED: FROM THE MULTILATERAL TO THE BILATERAL TO THE SUBREGIONAL?

The EuroMed process since 1995 (Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, European Neighbourhood Policy, Union for the Mediterranean) has officially privileged a multilateral framework of cooperation. But this approach has failed mainly because of the lack of coherence in the “Mediterranean” concept and because of the negative impacts of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Faced with this deadlock, the EU has opted in reality for bilateral frameworks with each Mediterranean country, while maintaining a multilateral umbrella. These bilateral processes are likely to endure, but there are probably also opportunities to

develop a European approach at the sub-regional level, particularly towards the Maghreb and the Mashreq.

FORWARD LOOKING: SOME WAYS AND MEANS TO DECREASE CURRENT TENSIONS

The changing socio-demographic composition of populations on both sides of the Mediterranean has created diverse societies that include, especially in the North, significant communities from the other shore that have over time and through the generations become components of the host societies. Managing conflict requires a shared vision of inclusion and common destiny. Several stages will be necessary: a transition from common interests to shared principles (or, even better, common principles) and ultimately to shared (or common) values.

Common interests that provide a plausible basis for fruitful cooperation include: political stability, economic growth, social development, cultural awareness and promotion of human rights. For any process of transition towards common values to be sustainable, it must be accepted and incorporated into the consciousness of people on both sides of the Mediterranean, or at least large sections of the populations thereof.

Four priority areas where action within the Euro-Mediterranean relationships could lead to rapid and tangible improvements are:

- 1) Migration
- 2) Visa policy
- 3) Media and culture
- 4) Education.

1) For migration, more humane approaches are needed that are realistic about legitimate concerns of host countries, but that also avoid taboos and stereotypes. Policies solely or largely guided by fear, electoral considerations and/or demagogic postures are not reasonable options if there is a genuine aim to create serious cooperation between the two shores of the Mediterranean. Nor are they conducive to harmonious relationships inside European societies where people from the South of the Mediterranean are often significantly represented.

2) The need for improvement in visa policy is important. A more confident and open policy with transparent and harmonised procedures should be sought, that takes into account the diversity of situations, is able to adapt and is therefore more respectful of individuals.

3) In the case of the media, stronger affirmative action in favour of better intercultural understanding should be promoted. The intensification of joint initiatives in the media and cultural productions would be a positive step towards improved perceptions of other cultures, traditions and societies, their characteristics and specificities. A shift of emphasis towards the factors that unite cultures rather than those that divide them, towards what brings together rather than what separates, would be helpful. Such a shift would help diffuse tensions and create opportunities for working together.

4) In the case of education, existing initiatives for a better understanding of cultures and societies and of their intellectual and artistic heritage should be significantly strengthened. The respect of others begins with understanding and understanding begins with knowledge and acquaintance. Initiatives of this kind between people could contribute to a favourable climate for political negotiations between countries.

3.2 *Win-win solutions*

by Rafael Rodríguez-Clemente

STATE OF THE ART AND WHERE WE GO

Visions of which will be the situation of the Euro-Mediterranean relationship in 2030 necessarily pass through the evaluation of the actual frame of relations and what are the wishes and challenges at stakes. The Barcelona Process and its continuation the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) were designed to support the Mediterranean Partners Countries (MPCs) in realizing political, economic and social reforms; as it was perceived from the EU side that only the social and economic development of the Mediterranean Countries could guarantee good neighbourhood and the implementation of relations aimed at the mutual economic and social benefits and a joint approach to common problems, such as the handling of the security aspects (terrorism), the management of immigration, transport and tourism development, the energy and environmental concerns, etc. Fifteen years later the situation of the political agenda is still blocked by the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the Free Trade Area has not been completed in 2010, and many other objectives have not been attained. The critical revision of the Barcelona Process made by the setting of the UfM, a political intergovernmental structure, is trying to impulse the objectives marked in 1995, but making pragmatic approaches through several concrete projects in areas of common interest. The MPC-MPC trade is lagging behind in spite of the progress represented by the Agadir Free Trade Agreement of South –South cooperation signed by Tunisia, Morocco, Jordan and Egypt in 2007. However, in spite of these adverse circumstances and the yet unclear way of how we pass from the legitimacy of the Barcelona Process, managed by the European Commission, to the Union for the Mediterranean, managed by the Co-Presidency of a EU Member State and a Mediterranean Country together with the UfM Secretariat, the global objectives pursued in the Barcelona Declaration are still valid as probed by the maintenance of the EU-Summits and the Thematic EU-MPC Interministerial Conferences. The most important weaknesses concerning the EU-MPC cooperation and implementation of the EU-MPC partnership, including the scientific and technical cooperation, refers to the slow

processes of convergence, the lack of regional and sectorial coverage with regard to liberalization of fluxes (products, services, knowledge), the lack of formal commitments with regard to many of the ambitions, and insufficient attention to facilitating and realizing the necessary improvements in domestic capacity and legal frames in order to realize the more ambitious elements of the processes.

WHICH ARE THE CHALLENGES?

The Association Agreements together with the previous MEDA Program and the actual European Neighbourhood Policy Instrument (ENPI) constitute the core of the economic pillar of the Barcelona Process. The network of bilateral Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements is now almost complete. The EU-MPC trade is making significant progress¹, expressed by the evolution of the total exports and import of the MPC to the EU accounting yearly, respectively, some €67 billion, and €60 billion, with an annual export increase since 2000 of 10% a year, and a growth pace of imports of 4% for the same period. A recent revision of the strength and weakness of the EU-MED Free Trade Agreements² indicate that the simple political wish is not enough to guarantee the consecution of the marked objectives. Limiting this analysis to those activities related to economic cooperation which rely to the availability of scientific and technological capacities in the MPC countries, it is clear both that an important degree of progress in a number of countries, and with respect to particular areas has been achieved: all the industrial goods originating in MPCs have duty free access to the EU market and, on the other hand, MPCs are progressively eliminating their tariffs on imports of EU industrial goods over a period of 12 years; but equally clear is the remaining of a number of significant barriers, such as the lack of credible and comprehensive conformity assessment systems (testing, surveillance, inspecting, auditing, certification, registration, and accreditation); differences in labelling and packaging requirements; differences in customs testing procedures; weak market surveillance systems; and lack of flexibility in choosing international standards. Of particular importance are the additional Sanitary and Phyto-Sanitary (SPS) inspection procedures for specific agrofood products and with regard to geographical and religious requirements. Another important issues are the differences on enforcement of IPR laws and regulations, weak provisions in

the legislation, low levels of public awareness regarding IPR related measures and lack of technical capacity for implementation of this targeted objectives.

ARE THE EUROPEAN INSTRUMENTS SUFFICIENT?

The EU-MPC cooperation mechanism for research and innovation are the following:

- European Neighbourhood Policy Instrument (ENPI)
- Structural Funds: Territorial Cooperation (Former INTERREG Initiative)
- VII Framework Program of RTD

There is an important problem of bad coordination between the opportunities offered by these three instruments. There exist instruments, such as the Twinning Programs, financed by the ENPI and aimed at improving the performance of a given sector, and also in the VII FP a number of Specific International Cooperation Actions (SICA) aimed at addressing common scientific objectives are being launched. Hence, while on the one hand formally much has been achieved with the signing of the Association Agreements, the signing of individual Action Plans with several countries, the increase in capacity and human resources, and with the Union of the Mediterranean, this has yet to translate into a really meaningful perceived impact on cooperation, trade and growth. Moreover, the greater the number of bilateral FTAs there is a greater likelihood of a spaghetti bowl of agreements with slightly different provisions, and thus the need for common mechanisms covering all the MPC is a must, as it is a stronger South-South integration to guarantee a fair regional EU-MPC dialogue on the issues of common interest³. On the other hand, while from the European side a number of financial and administrative instruments are available, from the MPC side there is not a great perception of efforts to guarantee a fruitful use of these opportunities, either in the pace of adaptation of the regulatory frame to the common EU-MPC objectives or the compromising of financial resources to match the European resources among other clear political options. So, in conclusion, the EU Instruments could not be enough and, certainly, are cumbersome in their use, but a symmetrical engagement from the MPC is necessary to guarantee the common compromise in areas of common interest.

THE COMING CHALLENGES

With knowledge and innovation at the core of the competitive advantage in the global economy, the capacity to innovate is considered by most nations as an optimal response to both current and future challenges⁴. MPCs are urged to enhance their resources in the field of education, science, research and technological development, in order to improve their innovative capacity, and, by these means, be able to compete in the new world stage. Their innovation systems have to be enhanced, improved, and created, where necessary. A common agenda of the EU and the MPC to develop scientific and economic partnership based in the common interest could help in improving the pace of convergence in economic and social development, and bridge the gaps in these fields, which are the primary cause of problems between the countries riparian to the Mediterranean. In the process of setting up innovation policies in MPCs, it seems necessary to identify the key sectors at local level, those with the best potential for competitiveness and job creation, as well as to find the delicate equilibrium between supporting traditional sectors, offering strategic competitive strengths, and promoting new, more “innovative”, ones. Traditional sectors are more likely to be developed and to generate socio-economic benefit and innovation “culture”, than in totally new industries, barely known and understood by the local population and by the work force.

WHAT SHOULD BE DONE AND HOW WE GET THERE

Several fields of cooperation were identified in the Barcelona Declaration and have been specifically addressed by the Union for the Mediterranean. The general objectives and, particularly, the “Projects” defined in the Paris and Marseilles Declaration: Depollution of the Mediterranean, Maritime and Land Highways, Civil Protection, Alternative Energies: Mediterranean Solar Plan, Higher Education and Research, Euro-Mediterranean University, and the Mediterranean Business Development Initiative, must be considered drivers to align the common efforts resulting in common benefits. Other fields of activity, not related to the “invisible hand” of the market or to circumstantial political will, must also be considered as actions aimed at win-win cooperation, and support to capacity building activities that will result in common benefits:

- The Association Agreements must incorporate the setting up national research and innovation systems, the reinforcements of the infrastructures, the improvement of managerial skills and the information dissemination to generate synergies with the industrial sector, research centres and, in general, the socioeconomic apparatus in MPCs as well as supporting the Standards and SPS adoption and application. The promoting of clusters integrating the production and knowledge actors together with the administrations could help to promote not only industrial companies but also companies delivering services to industry, as the involvement of the business and academic sectors are decisive in terms of transforming a business culture characterized by low trust and a lack of cooperation between the private sector⁵ and the government into a more cooperative culture. A system of governance support from the scientific sectors should be drafted.
- Investigate new potential for cooperation among sectors between the EU and the Mediterranean partner countries and among the partners themselves in a way similar as the running dialogue on the future of the textiles and clothing sector promoted by the Euro-Mediterranean Industrial Cooperation Work Program. The main emphasis here could be on the transfer of EU knowledge and expertise in managing and developing such sectors (e.g. electricity, environment, water, and telecommunications) to Mediterranean partners.
- There is a significant problem of reliable data collection and availability to monitor all the issues related to EU-MPC cooperation in business and science and technology. An urgent revision of the data collection methodologies and, if possible, the use of common standards in all the MPC, is needed.
- Time management is one of the greatest obstacles in organizing Euro-Mediterranean trade and scientific cooperation⁶. The “time” of the business and scientific cooperation is that of the participants’ slowest administration. In general, MPC administrative structures are conceived for managing procedures and resources from national sources. The disconnection between management and function causes all kinds of serious problems in the development of international collaboration processes⁷. The problem is global, i.e. does not concern a unique sector, such as trade or research,

because it affects the global design of the national administrations and their interdependency. A new focus of the national administrative laws taking into account the scenario created by the new globalization process is urgently needed and several available instruments, such as the Twinning Programs financed by TAIEX should be used more intensively, but with a comprehensive approach; i.e. incorporating the key sector of the administrations, such as finance and justice. All these actions, being necessary, will have little chances of success if the MED countries do not allocate the necessary resources from their national budgets and from the private sector⁸. However, the main obstacle for EU-MPC cooperation, the mutual ignorance of the cultural frames, or, worse, the misunderstanding of the root of behaviours and social values must be addressed. Lot of work must be done in these fields to favour a cooperation based in mutual understanding.

¹ Euro-Mediterranean trade relations are healthy and growing. European Commission DG for Trade. <http://ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/bilateralrelations/regions/euomed>. Updated on 1st November 2008.

² L. De Wulf and M. Maliszewska (Eds.), R. Ayadi, M. Gasiorek, A. Farouk Ghoneim, S. Guerin, P. Holmes, H. Kassal, J. Lopez Gonzalez and M. Tekce, "Economic Integration in the Euro-Mediterranean Region", Final Report (2009), Center for Social and Economic Research (CASE).

³ Conclusions of the 8th Conference of Ministers of Trade of the Union for the Mediterranean. Brussels 9 December 2009.

⁴ P. Pasimeni, A.-S. Boisard, R. Arvanitis, J. M. González-Aranda and R. Rodríguez-Clemente, "Towards a Euro-Mediterranean Innovation Space. Ideas for Research and Policy Making", Contributed paper for the Conference on Corporate RandD (2007) (CONCORD).

⁵ Minutes of the Working Party on Euro-Mediterranean Industrial Cooperation, European Commission, DG Enterprise, Brussels, 10-11 February 2010.

⁶ R. Rodríguez-Clemente and J.M. Gonzalez-Aranda, "Euro-Mediterranean Scientific Cooperation: Facts, Obstacles and Solutions Using ICTs. Practical Cases", MED (2007), IEMed.

⁷ MED 7 Project, "Thematic Workshops for the Definition of the Euro-Mediterranean Science and Technology Policy within FP7".

⁸ "Euro-Mediterranean Industrial Cooperation Work programme", European Commission, DG Enterprise and Industry, 20 October 2008.

3.3 Mutual benefits and institutional needs in higher education

by Nada Trunk Širca

CONSTRAINTS BY THE THEME ANALYSIS:

- 1) Trends and tensions in the field of education, especially in higher education, recognized so far:
 - The growth of population is critical; it will determine the demand for higher educational facilities;
 - The projections for economic growth do not suggest that the resources will be available endogenously to create the educational facilities and the jobs needed to cater for the expected increase in the work force.
- 2) Institution needs in higher education should be addressed in terms of two important aspects:
 - Relations between higher education institutions and economy, especially in the context of the transfer of knowledge (research and innovation) and labour market;
 - Relation between higher education institutions in the international environment – internationalization.
- 3) In this paper I am analyzing the internationalization of higher education from two aspects:
 - The aspect of Europeanization of higher education; European policies, particularly the “spirit” of Bologna has influenced regions in the whole world, also the Mediterranean region to develop into a ‘Mediterranean higher education area’ (Union for the Mediterranean and other Arab countries).
 - Motives for the internationalization, which can be of academic or economic nature - especially the latter, which is becoming focal, has a strong influence on the different management of higher education institutions.

Internationalisation also implies a gradual de-nationalization and raises the question “why does the North want to cooperate with the South?” For the balanced and sustainable

development of the region it is crucial that the internationalization is set in the way that it guarantees mutual benefits.

INTERNATIONALIZATION OF HIGHER EDUCATION

Internationalisation is an old phenomenon in higher education. However, the rapid changes in the field are observed through several activities and developments. In the past, mobility of students and staff was dominating. Nowadays, setting up joint programmes or degrees, branch offices in foreign countries and participation in international consortia are gaining importance. Thus, international activities are not marginal any more but are increasingly central strategic issues at the institutional level and an important dimension in national higher education policy development¹. Internationalization for instance is referred to the following issues:

- series of international activities such as mobility for students and teachers;
- international partnerships and projects;
- new international academic programs and research projects;
- the delivery of education to other countries;
- inclusion of an international and global dimension into the curriculum and teaching learning process.

Many attempts have been made to define internationalization. An encompassing definition is given by Knight and is relevant for this paper as well: “Internationalization of higher education at the national, sectorial, and institutional level is the process of integrating an international, intercultural or global dimension into the purpose, functions or delivery of postsecondary education”².

A lot of internationalization policies such as: Framework Programme for HE research (from 1982 on), Erasmus – Socrates (from 1987 on), Tempus, Barcelona Declaration (1995), Bologna declaration (1999), Lisbon strategy (2000), Erasmus Mundus (2001), Cairo Declaration (2007), et al. had a major impact on higher education systems in Europe and wider, national governments and individual higher education institutions more or less reacted to (or we can expect that they will react to) these developments.

'EUROPEISATION' OF HIGHER EDUCATION

Since the late 1990' changes in higher education in Western and Eastern European countries accelerated with an aim to enhance the convergence between higher education systems in different countries. Three key documents that shape the development are the Sorbonne declaration (1998), the Bologna declaration (1999) and the Lisbon Strategy (2000). The objectives of the first two are to make study programmes more compatible and comparable across European systems and the Lisbon Strategy seeks to reform fragmented systems into a more powerful and more integrated, knowledge-based economy. The first two documents are bottom-up initiated, they are signed by national governments and are legally not binding, whereas the Lisbon Strategy was committed by the European Council which defined a new approach to political coordination: 'the open method of co-ordination'.

- The *Sorbonne Declaration* (1998) was signed by 4 ministers of education
- A year later 29 ministers signed the *Bologna declaration* (1999) to establish the 'European higher education area' by 2010 ...
- How the process has spread is evident - by now the declaration has been signed by 46 countries already, what goes far beyond the EU borders.

The movements expressed in declarations can also be viewed as pressures from the 'outside' on national systems to be transparent and comparable ("audit culture"). However, those documents that set the basic lines of development in European higher education area, only stress the moral obligation of all signatory states. Yet, in order to practice mobility and

achieve comparability, transparency is necessary, therefore auditing (external and internal) is at the heart of these movements. The analysis of the Bologna Declaration, which specifically argues against pressures, promotes co-operation and is based on continuous audit and agreements on new measures, such as:

We hereby undertake to attain these objectives – within the framework of our institutional competences and taking full respect of the diversity of cultures, language, national educational systems and of University autonomy – to consolidate the European area of higher education. To that end, we will pursue the ways of intergovernmental co-operation, together with those of non-governmental European organisations with competence on higher education. We expect Universities again to respond promptly and positively and to contribute actively to the success of our endeavour. Convinced that the establishment of the European area of higher education requires constant support, supervision and adaptation to the continuously evolving needs, we decide to meet again within two years in order to assess the progress achieved and the new steps to be taken³.

TENSIONS BETWEEN 'LOCAL' AND 'EUROPEISATION', CONVERGENCE AND DIVERGENCE IN THE HIGHER EDUCATION

Bologna Declaration shows something of the tensions between the 'local' and the 'European', between 'taking full respect of the diversity of the cultures ...' and 'consolidation to the European area of higher education'.

Nóvoa and de Jong-Lambet⁴ critically discuss the idea of 'European educational space' and argue that "education has been one of the most contested arenas in Europe, not only due to its symbolic value in national imaginaries but also because of public resistance to a 'common policy'". Further, they analyse the 'Work Programme for 2010'⁵ which emphasise four verbs: identify, spread, measure and compare.

To identify means to agree on shared objectives and guidelines for educational policies and to spread refers to the diffusion and transfer of most successful practices from one country to another. To measure is to establish precise benchmarks and to evaluate the performance

of each educational system, and to compare means to organise a way of assessing the progress made by each country. It is pointless to restate the overt intention that all of these convergence policies be adopted to 'agreed instruments', 'voluntary participation', 'partnership' and 'decentralised approaches'. The goal of these processes is described as 'to help Member States to develop their own policies progressively'. Which we translate as: 'to help Member States to develop their own policies progressively, in accordance with the objectives defined at the European level'⁶.

Nóvoa and de Jong-Lambet⁷ claim that the idea of 'Europeisation' is based on "a logic of mutual accountability, as developed through an evaluation of, or comparison between, national systems of education, using a series of indicators, outcomes, benchmarks and guidelines" and that the 'education space' is considered "as a field of expertise, in which the main objective is to achieve consensus".

Current European trends (signed declarations); movements toward comparability of higher education in Europe could be understood as a creation of a new, 'Euro higher education scape'. Yet, there is a specific tradition of academic freedom that has to be taken into account when 'scape' is discussed. Declarations can potentially contribute to the 'creation' of the 'Euro HE scape'. These documents were locally discussed with a certain level of scepticism. These tensions seem irresolvable but as they are surfaced, they can be seen as 'pulse' for change processes, re-applying the Stronach et al.⁸ metaphor from the context of professionalism into global HE processes: "the metaphor for professionalism is 'pulse' rather than 'push'.

When discussing developments in higher education on the European continent it makes sense to relate it to the concepts of convergence and divergence. Along history several traditions in all fields of life have developed in Europe. The area of education is not excluded from these trends. Europe offers a rich variety of educational systems and cultures.

The whole “Bologna” process captures two conceptual units:

- Convergence or integration that aims to bring higher education systems closer to each other, make them more transparent so that the academic cooperation and mobility become easier.
- Divergence within and among higher education systems for the purpose to serve different needs of students and to maintain and stimulate the richness of different cultural and educational traditions which through many centuries developed several national and cultural identities in Europe.

The economic and political situation with economic crisis in the 1970's stimulated some actions of convergence. Market driven demands enhance the competitiveness of the European economy on the global markets with the need to train labour force skilled to cope with the challenges of the knowledge societies. In this respect some mechanisms to make higher education systems more compatible and transparent became a necessity. On the other hand massive enrolment into higher education requires a variety of provision to fulfil a greater variety of students' and labour market needs.

The Bologna process is very influential in changing the degree structure into a two-cycle, implementation of ECTS as a tool of enhancing the readability and recognition of degrees, development of the European Qualifications Framework, the tuning of the learning outcomes⁹. There is variation in the degree of change at the implementation across countries. Also examples of increased diversity within countries have been observed.

“EXTERNAL DIMENSION” OF BOLOGNA AND EURO-MEDITERRANEAN COOPERATION

The idea of establish the European higher education area has been closely related to wider international and global processes in higher education based on cooperation and partnership with countries from other regions beyond the borders of the European Union and not only on international competitiveness, attractiveness and recognition. Zgaga¹⁰ explored the echoes of the Bologna declaration around the world (i.e., China, Asia and Oceania, Africa, Latina America and Caribbean). The Bologna process has had an important

impact on higher education reforms in South Eastern Europe and in Russian federation since 2002.

These developments are grounded on broader policies on regional cooperation. *Barcelona declaration* from 1995¹¹ offers a wide framework for political, economic and social relationship between the Member States of the EU and Partners of the Southern Mediterranean, the Barcelona Process has three main objectives:

- 1) To build common area of peace and stability through the reinforcement of political and security dialogue;
- 2) The construction of a zone of shared prosperity through the economic and financial partnership and the gradual establishment of free-trade area;
- 3) The rapprochement between peoples through social, cultural and human partnership aimed at encouraging understanding between cultures and exchanges between civil societies.

The third goal of the Barcelona process stresses the need for the development of human resources as a mean to promote understanding between cultures and exchanges between societies. Policies focusing on higher education and research have been taking place in this direction. The *Tarragona declaration*¹² stresses the dialogue and cooperation between the EU and Mediterranean universities. Such inter-university cooperation might contribute to efficiency and increasing competitiveness of the European higher education system, to acquire skills necessary for social, economic and institutional development and to increase cultural and technological exchange.

Mediterranean is an important region of which countries in the “European part” are today EU Member States. There has been a lot of co-operation between countries of both regions already (Tempus projects covered through MEDA Programmes, Cards and Tacis in the Western Balkans, East Europe and Central Asian region)¹³.

Another important document in the region (12 ministers who signed the document) is the Catania declaration¹⁴ which has been very much influenced by the Bologna processes. It is aiming to create a “Euro-Mediterranean Higher Education Area” and among other things

“activate a structured cooperation in order to promote the comparability and readability of higher education systems in the Euro-Mediterranean Area, though preserving each country’s individuality, establishing common education and training paths based on a system of transferable credits and on easily readable qualifications, sharing quality assurance schemes, promotion of PhD programmes, establishment of Centres of Excellence, strengthening distance learning, developing vocational expertise and diplomas in higher education.

The Cairo Declaration “Towards a Euro-Mediterranean Higher Education & Research Area” (2007) constitutes the framework, guiding principles and general/long-term objectives of the Euro-Mediterranean cooperation in Higher Education, Research and Technological Development (RTD). A new impulse for the Euro-Mediterranean partnership was provided by the Joint Declaration of the Paris Summit for the Mediterranean (Paris, 13 July 2008), which launched the Union for the Mediterranean. The Marseille Declaration of the Euro-Med Foreign Ministers Conference (Marseille, 3-4 November 2008) emphasized the importance of further developing the “Euro-Mediterranean Higher Education and Research Area”.

EMUNI University was inaugurated in 2008, in the European Year of Intercultural Dialogue. It is expected that EMUNI will operate and play a role of utmost importance within the framework of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EUROMED).

- In respect to the trend of convergence the EMUNI follows the recommendations of the Bologna process to make study programmes more transparent and more similar in the European and wider higher education area. As such could contribute to “harmonisation” of HE and research area in the Mediterranean region (performing the programmes in line with the Bologna process, using the ECTS and Diploma Supplement, supporting and promoting the mobility for students and graduates, allow mutual recognition of study periods and diplomas).
- EMUNI also aims to contribute to the processes that stimulate divergence in European higher education. The emphasis on international co-operation involves cultural diversity and also a wide variety of topics to be covered in research and study

programmes. The EMUNI intends to develop and further elaborate sensitivity for cultural diversity in a variety of academic disciplines and in academic cooperation.

MOBILITY IN NUMBERS




Figure 3 Number of students from Mediterranean countries studying abroad, 2007

Source: GED 2009, 143-145 (For more detailed information see Supplement)

As it is seen from the figure above, the Mediterranean countries¹⁵ can be divided in four basic groups. The first one contains countries with number of outbound students over 30000. Among these France has the highest number of outbound students (54,021). Top five destinations for France outbound mobile students are United Kingdom (13,068), Belgium (8,949), U.S.A. (6,852), Germany (5,960) and Switzerland (4,876). Country with the second highest number of outbound students is Morocco (41,502); most of these students are studying in France (27,684) and Germany (4,369). The greater part of Italy's outbound mobile students are studying in Austria (6,209), United Kingdom (5,989), France (4,790), Holy See (4,103) and Germany (3,636). Most Greece's outbound mobile students are studying in United Kingdom (16,051), and Italy (5,054).

The second group consists of countries with outbound students between 20000 and 30000. In these section Spain (23,914), Algeria (23,213) and Cyprus (22,898) have about the same number of outbound mobile students. Top five destinations for Spain outbound students are United Kingdom (6,352), Germany (4,170), France (3,860), U.S.A. (3,654) and Sweden (912). Most of Algeria outbound mobile students are studying in France (20,125) and Canada (1,197) and most of Cyprus outbound mobile students are studying in Greece (11,449) and United Kingdom (8,712).

In the third group there are Syria (13,278), Lebanon (12,702) and Israel (11,882), with number of outbound students from 10000 to 20000. Top five destinations for Syrian outbound students are France (2,618), Ukraine (1,933), Jordan (1,845), Germany (1,650) and Saudi Arabia (865). Most Lebanon’s outbound mobile students are studying in France (5,391) and U.S.A. (1,893). Majority of Israel outbound mobile students are studying in U.S.A. (3,341), Jordan (1,863), Germany (1,275) and Italy (1,121).

Last and the largest group is the one with the smallest number of outbound students, with the number under 10000.




Figure 4 Top five destinations for Mediterranean outbound mobile students

Source: GED 2009, 143-145 (For more detailed information see Supplement)

Data shows that majority of Mediterranean students are studying in Europe and in USA. Most popular European countries for study are France, United Kingdom, Germany and Italy.




Figure 5 Number of abroad students studying in Mediterranean countries, 2007

Source: GED 2009, 143-145 (For all other Mediterranean countries there is no data available, For more detailed information see Supplement

From Figure 5 we have seen that the Mediterranean countries have many of outbound students, but the view on the inbound mobile students can be very different. Only 12 Mediterranean countries have reported inbound mobile students. The highest number of students from abroad between Mediterranean countries has France (246,612) and the second is Italy with the number of 57,271.

Only three Mediterranean countries have positive net flow of mobile students (inbound – outbound); France (192,591), Italy (22,138) and Lebanon (9,972). Perhaps, on the basis of these data we can suggest that the Mediterranean countries currently are not very attractive for foreign students.

MOTIVES FOR INTERNATIONALISATION AND INFLUENCE ON THE OPERATION OF THE INSTITUTIONS

Although the interpretation of the internationalisation of higher education between higher education institutions can be similar, the way of the implementation of their activities (mobility, curricula, common degrees, transnational education etc.) can differ greatly. These

inconsistencies may be a consequence of different priorities, cultures, history or different political systems.




Figure 6 Institutional priorities in internationalization

Source: IAU 2009

Figure 6 shows that the institutions included in the global survey¹⁶ on internationalization of higher education, have ranked the highest priorities in internationalization to be - outgoing mobility for students, international student exchanges and attracting international students and research collaboration. The next three priorities following the highest ones are strengthen international content of curriculum, joint or double/dual degrees and outgoing mobility for faculty/staff. Priorities which are ranked as the lowest are internationalization at home and the development and capacity building projects.

The approaches to internationalisation of higher education can be divided to the following four groups¹⁷:

- Active approach enhances activities of internationalisation of higher education, such as: internationalisation of curricula, student exchange and academic staff and international students;
- Competence approach emphasises the development of skills, knowledge, and values of students and employees in the higher education institutions;

- Ethos approach emphasises the development of cultural values and supports international/intercultural views and initiatives;
- Process approach encourages integration of international/intercultural dimension into education, research and services in the field of different activities and processes.

According to Knight¹⁸ the motives for internationalisation of the European higher education are mainly of academic nature and relate to quality improvement, development and improving the reputation of the higher education institutions, while the economic interests prevail in the USA and Australia, where the level of the internationalisation is the highest.

The increase in the mobility of students, academic staff, international study programmes, international consortia, increased importance of the international reputation of higher education institutions and transnational virtual education is a challenge to the higher education institutions in the whole world and requires changes in their operation: increased attention is going to new (more) market oriented mechanisms and modern types of management at the higher education institutions. Key words, such as: accountability and new public management have replaced the traditional role of state as the inspecting body for the field of higher education. According to Boer and File (2009) the state has shifted the task of the accountability and quality assurance in the field of higher education to the higher education institutions' management with a purpose to increase efficiency and raise the awareness of social needs and demands. On the basis of the increased competence in the field of higher education and bigger institutional autonomy and internationalisation the higher education institutions needed to become more sensitive to different demands of their stakeholders.

The reduce of public financing in the field of higher education resulted in the need of higher education institutions to become 'entrepreneurial' in terms of acquiring additional financial resources – internationalisation got the economic dimension (recruiting foreign students, implementation of transnational education etc.) The latter requires the fundamental reorganisation of the processes of operation of higher education institutions, including

administrative, pedagogic, research reorganisation and also changes in leadership and mentality.

INTERNATIONALISATION AS “MUTUAL BENEFIT” CONCEPT

IAU (International Association of Universities, 2005) adopted a position that the internationalisation of higher education is still perceived (governmental institutions and academic sphere) as a move towards the further development of higher education.




Figure 7 Benefits of internationalization

Source: IAU 2009

As we can see from the Figure 7, most institutions included in the global survey¹⁹ on internationalization of higher education have ranked as the highest benefit international awareness of students (24.05%). Next ranked benefits are strengthened research and production with 15.93% and cooperation and solidarity with 12,46%. Between investigated institutions, internationalized curriculum (11.01%) and enhanced prestige/profile (10.65%) are seen as less significant contributions of internationalization.

However, according to the opinion of IAU there are also negative challenges, connected to internationalisation of higher education, such as:

- financial opportunities, connected to different forms of internationalisation may result in the reduce of higher education as public good;
- the increased competition between higher education institutions may reduce rather than increase cooperation among them;
- the importance of the promotion of cultural diversity may be reduced by the extension of “the strongest” language and dominant culture, national identities are getting lost;
- brain drain.

For the purpose of the balanced development of the region the member states should offer a chance for inter-university exchange of staff (North – South, South - North) to achieve 'brain circulation' (academic extension of internationalisation).

Internationalisation may be perceived as the “exchange” of knowledge, different forms of cooperation. This exchange cannot be treated as a “gift” or “commodity”, so a framework needs to be found, in which this kind of cooperation may be recognised as 'mutual benefit'. An important starting point for developing a partnership (between HEI and state-national HE systems) is recognizing that partners have different interests, needs. Usually time is taken to communicate openly about interests and needs of the respective parties; it's worth to built a mutually beneficial partnership; relationship built upon reciprocity are less likely to degenerate over distrust and feelings of resentment. In order that partnership is to be sustained over time, relationship must be based upon mutual understanding and respect. From outset, it's very important to make it clear who is going to benefit from the collaboration activity; and to be sure that expectations and roles are clearly defined.

Internationalisation is moving from “the margins” of operations of individual higher education institutions to its focus. New, entrepreneurial forms of internationalisation of higher education have become interlinked with other processes, such as: commoditisation,

privatisation, competition and establishing international links between higher education sectors. The internationalisation of higher education, which is perceived as one of the creative ways of the response of higher education systems and higher education institutions to the process of globalisation, may be in the case that the current internationalisation – economic strategies will continue, be actually renamed into the globalisation of higher education. This shift could mean the devaluation of the key purposes of the internationalisation of higher education, such as: cooperation between higher education institutions and their operators, understanding of diversity and knowledge exchange.

The existing experience and knowledge on different fields in HE in diverse Mediterranean countries has to be transferred to other countries to mutual benefit. The cultural and educational aspects of each country must always be respected as they constitute the fundamental pillars of Mediterranean tradition²⁰.

SUPPLEMENT

Region	Students from a given country studying abroad (outbound mobile students)			Top five destinations (host countries) for outbound mobile students. (The number of students from given country studying in the host countries is shown in brackets)	Number of students from abroad studying in given country (inbound mobile students)	Net flow of mobile students (Inbound – outbound)	
	Country or territory	MF	Outbound mobility ratio (%)			Gross outbound enrolment ratio	MF
AFRICA							
Egypt	7,802	0.3 **,- ²	0.1	U.S.A. (1,701), United Kingdom (1,204), Germany (1,020), France (862), Saudi Arabia (531) ¹
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	3,548	...	0.5	United Kingdom (1,686), Malaysia (466)-1, Germany (229), France (228), Canada (132) ¹
Tunisia	17,420	5.6	1.6	France (10,533), Germany (2,499), Canada (1,137) ¹ , Romania (777), Ukraine (568)
Algeria	23,213	2.7	0.6	France (20,125), Canada (1,197) ¹ , United Kingdom (477), Germany (196), Switzerland (177)	5,709	-17,504	...
Morocco	41,502	11.7	1.3	France (27,684), Germany (4,369), Canada (2,652) ¹ , Spain (1,782), U.S.A. (1,229)	7,029	-34,473	-9.3
EUROPA							
Bosnia and Herzegovina	8,634	8.7	3.2	Croatia (2,974), Austria (2,582), Germany (751), Turkey (520), U.S.A. (422)
Croatia	5,544	3.9	1.8	Italy (1,353), Austria (1,259), U.S.A. (643), Slovenia (597), Germany (512)	3,488	-2,056	-1.5
Albania	19,930	...	6.7	Italy (11,883), Greece (4,253), U.S.A. (860), Turkey (600), France (450)
Slovenia	2,244	1.8	1.7	Austria (556), Italy (387), United Kingdom (283), Germany (279), U.S.A. (203)	1,195	-1,049	-0.9
France	54,021	2.5	1.4	United Kingdom (13,068), Belgium (8,949), U.S.A. (6,852), Germany (5,960), Switzerland (4,876)	246,612	192,591	8.8
Italy	35,133	1.6	1.2	Austria (6,209), United Kingdom (5,989), France (4,790), Holy See (4,103)-8, Germany (3,636)	57,271	22,138	1.1
Greece	32,588	4.6	4.9	United Kingdom (16,051), Italy (5,054), Germany (2,707), U.S.A. (2,030), France (1,952)	21,160	-11,428	-1.9
Malta	1,033	8.6 ⁻²	3.5	United Kingdom (815), Italy (44), Germany (35), U.S.A. (28), Australia (20)	605 ⁻²	-213 -2	-2.3 ⁻²
Monaco	376	France (285), United Kingdom (44), U.S.A. (21), Italy (9), Switzerland (8)
Spain	23,914	1.2	0.9	United Kingdom (6,352), Germany (4,170), France (3,860), U.S.A. (3,654), Sweden (912)	21,315	-2,599	-0.1
Montenegro
ASIA							
Israel	11,882	3.7	2.2	U.S.A. (3,341), Jordan (1,863) ³ , Germany (1,275), Italy (1,121), United Kingdom (889)
Cyprus	22,898	110.7	37.3	Greece (11,449), United Kingdom (8,712), U.S.A. (896), Bulgaria (552), Hungary (293)	5,590	-17,308	-77.9
Turkey	36,840	1.5	0.5	U.S.A. (11,760), Germany (7,165), Azerbaijan (3,050), France (2,339), Austria (2,245)	19,257	-17,583	-0.7
Palestinian Autonomous Territories	8,119 ⁻¹	6.2 ⁻¹	2.3 ⁻¹	Jordan (5,278) ¹ , Saudi Arabia (766) ¹ , U.S.A. (369), Qatar (346), Turkey (195)	-
Lebanon	12,702	7.0	3.5	France (5,391), U.S.A. (1,893), Canada (1,056) ¹ , Germany (675), United Kingdom (669)	22,674	9,972	5.3
Syrian Arab Republic	13,278	...	0.6	France (2,618), Ukraine (1,933), Jordan (1,845) ¹ , Germany (1,650), Saudi Arabia (865) ¹

Table 2 International flows of mobile students, 2007

Source: GED 2009, 143-145

... No data available

-n Data refer to the school or financial year (or period) n years or periods prior to the reference year or period

FM male and female

** UIS estimation

¹ J. Huisman, and M. C. Wende (Eds.), "On cooperation and competition ii: responses to internationalisation, europeanisation and globalisation", 2005.

² J. Knight, "Updated Internationalization Definition. Borton. International Higher Education", 2003.

³ The Bologna Declaration (1999); http://www.bologna-berlin2003.de/pdf/bologna_declaration.pdf.

⁴ A. Nóvoa and W. de Jong-Lambert, "The Education of Europe: Apprehending EU educational policies", Paper (draft) presented at Post-Graduate and New Researchers' Pre-Conference. Lisbon: ECER 2002.

⁵ The 'Work Programme for 2010' or detailed work programme on the follow-up of the objectives of education and training system in Europe (6365/02 – EDUC 27) was approved in 2002 by Education Council (February 14) and by the Barcelona European Council (March 15–16). The primary purpose of the program is to organise EU educational standards into a 'single comprehensive strategy' (Nóvoa and de Jong-Lambert 2002).

⁶ A. Nóvoa, and W. de Jong-Lambert, "The Education of Europe: Apprehending EU educational policies", Paper (draft) presented at Post-Graduate and New Researchers' Pre-Conference. Lisbon: ECER 2002.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ I. Stronach et al., "Towards an Uncertain Politics of Professionalism: teacher and nurse identities in flux", Journal of Educational Policy, 2002.

⁹ M. Van der Wende, "European responses to global competition in higher education", Paper presented at the symposium on Crisis of the publics. Centre for Studies in Higher Education, University of California, Berkeley, 2007.

¹⁰ P. Zgaga, "Looking out: The Bologna process in a global setting, On the "external dimension" of the Bologna process", Oslo: Norwegian Ministry of Education and Research, 2006. Available at: <http://www.bolognaoslo.com/expose/global/download.asp?id=51andfk=29andthumb> [10 February 2008].

¹¹ See http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/euromed/bd.htm.

¹² The Tarragona Declaration (2005); <http://www.unimedforum.net/index.htm>.

¹³ See http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/euromed/meda.htm.

¹⁴ The Catania Declaration (2006); <http://www.miur.it/UserFiles/2209.pdf#search='Catania%20Declaration'>.

¹⁵ Mediterranean countries:

- In Europe, from west to east: Spain, France, Monaco, Italy, Malta, Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Albania and Greece.
- In Asia, from north to south: Turkey, Cyprus, Syria, Lebanon, Israel and Palestine.
- In Africa, from east to west: Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco.

¹⁶ International Association of Universities (IAU) 2009: Global Survey on Internationalization of Higher Education. Responses in this edition of the survey were received from higher education institutions in 115 countries around the world (Africa 6%, Asia and Pacific 19%, Europe 44%, Latin America and Caribbean 9%, Middle East 5%, North America 17%). N=745.

¹⁷ Z. Quiang, "Internationalization of Higher Education: towards a conceptual framework", 2003. http://www.wwords.co.uk/pdf/validate.asp?j=pfieandvol=1andissue=2andyear=2003andarticle=5_Zha_PFIE_1_2_web, (20. 12. 2006).

¹⁸ J. Knight, "Internationalization- the New World of Crossborder Education Developments, Complexities and Challenges", 2005. http://www.itpnz.ac.nz/conferences/2005_Nov_ITP_Conf/Jane_Knight_Internationalisation.pdf (20. 7. 2007).

¹⁹ International Association of Universities (IAU) 2009: Global Survey on Internationalization of Higher Education. Responses in this edition of the survey were received from higher education institutions in 115 countries around the world (Africa 6%, Asia and Pacific 19%, Europe 44%, Latin America and Caribbean 9%, Middle East 5%, North America 17%). N=745.

²⁰ IEMed2030, 2009.

3.4 Towards a EuroMed Community

by Cilja Harders

The limiting case of the EuroMed relationship involves some kind of political cooperation. The paper should consider what kinds of political cooperation might in practice be possible. It should then discuss the risks and opportunities, the realism of options, the preconditions and the actions/fora that would be needed to make progress on these lines possible.

COOPERATION

Relations between the EU and other states and/or societies can very broadly be framed on a continuum between the two extremes “conflict” and “accession” thus including a wide variety of types of interaction. In addition, cooperation can happen on different levels (micro, meso, macro), in different fields, involving different actors (governments, intermediate organizations, individual actors) and institutions (formal, informal, inter-governmental, non-governmental) and different time horizons (short-term, mid-term, long-term). Thus, a possible EuroMed Community can be fledged out according to all these differentiations and a host of visions is possible.

Many social theories (political sciences, sociology, economic, psychology) hold that cooperation is possible, necessary and desirable because of the positive effects involved. It can produce win-win situations for all actors even though all types of cooperation involve costs and actors might not share all interests and/or aims. Cooperation is at the same time a precondition and a product of the abstention from the use of violence in inter-state relations. Politically, this conviction has been a major driving force of inter-European relations after WW2 as well as of the foreign relations of the EU as stated in the treaty of Lisbon.¹ It also shaped the Barcelona Process as a very ambitious multilateral, norm-based, regionalist, and integrative project.

Three important issues have to be kept in mind:

Firstly, vivid, fruitful and sustainable cooperation should not rely on mechanistic and functionalist visions even though the history of the EU might suggest otherwise post factum. Deepening and broadening of cooperation is not an automatic effect. The same is true for domestic transitions in the South: there are no “one-size-fits-it-all” ready-makes in order to change regimes or to create a free trade area. There is no simple causal link between economic liberalization and political liberalization and the experience of the EMP shows that there can be many dilemmas e.g. concerning the promotion of democracy and stability at the same time. Thus, cooperation always depends on favourable conditions and political will. Modelling in terms of game theory and along the interests and preferences of all actors involved can describe possible win-sets. In addition, non-material factors such as trust, shared norms, a spirit of partnership, hospitality, and diversity on both sides will be crucial for the success of any deeper cooperation. This is a long-term endeavour and the costs involved are substantial – as are the costs of a possible failure of cooperation.

Secondly, most theories of cooperation agree that trust is the main ingredient of successful cooperation and lack of trust the main reason for failing cooperation and enduring conflict even though win-win-situation could be created in principle. Lacking trust can be build but this is a long-term process involving many material and non-material resources and incentives, not the least: political will to build trust and a vision why this cooperation could be fruitful. European history after the WW2 and especially Franco-German relations show both: that trust can be build even after a long history of mistrust and violent conflict and that this takes time, a lot of effort on all levels and substantial amounts of money.

Thirdly and in addition, these successes need continuous reinforcement and active support on a daily basis as the current financial and currency crisis shows. Thus, what is true for the EU as a success-story is even more important for the more ambitious, difficult, and complex processes, which involve Europe’s neighbours and friends.

COOPERATION IN THE EURO-MEDITERRANEAN SPACE: MAJOR PROBLEMS

Today, most policy makers' and researchers' assessments of Euro-Mediterranean tend to be sceptical. Even though I share most of the criticism I think that the concept of the EMP was ambitious – and rightly so – and that these ambitious aims cannot be achieved in a short time and in an increasingly unfavourable regional environment. In a nutshell, these are the main issues:

- 1) Institutional set up: it is asymmetric. At the same time there is a proliferation of policies, initiatives, sub-strategies, which creates a very problematic institutional fuzziness. The EMP was asymmetric, the ENP strengthened this impression deeply: you choose your partners but not your neighbours! The UMed sets up new institutions but is severely de-politicised.²
- 2) The regionalist / multilateral dimension: is very important but no tangible progress on this side. To the contrary, the bilateralism of the ENP is weakening the regionalist idea of a shared Mediterranean space. The project-oriented approach of the UMed can enhance regional community building and cooperation on a practical level. It might as well reinforce bilateralism and the differentiation of status types which are already in place (see Morocco's special status, Israel's special relations, Turkey's status as candidate state etc.)
- 3) Domestic politics: The authoritarian regimes of the region constitute the main domestic barrier for progress in terms of democracy, human rights and rule of law. At the same time, Arab societies are currently experiencing deep social, cultural and economic change which is not concomitant with political change on the level of regime change. These "transformations without transitions" create social pressures on the regimes.³ Thus, needs-oriented local tensions and uprisings as well as anti-regime groups and movements are active all over the Arab world. This includes Islamist movements, which have so far been excluded from European policy efforts.
- 4) South-South cooperation: Lack of trust and cooperation prevails between southern partners. The complete and violent deadlock in the Arab Israeli conflict, but also in the Western Sahara constitutes a major problem for building trust in foreign relations

within the Arab world and the EU alike. The EU's passive role in the Arab-Israeli conflict and the unwillingness to criticise Israeli policies in the occupied territories adds to the picture of an EU, which is not impartial. Other major regional players such as the Gulf countries, Iraq and Iran have so far been excluded from the EuroMed process.

- 5) Norms and identities: Securitization, militarization and culturalization of foreign and domestic relations on both shores of the Mediterranean after 9-11 and the "war on terror" endanger cooperation in the region. This does not contribute to a culture of shared humanity, unity in diversity and mutual respect on the societal level. The increasing framing of foreign policy issues in terms of the defence of identities developed mobilizing power, which is channelled by Islamist and nationalist/Arabist forces in the region. Decreasing legitimacy of the EU as normative power due to double standards concerning the dilemma of democracy and stability, in face of the Palestinian situation, and in terms of Islamists coming to power.
- 6) Huge gap between the "incentives" or the offered assistance and the expectations given the enormous costs of the necessary adaptation processes. Main issues are the agrarian products, the slow pace in terms of the EuroMed FTA, problems with rules of origin, insufficient funds.

Summing up, these are the main problems:

- Lack of a shared vision,
- Lack of political will,
- Lack of trust,
- Lack of resources,
- Lack of suitable institutions.

CONTOURS OF A EUROMED COMMUNITY

The “Acquis” describes the shared vision of the future euro-Mediterranean community, which will take the form of shared rules defining the obligations and benefits. The EuroMed Community’s institutional set up will be embedded in a co-responsible scenario. Enlarged cohesion, convergence, progressive integration and possible accession are steps and aims on the way to reach the envisioned EuroMed Community.

Community Acquis: The acquis is the normative and regulative framework of all possible closer cooperation. As in the different stages of EU enlargement (southern, northern, eastern), the acquis represents all foundational principles of the EU and as such the EU offers to future partners to adhere to the same rules. Whereas steps towards reaching this can be a matter of debate the acquis itself is not. Even though the binding rules and obligations of the acquis and the accession to this acquis constitute the most encompassing vision it is also deeply asymmetric, as newcomers cannot change the rules. Their incentive is the future possibility to set (and change) the rules. The acquis maps out the main aims of any integration and convergence scenario.

A special Euro-Mediterranean acquis as a common vision and a road map: The Barcelona Declaration, the association agreements, the ENP, the action plans and UMed documents already constitute a specific acquis of the future EuroMed Community. A condensed version of the implicit and explicit agreement already reached in the above mentioned documents would map the shared vision of all members of such a community. It constitutes a formal commitment of all partners and legitimizes the institutional rules and procedures already developed (e.g. the complex mixture of bi- and multilateralism, the basket-structure, the specific role of the commission as a guardian of the EMP). In addition, it embodies the political will of all parties involved and it defines a shared vision of the aims, institutional set ups and necessary steps on the way to a Euro-Mediterranean Community. Not all aims have to be fulfilled before entering the EuroMed Community because this acquis serves as a vision and a roadmap. But the “potential acquis” as it was coined in a Euromesco-Report has to be fully acknowledged as the shared vision. This includes aims already stated in the Barcelona declaration of 1995:

"...first, the primacy of fundamental values; second, the rejection of power politics in relations between states; third, a commitment to build a common economic area, with the establishment of a Free Trade Area (FTA) in 2010 as an indispensable instrument to achieve that goal; and fourth, placing civil society at the core of the processes of regional integration, cooperation and reform. At the heart of the process is the commitment of the partners 'to develop the rule of law and democracy in their political systems.'"⁴

The institutional set up: A co-responsible scenario

The EuroMed community builds on the institutional acquis of the Barcelona Process including the latest institutional innovations of the Union for the Mediterranean. Two major aims have to be pursued: first, to overcome the structural asymmetry of governmental relations within the EU setting and second, to ensure the broadest societal involvement possible, i.e. co-responsibility of governments, intermediary organisations and the citizens of the Union. This implies different sets of rules on the different levels of interaction. On the inter-governmental level, rules of cooperation (i.e. the right of agenda- and budget-setting, decision making, financial contributions, responsibility for results, benchmarking, conditionality) have to be developed in order to create a maximum of procedural legitimacy as well as to be able to produce tangible outputs (input- and output-legitimacy). There are already many models of how to create such an institutional structure e.g. in the framework of accession processes but also in the EMP-UMed framework (Euro-Med committee, shared presidency, Euro-Med Secretariat, multisectorial EuroMed Unit, majority voting, conflict resolution procedures)⁵.

On the transnational level, i.e. the level of cooperation between intermediary organizations and individual human beings, the institutional set-up has to be flexible in order to create fora for building the much needed human trust through transnational exchange, shared experience, dialogue, and hospitality. The EuroMed civil forum, the Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly, the Anna-Lindh-Foundation and the multiple networks in the field of economic cooperation can serve as models for these enabling spaces. They should enable the broadest participation; create spheres of non-interference by governments, spheres of mutual respect and a spirit of unity in diversity.

The aims of a EuroMed Community: Cohesion and convergence

Whereas the general aims of the EuroMed Community are laid down in the Community acquis and the Barcelona acquis, cohesion and convergence can be understood as operationalizations of the general vision of peace, well-being and respect of human rights and the rule of law. Convergence policies have been at the core of EU policies in order to promote growth-enhancing conditions and factors leading to economic, social and territorial convergence for the least-developed Member States and regions. The aim was and is to create social cohesion through equitable and sustainable growth, thus balancing huge disparities in welfare and development and creating solidarity and the social basis for peace. This is a major issue for any meaningful EuroMed community in light of the striking imbalances, which are currently a sad and ongoing Euro-Mediterranean reality. Thus, in order to create cohesion and convergence substantial funding will be necessary even if the eligibility threshold is set at much less than the EU wide of a GDP of below 90% of the Community average.

Stepping stones towards a EuroMed Community: Progressive integration and possible accession

Social cohesion and material, legal, economic, social and political convergence is the precondition in order to reach more cooperation, deeper integration and possible accession. Cooperation and integration could follow the path of variable geometry, which has often been successful in the history of the EU as sectorial integration was a major stepping-stone towards accession. Here, the promises of the ENP: a stake in the internal market and access to the four freedoms come into play. Accession itself is a highly formalized process of plurilateral negotiations, which follows an institutional routine set by the EU. The full adoption of the Community acquis is a precondition. The necessary processes of adaptation take time and they have been strongly supported materially and non-materially by the EU in all enlargement rounds of the Union. In addition, there has been strong political will on part of some European states and a “community trap” that worked in favour of the Eastern European states and their supporters.

HOW TO GET THERE?

Any coherent strategy towards reaching the aim of a EuroMed community as outlined above has to strike a balance between tackling the criticisms of today and at the same time work towards a shared future.

Institutional set-up: The aim must be partnership, shared responsibility, stake-holder involvement. Develop a clear structure. We do not need more institutional fuzziness but a clear set-up instead. The institutional structure can grow more complex over time as cooperation increases and new needs for coordination arise.

In addition, and as importantly as the institutional set-up, are the beliefs and values of those engaged in the partnership. As long as a paternalistic language of conditionality, incentives, modernizing countries etc. prevails, the vision of a community will remain pure rhetoric. This in turn is detrimental for building much needed trust, especially as the ruling elites on both sides of the Mediterranean will have to build political will, in order to engage in costly, time consuming changes in all major fields of the society, economy and politics. A good step would be a high level renewal of agreement about the above mentioned Barcelona acquis as a shared vision of the EuroMed community.

Regionalism, multilateralism, South-South relations: As both components describe ways of reaching an aim i.e. a EuroMed community and at the same time constitute aims they can be included in any of the above mentioned scenarios as mechanisms and as aims. The multilateral dimension should also enhance those non-governmental types of cooperation in economy, migration, education, culture, which are well below highly institutionalized activities. At the same time the multiplication of such transnational, societal activities constitute the bulk of sustainable measures in building trust between the two shores of the Mediterranean and between the southern states. On the level of governmental actors, reaching peace in the Middle East must become a major short term and medium term aim (Asseburg, Salem 2009). Without a fair and sustainable solution to one of the most protracted conflicts in the world which is deeply affecting the foreign and domestic politics of Israel, the PA/ Palestinian territories and the Arab States alike, there will be no progress in terms of building a security community. Reaching such a peace will involve other regional actors such as the Gulf States, and Turkey. As violent conflicts always constitute major

obstacles for cooperation, all major players in today's conflicts in the region have to be taken into account: Iraq, Yemen, Iran, and the Gulf-states. This could also enable the prospective community to benefit from resources from the oil-rich countries. Such an enlarged EuroMed scenario will surely challenge the Mediterranean character of the envisioned community. But EuroMed Plus matches the geographical and political interdependencies in the region as much as it would cater to European, Arab and Israeli interests.

Economically, the US and emerging powers will play a major role in the region. Their offers will shape the interests and preferences of Euro-Med actors and these needs to be taken into account in terms of the economic and non-material benefits which will be offered by EuroMed cooperation.

Domestic politics and authoritarian regimes: It is difficult to envision incentives for authoritarian regime elites to loosen their grip on power. The EU cannot and should not buy them out of power. At the same time, it should leave the idea of more or less indirect "trickle-down-effects". Political change in the region has to be pursued by those who live there and pay the price of possible repression. It has to be pursued from above and from below. Thus, a policy of gradualism towards the elites is necessary in order to strengthen those parts of the (coopted) elites who are interested in (limited) reform. Here, a focus on the rule of law and modernizing the bureaucracy could be helpful. Still, all these measures are in danger of being coopted.

At the same time, on the level of intermediary organizations and the citizens, other approaches can be applied. There is huge potential for change as many recent polls show. Still, these processes take time and transition research shows that these processes are necessarily open ended. Thus, as long as the EU is not willing to engage with the outcomes of democratic processes (cf. Hamas in Gaza) it will be very difficult to demand more democracy. The other problem of external democracy promotion is the dilemma of westernization and cultural imperialism, which hits progressive forces the hardest. This implies a non-directive interaction, which in turn might provoke questions from the European Voter. Thus, the EU should act as provider of enabling spaces. The creation of spaces for the participation of collective non-governmental intermediary actors as well as ordinary citizens will provide for the necessary exchange between citizens.

SUGGESTED MEASURES

The EuroMed community should adopt a fixed date policy and define clear terms, aims, instruments and financial modes. It has to strike a balance between the positive effects of variable geometry and integration according to different needs and paces and the keeping up of a shared vision as laid down in the acquis of Barcelona. In addition, the following short-, medium- and long-term measures could be taken.

Short-term: implement measures, which produce tangible and visible positive output quickly. A major symbolic and practical measure that would embody the new spirit of shared humanity and interdependency is a change in visa- and migration policies (free movement of people). Make Middle East Peace a priority in terms of foreign policies.

Mid-term: Concretize the promises of the ENP and offer tangible access to the internal market. Openings in the sensitive field of agrarian products should be a major aim as this will have positive impacts on large parts of the southern-Mediterranean rural population.

All trust-building measures rely on regular exchange as the concrete experience of trust, hospitality, diversity, and respect leads to the routinization of expectations and thus trust. Thus, the transfer and exchange of know-how, the support of educational exchange (schools, universities, teachers, staff, long-term and short-term visits) will create the future multipliers of the EuroMed community. Mutual understanding and learning should be the spirit of these endeavours. Further cooperation between economic actors not only as a unilateral FDI-exercise but also as processes of mutual learning and exchange.

Institutionally and economically: Take all measures necessary for integration and cohesion. Keep the process flexible, regular stocktaking and possible re-definition of aims and procedures as to be assured.

Long-Term: all measures necessary to prepare a pre-accession and accession process. Support all measures, which support the normative dimensions of EU policies in the region. Shared values are rather the outcome of a long process of cooperation and contact than a precondition for the beginning of a partnership.

¹ In the Title 2 of the Treaty of Lisbon, Articles 1, 2 and 3 state the norms on which the union is founded: "The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail."

Article 7a serves as the legal basis for relations with the Mediterranean: "The Union shall develop a special relationship with neighbouring countries, aiming to establish an area of prosperity and good neighbourliness, founded on the values of the Union and characterised by close and peaceful relations based on cooperation."

² K. Kausch and R. Youngs, "The end of the „Euro-Mediterranean Vision", *International Affairs*, Vol. 85, No. 5, 2009.

³ C. Harders and M. Bolle, "Scenarios 2025. The Euro-Mediterranean region in Transition", Berlin: Working Paper on the Center for Middle Eastern and North African Politics, 2009.

⁴ Euromesco 2005: Towards a Euro-Mediterranean Community of Democratic States. A Euromesco Report, Lisbon, Euromesco Secretariat.

⁵ S. Prado, "Towards an Ever Closer Partnership. A model for new Euro-Israeli Partnership". Lisbon, Euromesco Paper No. 72, 2008.

3.5 The feasibility of deeper integration between Arab countries and the EU

by Ibrahim Saif

INTRODUCTION

More than a decade has passed since the launch of Barcelona process and the Euro-Med partnership agreement. The dialogue between Arab countries dated back to the early seventies, after the first imposed oil embargo. This dialogue was always overshadowed by the Arab Israeli conflict, hence attempts were made to create parallel tracks that tackle economic, political and regional cooperation.

A common EU policy was adopted and accordingly Association Agreements (AA) with South Mediterranean Countries (SMCs) were signed aiming at "creating area of prosperity" through free exchange of trade by 2014. Following the free trade agreements, services sectors and other related activities could be included.

Focusing on trade only means that priority was given to "shallow integration". Deeper integration includes emphasizing issues such as infrastructure, legislation, investment and other aspects of cooperation.

In general the outcome of the AA has been modest with varying degrees and does not lead one to expect that deeper integration is a high possibility. In the trend side, we discussed developments and the expansion of the EU umbrella and the new policy changes that the EU introduced over the last few years in its attempt to at least achieve one of the main goals that were envisaged when Barcelona Process was launched; namely the economic integration and prosperity.

The ENP was viewed by some experts (e.g. Hoekman) as a new device which provides a way to deepen the Association Agreement. Given the criticisms against the Association Agreement for its shallowness, the ENP offers partner countries, the chance to deepen their relationship with the EU. What we observe is that the Association Agreement contained the necessary provisions for such deep integration, however they were either postponed to the

future or worded vaguely. The ENP may have had an advantage of making such issues precise based on the Action Plans agreed upon jointly between the EU and the neighbouring countries. However, the Action Plan still did not identify the means of implementation, and modes of cooperation. Although it has decided a number of priorities, the list of priorities came too long that the priority aspect was either lost or generalized as can be seen from the table1 below. Time dimension was not emphasized by referring to what needs to be achieved as a short term and medium term. Means of implementation were rather absent whether in type of cooperation or in means of financial and/or technical assistance.

	Jordan	Israel	Morocco	Palestine	Tunisia	Lebanon	Egypt
Political Dialogue	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Free Movement of Goods	Yes	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes
Industrial goods	Yes	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes
Agricultural, fisheries, and processed agricultural products	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Right of Establishment	Yes	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes
Payments and capital movements	Yes		Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes
Economic cooperation	Yes (public finance)	Yes	Yes (public finance)	Yes (public finance)	Yes (public finance)	Yes (public finance)	Yes (insurance)
Education	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Scientific and technological cooperation	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Environment	Yes						
Industrial cooperation	Yes	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes
Standards and conformity assessment	Yes						
Approximation of laws	Yes						
Information and telecommunications	Yes						
Energy	Yes						
Investment	Yes	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes
Customs	Yes						
Drugs	Yes	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes
Crime	Yes	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes
Terrorism	Yes						
Consumer protection		Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes
Social matters	Yes						
Migration	Yes	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes
Cultural matters and audiovisual	Yes						
Democracy	Yes						
Judiciary independence	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Women	Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Export potential	Yes						
Services	Yes						
Sustainable Development	Yes						
Poverty reduction	Yes						
Transport	Yes						
Human Rights	Yes						
Business climate		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Public administration			Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Corruption		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Competition law and policy	Yes						

Table 3 Areas of priorities as identified in the Action Plans within the ENP framework

Source: Action Plans of different countries mentioned in the table

However the action plans have been more specific on addressing certain issues that could enhance deeper integration, for example the action plan with Egypt identified few issues that were not part of the association agreement, this includes investment flows from the EU to big countries such as Egypt. Clearly the record of investment flows from the EU to the rest of Arab countries was mixed. While Tunisia and Morocco have attracted a good volume of investment, Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon did not manage to match that record.

	Association Agreements		Action Plan	
	Infrastructure	Institutional / regulatory / policy	Infrastructure	Institutional / regulatory / policy
Tariffs / quotas		X		
Standards: (SPS, TBT)		X		X
Investment		X		XX
IPR		X		X
Trade facilitation (mainly transport)		X		X
Trade defence		X		X
Services		X		X
Network industries (mainly energy)		X		XX
Govt. procurement		X		X
Competition policy		X		X
Dispute settlement		X		X

Table 4 Aspects of deep integration in the Association Agreement and Action Plan of Egypt with EU

Source: Egypt-EU Association Agreement and Egypt Action Plan

In this table an "X" included in the Action Plan replicates to a large extent what has been mentioned under the AA. The "XX" show that there have been some kind of extra deepening efforts.

Other countries such as Jordan and Lebanon replicate the case of Egypt, while countries such as Tunisia and Morocco have managed to include issues such as trade facilitation and competition policy and intellectual property rights in their action plans. As such one has to make a distinction between the North African (NA) records and the rest of the countries in terms of what has been achieved so far and the future prospects.

With some weakness in the ENP and its rather general approach, the idea for the Union for Mediterranean (UFM) came through aiming at promoting regional initiatives and not waiting a breakthrough in the Middle East peace process. It is too early to judge how far the UFM can progress while pushing back the burning issues of the Arab Israeli conflict. For example, the 4th Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Conference on Water, held in Barcelona few months ago, failed as a result of discrepancies regarding the naming of the occupied Palestinian territories

Lack of agreement on how to name the occupied Palestinian territories has prevented representatives of the 43 countries of the UFM approving a joint strategy for guaranteeing the water resources of the whole Mediterranean basin.

A document intended to promote common initiatives for water management, which was going to be the first major strategy of the recently created Union, was supposed to come out of the 4th Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Conference.

As was explained following the meeting, the insurmountable obstacle was a nuance of terminology, since Israel's representatives would not accept the document referring to 'occupied territories' and proposed the term 'territories under occupation', which was not acceptable to the Arab block.

The strategy was supposed to establish the political, methodological and financial framework for bringing in regional policies on the matter. It also envisaged reducing the consumption of water between now and the year 2025, to levels 25 percent below those of 2005.

This incident demonstrates the difficulties that are going to face the UFM to proceed with more controversial regional initiatives. If we take this as an example, it would be very difficult to envisage how energy, tourism, or infrastructure projects can be advanced.

One would argue that deeper integration under such framework has little chances to succeed unless a political breakthrough such as the two state solutions and reconciliation can be achieved.

If we to accept such gloomy scenario, we get back to where we started, i.e., enhancing trade and remove the remaining obstacles that hinder expansion of trade in goods and services. Moreover, building and upgrading institutional capacities in areas identified under the ENP can further in deepening integration gradually.

POTENTIAL FOR TRADE EXPANSION

The table below exhibits the level of trade between South Mediterranean Countries (SMC) and the EU and how it evolved over the period 1995-2006. Clearly some countries sustained and increased their level of exports to the EU market such as Morocco and Tunisia, while other countries registered a decline such as Egypt and Jordan. Lebanon exports has increased significantly to represents 10 percent of its total exports. On the other hand, imports of the SMCs from the EU constitutes a significant share of most of the countries. That is; trade balance in most cases is in favour of the EU.

	% of Exports to EU	% of Imports from EU
	1995 2006	1995 2006
Algeria	65 51	60 54
Egypt	47 42	40 31
Jordan	6.2 5.4	34 27
Lebanon	25 10.7	49 38
Libya	81.7 75.5	66 49.4
Morocco	60 62	52 57

Syria	59 32	35 21
Tunisia	80 73	71 72
Turkey	55 51	48 39

Table 5 Exports and imports percentage shares of SMCs to and from the EU

Source: UNCTAD, 2008, *Handbook of Statistics*

Indeed there are several simple methods to determine the potential of trade between partners. A simple one uses what is known as Concordance indices devised by Michaely (AER 1962). These indices gauge the extent of correspondence between a country i exports with country j imports by commodity in a highly disaggregated manner.

$$Se_j m_k = 1 - \frac{\sum |E_{ij} - M_{ik}|}{2}$$

where

$Se_j m_k$ is the index of correspondence of country j's exports with country k's imports.

E_{ij} is the share of exports of good i in country j's total exports

M_{ik} is the share of good i in country k's total imports

The index sums the absolute differences between export and import shares. If country j's export shares match one for one country k's import share, the sum of the absolute differences would be zero and the index of concordance would be 1. If on the other hand there is perfect discordance, i.e., what country j exports country k does not import, the sum of the absolute differences would be equal to 2, resulting in an index value of zero. The

reverse calculation is needed by changing country j into an importing country and country k as an exporting country.

$$Sm_{j,e_k} = 1 - \frac{\sum |M_{ij} - E_{ik}|}{2}$$

The results in the Table below suggest that Egypt has its highest concordance (61.4%) with the European Union and its lowest (19.3%) with Japan in 2008. Its export concordance with the Arab region started low in 1998 at 33.2% but climbed to 41.5% in 2008 indicating an improvement in its potential to affect higher exports flows with the region. Jordan export concordance indices are also highest with the World at 58.8% in 2008 dropping from 63.3% in 1998. The concordance indices with the EU at 54.4% represent the second highest in 2008. But Jordan experienced a decline in its concordance from the level of 62.3% in 1998.

**Concordance Indices of Country Exports
With Selected Regions, 1998 and 2008**

	World		Arab		E. U.		NAFTA		Japan		China	
	1998	2008	1998	2008	1998	2008	1998	2008	1998	2008	1998	2008
Egypt	63.12%	60.80%	33.18%	41.49%	59.80%	61.44%	35.38%	30.03%	24.68%	19.28%	45.28%	38.86%
Jordan	63.27%	58.79%	37.41%	38.13%	62.24%	54.43%	34.04%	42.31%	18.56%	16.30%	42.27%	31.66%
Morocco	63.31%	62.65%	18.74%	39.25%	58.30%	59.30%	24.04%	25.55%	17.55%	14.02%	36.68%	30.60%
Palestine	N/A	41.11%	N/A	26.84%	N/A	33.48%	N/A	22.09%	N/A	3.96%	N/A	22.76%
Sudan	45.35%	52.17%	41.14%	50.22%	42.20%	41.05%	13.09%	8.41%	11.57%	11.50%	20.77%	32.48%
UAE	70.03%	62.75%	51.06%	31.83%	62.59%	58.43%	49.96%	44.65%	23.48%	19.28%	42.17%	37.15%

Source: UNCTAD COMTRADE <<http://stats.unctad.org/globstat80/>>

Table 6 Concordance indices of country exports with selected regions

Morocco had a high concordance with the EU. The extent of similarity of the structure of exports of Morocco with the imports of the world at large is relatively high both in 1998 and 2008. Of special relevance is the high concordance indices of Moroccan exports with EU imports that increased slightly between 1998 and 2008 from 58.3% to 59.3%.

The concordance value for Moroccan exports with Arab imports increased over time; more than doubling in 10 years from a low of 18.7% in 1998 to 39.3% in 2008. Declines in the concordance indices between 1998 and 2008 are noted for Moroccan exports with Japan, and China. Those associated with NAFTA increased slightly from 24% in 1998 to 25.6% in 2008.




Figure 8 Selected Arab countries' concordance indices with the EU

Source: Comtrade data base.

In the figure above the concordance indices of Arab countries trade with the EU are relatively high particularly for Egypt and Morocco. A declining trend is observed for the UAE and Jordan.

Overall estimates of concordance index suggest that there is a high potential to increase trade flows if we can address issues that obstruct trade flows from achieving its full potential.

FUTURE TRENDS OF TRADE FOR MASHREQ COUNTRIES

Building on the conclusion that concordance suggests high potential for further trade then, what is the expected level of trade in the region. The WB has recently published a report on trade facilitation for the Mashreq countries¹ in which it projected the potential for inter and

intra trade in this region. This section builds on the findings of that report to project how the future looks.

Over the next 10-15 years, the growth in overall trade for the Mashreq countries is expected to be modest, but significant growth in exports is projected. The share of Interregional trade is expected to grow while that with Europe is expected to be modest. The trade with Asia is also expected to increase significantly but from relatively low levels at present. If we to utilize the concordance estimate, then it is expected that the EU can achieve a high rate of growth in its trading with these countries.

Year	Exports	Imports
2005	27	217
2015	54	239
2025	100	277

Table 7 Projected growth rate non-oil trade for Mashreq countries

Source: WB Trade Facilities report

From/To	EU	GCC	Turkey	Mashreq
Iraq	5%	0%	2%	25%
Jordan	10%	19%	5%	38%
Lebanon	20%	24%	5%	40%
Syria	20%	12%	10%	45%
West Bank	1%	1%	0%	16%

Table 8 Projected destination of exports in 2025

Source: WB Trade Facilities report

In the future, the region is expected to develop a significant export trade in fruits and vegetables. This will require an improvement in logistics so that the countries can deliver higher value food products to markets in Europe and the Gulf. These include fresh and table-ready products. Improved logistics will be needed in order to develop large efficient processing facilities.

It is also expected to Jordan and Syria will experience growth in clothing exports, especially Syria, which will take advantage of its local supplies of cotton. In order to compete in this global industry, both countries will have to establish viable niches. There is some question as to whether the special arrangements between Jordan, Israel, and the US are sustainable known as the Qualify Industrial Zones. At the same time it is unlikely that either the countries can compete in basic contract manufacturing against lower-cost producers and Asia. So Jordan is likely to compete more in higher value garments which have a greater fashion component and are produced in small order sizes. To be competitive in this market will need a substantial improvement in the logistics both inbound for the supply of accessories and synthetic materials and outbound for direct delivery to retail outlets.

If products of these two countries are to reach the EU market, further steps would be needed to improve market access. Here, the technical assistant is important in areas of developing accreditation laboratories and market surveys and other relevant tools that would accelerate trade and investment exchange.

Another area in which increased trade is expected is the production of equipment for both production and consumption. This will build on current small-scale activities in the fabrication of appliances and basic machinery where the principal market is other countries within the Mashreq region. For example, Jordan's success in developing a pharmaceutical industry producing for distribution in the region suggests that the other countries will also identify niches for consumer products to be distributed through the region and the EU market. The growth of these exports will depend on efficient cross-border movements as well as improved logistics for the delivery of the import inputs so as to allow just-in-time production and marketing.

SERVICES: THE NEGLECTED IMPORTANT SECTOR

If we analyze the economies of the SMCs, we observe that most of them are dominated by services with the exception of Algeria which relies heavily on the natural resources and agricultural.

	GDP constant 2000 prices (billion Euro)	GDP per capital current prices	Sector	Share in GDP	Share in Employment
Algeria	79.68	2770	Industry	53.8	28.4
Egypt	126.26	1066	Services	49.0	47.6
Jordan	12.56	2034	Services	72.7	67.0
Lebanon	22.46	4598	Services	75.4	68.5

Morocco	51.12	1716	Services	59.9	48.5
Occupied Territories	4.44	1003	Services	76.7	60.4
Syria	25.1	1415	Services	50.1	47.0
Tunisia	28.4	2447	Services	55.2	49.0

Table 9 Services sector contribution to the GDP SMCs

Source: Adapted from the Eurostat Annual Year book 2009

Developing the services sector by removing barriers and identifying strength and weakness in these sectors can open doors for further cooperation. Indeed services sector has rarely been discussed as part of trade openness due to the difficulties associated addressing such issues.

Services cover sectors such as education, health, financial services, information technology, and several other sectors. Analysis shows that there are sectors that possess a very high potential and they enjoy comparative advantages when compared with other countries.

As shown below in the Revealed Comparative Advantages (RCAs) for different SMCs vis a vis the rest of the world. The higher the figure the better it is, RCAs enjoyed by these countries imply that trade in services can act as a catalyst for further integration between them and the EU. However, ENP framework and action plan did not tackle services liberalization beyond GATS commitments of its members.

	Egypt	Jordan	Morocco	Tunisia
Transport	1.55	0.96	0.69	1.32
Travel	1.79	2.51	2.32	2.02

Communications	1.26		1.61	0.22
Construction	1.32			1.65
Computer and Information Technology	0.07			0.12
Insurance	0.10		0.36	0.51
Financial services	0.17			0.21
Other business services	0.33	0.42	0.56	0.30
Recreational and social services	0.66			0.06
Government services	0.82	1.01	2.32	1.37

Table 10 Revealed comparative advantage of services exports in selected SMCs, 2007

Source: Handbook of Statistics, 2008, online version.

For services sector to be promoted, one has to go beyond the traditional trade liberalization sector. Issues such as the business environment, logistics and infrastructure are as important as trade liberalization measures. Normally they refer to such obstacles as the non-tariff measures. The EU with the SMC can identify few sectors that can be promoted. To be followed by training to qualify those who can provide such services to their client in the EU. Indeed this can help in creating jobs in the SMCs countries and may contribute in achieving desired changes in economies of the SMCs towards more interdependency with the EU.

To summarize, services sectors must be given the attention they deserve, and they could serve as catalyst for deep integration if arrangements can be structured to exploit the comparative advantages they already enjoy.

These sectors can be linked with investment program, if we can identify niche market in some services sectors, this could be an area to expand mutual investment beyond the

traditional sectors, such the telecommunication and manufacturing to enhance investment inflows from the EU into the SMC countries.

Indeed the business climate in SMC countries suffers from some shortcomings as measured by the "Doing Business" report, especially in area related to legislation and the cost to create business. These areas can be included in any future plans that the EU agree to explore with the SMCs.² There are barriers to business remain in some areas such as enforcing contracts, employing workers or in getting credit (legal rights). However the reported 37 measures that were taken during the 2009 were favourable to improve the business environment.

Furthermore, according to FEMISE (2009)³, SMCs are standing a good chance to attract more FDI, and that can be explained as follows:

First, the drive for greater competitiveness in European companies has led to the redeployment of their value chains and, as a result, the adoption of 'nearshoring' strategies that give preference to the southern shores of the Mediterranean. Second, the desire of the oil-exporting countries to invest in the region. Third, the Mediterranean region is specialized in 'trustworthy' sectors such as tourism, agriculture, and energy, less risky markets to which investors turn in times of crisis. Fourth, the improvements made by the SMCs in their business environment since the mid-1990s have also produced results and considerably enhanced their attractiveness, even in relation to the Eastern countries. We use the example of automotive industry in Morocco below to validate the points made above.

The medium-term prospects could be bright if the SMCs took advantage of the stagnation of capital inflow to other regions to increase their own market share by diverting flows thanks to their renewed attractiveness. This, however, will not be an automatic movement. Instead, it will be necessary to further boost current strengths, i.e. make further progress in the qualification of human capital, ensure an even more efficient business climate and foster greater openness to trade.

Automotive investment in Morocco

Although the automotive sector is hard-hit by the crisis, Renault has confirmed that it is going ahead with the plans for the Renault plant in Tangiers, with a two-year postponement. This project, initiated in 2007, represents an investment of up to 1 billion Euros: 600 million for the plant itself and from 200 to 400 million for the vehicles that will be produced there. The plant will create nearly 6000 direct jobs, plus another 30,000 jobs through the foreign and local equipment manufacturers setting up operations or already established there.

The plant will begin to produce the first models at the start of 2012, with a capacity of 170,000 vehicles per year. The project is located a few kilometres from the Tangiers Med port, to which it will be connected by motorway and railway.

Among the reasons for choosing Morocco, the investors had clearly stated in 2007 that preference was being given "to low-cost countries outside the euro zone. Looking ahead five years, it is more likely that Morocco will be cheaper than Rumania or even Turkey".

LABOUR MOVEMENT

This leads us to the second pillar that we need to address which concerns labour movement. Regarding regional cooperation on migration issues there are two sets of frameworks. With the European Union there is the Association Agreement signed in 2001, which was followed by the Action Plan within the context of the ENP signed in March 2007. The Association Agreement and the Action Plan include provisions related to the living and working conditions of legally settled migrant communities, the prevention of illegal migration, and the reduction of migratory pressures, but nothing on the management of further labour migration.

Given the demographic structure in both the SMCs and the EU, with young educated and unemployed in the SMCs and an increasing demand on such workforce. A lot can be done to introduce measures to encourage labour movement on both shores of the Mediterranean.

Here one must notice that labour and unemployment is an outcome of the economic and education process.

Since we have discussed the economic aspects, there is a need to emphasize the education policies including the vocational training. This is an area where special training and standards can be introduced in the short run to upgrade the level of skills acquired by the trainees. Indeed the ENP framework has allocated resources to the education and training, however, this issues has not emerged at a top priority that should be addressed ahead of other issues related to investment and trade. There is a need to link all these issues together (Trade, investment and education) so one can establish the link between growth and labour market and hence migration.

CONCLUSION

Based on the above account, and some other indicators that can be developed, it is clear that there is a room to enhance mutually beneficial activities through a more targeted approach. Indeed a combination of factors has to work together: broadening the horizon, cover services and also include institutional and infrastructure obstacles when contemplating how to enhance deep integration. This could result in trade and investment expansion. On trade, based on assumption made by the WB, there are a number of areas and commodities that may contribute to expand trade between the SMCs and the EU. Similarly, the SMCs seem resilient and attractive to investment, here a distinction between NA countries and rest of the SMCs must be made.

Services sector as we demonstrated dominate the SMC economies, with few sectors enjoying RCA, these sectors can act as catalysts to further deepen integration.

The prospects of the UfM does seem very promising, however, the action plan that governs the ENP implementation provides a practical tool, though it could be more selective and as such identify specific priorities and can set some measurable objectives that to help monitoring performance and evaluate achievements.

Labour movements are linked to three interrelated factors, the demographic structure, skill level and the economic growth. In order to deal with this topic one has to consider all these factors together. Reviewing migration in isolation for example, will not improve policy making regarding this issue.

There still some barriers to enhance investment inflows, it is not clear how the future looks given the global economic crisis. What can be done at this stage is to improve a conducive business environment to be ready once the global economy grow out of the crisis.

The EU can improve the existing financial tools it is using for budget support in several SMC towards a more specific targeted sectors that can be identified with the partner countries.

¹ World Bank, "Regional Cross Boarder Trade Facilitation and Infra structure Study for Mashreq Countries", Washington DC, 2009.

² For a review of this report: <http://www.doingbusiness.org/features/ArabWorld2010.aspx>.

³ FEMISE, "Mediterranean Partner Countries Facing the Crisis", Aug. 2009.

4. Additional insights

4.1 *Research and innovation in the SEMCs*

by Baruch Raz

INTRODUCTION

Technological Innovation (TI) is now a well-established contributor to a country's welfare. It is well correlated with both per capita income and quality of life. Its development is the target for all countries which are concerned about their citizens' welfare.

The Nobel Prize-winning research of Robert M Solow established the contribution of technological progress to economic growth in the early 1950s. This pioneering work gave birth to a linear theory of TI. The theory argued that investment in pure scientific research was the source of opportunities for R&D. The outcome of this matured into engineering, which in turn resulted in production and sales. Part of the profit generated by the sales would be invested into further research and the rest would be creamed off as profits.

This rather simplistic model was proven wrong by a number of researchers as early as the beginning of the 1970s but until today, the percentage of GNP dedicated to R&D is used to measure the intensity of TI in any given country. It should be noted that, while investment in R&D is no longer considered the sole driving force in TI, it is well correlated with its success. Maybe it is because the ratio of R&D:GNP is a measure of commitment to scientific and technological endeavour, and maybe because it is easy for policy makers to grasp this ratio as representing the intensity with which they support TI, that the linear model of innovation is so acceptable, even if not entirely true.

In the 1970s, a number of authors (Eric Haefner in Sweden, Ed Roberts and Erik von Hippel at MIT) have shown that other factors such as marketing capability, make as important and even more important contributions to innovation than R&D capability alone. This is subsumed into the 3M theory, where the contributions of Manpower (in the form of the

potential researchers), Money (standing for risk capital) and Marketing are interacting, together with government support, to breed innovation. The author of this paper proposed a dynamic picture of the interacting forces, where each of them fits into the general scheme of the innovation process in a way displayed in Figure 12.




Figure 9 The 10 innovation barrier - Government intervention

As shown in Figure 9, the role of research is to decrease the level of scientific uncertainty that is represented by branch A. This degree is measured by S that stands for entropy, the universal measure of disorder. Generally, this activity takes place along the R&D curve and stops at point A, where enough knowledge has been created in order to be considered a proper scientific outcome – usually, a scientific paper.

At that stage, industry, which is supposed to invest appreciable sums of money in bringing the outcome of the research into the market, is quite nonplussed. The uncertainty is too great and industry would rather wait until the level of expected return, represented by the scale \$, on the right hand side of the figure, reaches Point B. The uncertainty between A and B is much too big.

Between Points A and B, there is not only an uncertainty gap but also a risk mountain. The mountain shape results from the fact that, at the very left of the figure, the uncertainty is so high that no money is being risked on the project and the risk value, therefore, is zero. On

the right side of the figure, the risk (or at least the technological part of it) is very low again. In the gap area, the risk, as perceived by the potential investors, may be very high (they may be enticed to invest, but are very apprehensive). This is where governmental intervention can be decisive. Governmental aid can move Point A to A', Point B to B' and lower the perceived risk peak considerably. This is how an innovation policy can be conceived and how it can contribute to an enhancement of the economy.

TI IN THE SEM BASIN

Towards the end of 2007, a very detailed report dealing with innovation in the SEM region was presented to the EU (Estime: Inco-CT-2004-510696). This report is the source of most of the factual background for this chapter. When addressing the SEM countries, the Estime Report ignored Israel. The reason is quite apparent from Table 11, in which the GDP/capita values for the relevant countries are displayed. The relevance of Israel for our regional forecast is that the economic progress Israel has achieved in a period shorter than our time-range of 20 years was done almost exclusively through technological innovation. It may be argued that the case of Israel can be used as a standard for good practices.

	GDP/Capita US \$	% Literate Adults	% Literate 15 -26 yr olds	% of Student Population that can attend
Algeria	1,930	70	90	20%
Egypt	1,390	71	85	29%
Israel	29,500	—	—	—
Jordan	1,850	90	99	35%
Lebanon	4,040	—	—	48%
Morocco	1,310	52	70	11%

Syria	1,160	80	92	34%
Tunisia	2,240	74	94	26%

Table 11 GDP/capita, education and literacy in selected SMCs

The data for the Palestinians were probably not presented because of political difficulties but it is a well accepted fact that, on the whole, they enjoy a higher level of literacy as well as a higher number of academic degrees than their neighbours.

What Table 11 tells us is that all the countries relevant to our discussion are similar to each other with respect to their GNP per capita and are quite similar as far as literacy among the young is concerned. This however, is not enough in order to assess their potential within the first “M” in the 3M model. It is not enough that a country has a certain proportion of citizens who are literate. To participate meaningfully in the innovation process, people should have an appropriate educational standard that is enough to lead them to creative work.

In Table 12, we present a combination of data from UNESCO, the Estimate Project and the Israeli Ministry of Trade and Labour, relative to the availability of researchers (absolute numbers), the fractions of the GNP allocated to R&D and the population of each country in the region.

	RESEARCHERS (Absolute Numbers)	EXPENDITURE on R&D As a % of GNP	POPULATION (in millions) (Absolute Numbers)
Algeria	5,476	0.2	33.8
Morocco	5,594	0.7	33.7
Tunisia	4,870	1.0	9.9
Jordan	1,456	0.3	5.2
Lebanon	760	0.2	3.8
Israel	35,000	4.6	7.6

Table 12 Researchers, R&D/GNP and population in the SEMed countries

Table 12 shows two salient points that are very relevant to TI. The first is the very small communities of researchers in all of the countries of the region. The numbers of a few thousand researchers are small, not only with respect to the sizeable populations of these countries, but become close to insignificant when divided by the number of relevant scientific and technological disciplines. One wonders if there are many disciplines in which a country attains the critical mass necessary to create any innovative activity at all.

Another aspect of the innovation-inclined Manpower is the type of education it gets in high school and university. What is needed is not only to cover enough scientific material at each educational level. It is also the education towards an inquisitive, sceptical approach to scientific issues. In a variety of sources, there are hints to the fact that science and technology are not taught in a way that enhances creativity. It seems that much more research is needed to elucidate this matter and it most certainly merits serious attention.

A very interesting attempt has been made by the Estime team. Not being able to evaluate the relative importance of sociological studies from bibliometric data, they decided to use a surrogate. This was the catalogue of a very prominent Maghrebin library: that of the Abdul-Aziz Foundation in Casablanca. It may not be the most scientific of studies, but it is certainly very informative. The results of this survey are displayed in Table 13.

SUBJECT	Frequency of Occurrence
Psychology	150
Religion	150
Management	400
Science and Technology	650
Geography	1,000
Philosophy	1,050
Linguistics	1,300

Education	1,600
Arts	2,150
Islam	3,150
Political Science	5,600
Economics	5,800
History	6,500
Law	6,950
Sociology	8,000
Literature	9,900

Table 13 Representation of material in the Abdul Aziz library catalogue by subject

The data displayed above are definite evidence that science and technology are very little appreciated in our target countries. The situation is even more pessimistic because according to a recent World Bank report, science is taught through memorising, rather than through analytic and creative learning. In other words: science lies low on the list of priorities in SEM countries, it suffers from low governmental budgets, it attracts a relatively small number of students and the way they are being taught is not leading to enhanced creativity. Without a thorough change in governments' priorities, there will be no change in support for science education. There will be no drive to enhance creativity in science and technology through proper funding of the right educational programmes. The Point A in Figure 9 will be shifted upwards. Curve C describing perceived risk will be depressed, not because of higher understanding, but rather because of low propensity to invest. The curve on the right side of Figure 9 will degrade into non-existence. Who wants to sow money into an infertile technological terrain?

The only way one could reverse the situation is through a concentrated effort in an innovating and daring educational programme, followed by an economic one that supports innovation. These programmes have to be well researched and well designed, taking into

account national characters and based on technological forecasting. The alternative is a gradual decay towards the lowest strata of the global economy.

4.2 Desalination

by Baruch Raz

INTRODUCTION

Since the days of the patriarch Abraham and his nephew, Lot, water wells and water sources have been a subject of conflict until these very days. It is not that there is a shortage of Water in the Mediterranean region. All the countries in the Mediterranean Basin have direct access to sea water, supplemented frequently by generous amounts of subterranean brackish water. The problem is that most of the water sources are not potable and not usable for agriculture.

In the last few decades, a process has begun whereby salty water is treated in an increasingly economical way to yield potable water. The emphasis is on the term “economical” because since the olden days it was known that desalination could be achieved by distillation. The method could be, and was, used on ships of ancient times bound for long voyages, but the distillation of water through an infinite number of “schnapps alembics” was never going to produce large quantities of water at an affordable cost.

While the existence theory was proven long ago, the problem facing the scientists and engineers was to find alternative solutions for the separation of salt from aqueous solutions and, as it is a thermo-dynamic problem, much of the activity focused around how to invent ways of making the separation more energy efficient.

WHAT IS DESALINATION?

From the engineering point of view, the first solutions came in the form of multi-stage distillation that later acquired a number of variants. In principle, it was a system of successive evaporations into chambers with diminishing pressures where the heat generated from one condensation (following evaporation) feeds into the input of the preceding

chamber. In many cases, a mutual co-existence was formed between a water desalination plant and an electricity generation plant. By giving up several scores of degrees at the lower end of the reject steam, one gets a very good input heat for the desalination at the expense of several percentages of efficiency in the production of electricity. An overall efficiency of production of both electricity and desalinated water is achieved in an optimal way.

The first desalination plants in the world used multi-stage evaporation and many were built in the Gulf States where the cost of energy was relatively low. The very high dependence on energy costs stems from the fact that, for the creation of the vapour, one has to bring the water from room temperature to boiling point (100 degrees Celsius at sea level), then to effect the transformation of water at 100 degrees to vapour at 100 degrees. The heat required for this is called the latent heat and is about 540 kilocalories per litre.

A competitive method, energetically more efficient, was soon developed. It relies on the fact that, under normal conditions, the solidification of water into ice results in a pure solid, whereas the salt concentrates into a brine solution. The heat required for the transformation of liquid water into solid ice is about 80 kilocalories per litre, about seven times less than the latent heat in the evaporation process. While thermodynamically superior, the freezing method failed on the engineering plane. The separation of the brine from the ice proved rather difficult and this variation of desalination is still awaiting an engineering genius.

The most prevalent method of water desalination at present is that of reverse osmosis. This method is based on the fact that pure water and an aqueous salt solution, such as brackish water or sea water, have different chemical potentials. The phenomenon is apparent when the two liquids located in separate arms of a U-tube are put in contact through a semi-porous membrane. Such a membrane allows the transport of water from one side of the U-tube to the other, but does not allow the diffusion of salt ions across it in the reverse direction.

As a result of the difference in chemical potentials, water crosses the membrane and an inequality in the levels of the liquids results. (The salt containing branch of the U-tube contains a higher column of water.) This level inequality manifests itself in a hydrostatic pressure difference called osmotic pressure. The osmotic pressure compensates for the

difference in chemical potentials. If the osmotic pressure is exceeded, in other words, more pressure is applied on the salt arm of the tube, water will start flowing from the solution to the water side. The osmosis is reversed and a desalination process is started.

COST OF THE PROCESS

Reverse osmosis was tried successfully a few decades ago in the production of syrups and fruit juice concentrate (e.g. maple syrup concentrate). Here, the main objective was to produce concentrates with no application of heat or boiling, which may destroy the aroma of the original product. In water desalination, the projects are far more ambitious in terms of price targets and scale. The biggest seawater reverse osmosis project in operation today is an Israeli plant at Ashkelon. It produces 110 million cubic metres of pure water a year at a cost of €0.36 per cubic metre. This constitutes the lowest price of large scale desalinated water in the world. This performance is going to be surpassed by another desalination mammoth soon to be built in Hadera (Israel). By the year 2015, practically the entire Israeli consumption of water for personal use will be supplied independently of the vagaries of nature.

MAIN CONCLUSIONS

From all of the above, one can conclude:

- 1) Water desalination on a large scale is feasible at a price that is affordable for home usage (drinking, washing, watering the garden). This holds in big cities, not too far from the centre of desalination. For small remote villages, a hefty addition to the price for water conduction should be added and presumably, the paying capability of the population is lower.
- 2) At a price of €0.36 per cubic metre, desalinated water is not applicable for regular agriculture. It might be adequate for greenhouse agriculture where

- 3) The loss of water through evaporation is lower and where products could be chosen to hit market highs. This can happen for instance if the greenhouse produces out of season fruit or vegetables.
- 4) The costs of desalination that we have discussed apply to the case of seawater. Brackish water with a salt concentration well below 10,000 parts per million (ppm) can be desalinated at costs approaching half of those for seawater.
- 5) Mapping for brackish water reserves in the whole region and targeting rich reservoirs can be very useful. Special equipment should be designed because the pressures to be used in brackish water desalination could be much lower than those for seawater. The brackish water versions could be used as a precursor for the application of full scale seawater implementation.
- 6) Another element to be taken into account is that of brine removal. It is true that reverse osmosis of brackish water or seawater results in large quantities of sweet water. However, non-negligible amounts of relatively high concentration brine are an unavoidable product of the same process. This brine has to be dispensed with. It is very important not to create local high concentrations of salt, even if the brine is sent back to the sea, because of the responsibility not to perturb the ecology, even locally.
- 7) The existing technologies are very new technologies. It is hardly conceivable that they are already mature. Further research will almost certainly push the prices down and so will the building of many additional plants. As we all know, increasing the volume of production results in a decline of costs, a phenomenon normally leading to what is commonly called the lowering of the learning curve. In other words, the mere construction of many desalination plants will make sweet water produced out of seawater a less expensive product.
- 8) Following the argument at the head of this paragraph, it is hardly conceivable that we have arrived at the end of the possibility of improving on the technology of reverse osmosis. Obviously, the part that is most attractive in the whole construction is that of the membranes and very major improvements have led to the technology being so useful. However, other components of the system are begging for improvement in themselves. A great deal of capital is invested in the high pressure systems. A lot of

money is spent on energy. It would appear to be very useful if a thorough system analysis were to be applied to the process of seawater reverse osmosis: an activity that might identify targets for further research, development and engineering, making the sweet water that is produced this way much more affordable.

- 9) New research avenues should be explored. It might well be that biotechnology or classical biology may offer more effective solutions than the improvement of osmosis membranes. Solar energy can be a very important source of energy for the multi-stage evaporation systems in all their variants. One can even think of the use of wave power to create pressure that is needed in the reverse osmosis system without the high dependence of the electrical power that is now such an important part of the total cost of desalinated water.
- 10) Supporting technology should also be surveyed and improved. One of the important and potentially costly phases of desalination is the preparation of water to be desalinated. It starts by removing large objects like fish and dirt through simple filtration and then there is a series of increasingly fine filters down to nanofilters. The latter can remove bivalent cations, like calcium cations that otherwise would result in calcification of the membranes.
- 11) Calcification is a real plague because it reduces the penetrability of the membranes, which implies the need for higher than optimal pressures and treatment of the RO chambers with acid to dissolve the calciferous deposits.
- 12) As in many other technological cases, there is a mismatch between the potential user of a product, in our case sweet water, and the potential developer of the required technology – a laboratory or a company with an elaborate technological know-how. Thus the installations that have been developed, even those of a small water production scale, can only be taken advantage of by people with adequate technological prowess. In our case, it is very important to adapt those small installations for use in small localities of farmers with limited technical resources and minimal capability to pay. The availability of affordable, clean water in itself may not be reason enough for them to stay in their own communities and not to migrate to the big cities, with all the consequences of such migration. It is, however, a very important factor. Because of their very limited ability to pay, the small remote communities do

not constitute a natural target for the companies which are after a profit. It is their State, or the State's various supporters, that can assume the responsibility of contributing to these people's economy and their social well-being. This may stabilise many faraway communities that are on the verge of disintegration and becoming a potential for legal or illegal immigration to other countries.

In this discussion paper, we have concentrated on desalination of water. Independently, but in close relation to it, one can discuss opportunities of using solar energy, both for the sake of energy production as well as desalination. In the 1960s and early '70s, solar energy was investigated as a resource for small-scale desalination. It has been pushed aside by the fast development of other options. It might be time to re-analyse the situation and maybe apply solar energy-based devices for specific cases.

4.3 Upgrading educational systems for social inclusion in the Mediterranean area

by Mireia Montané

TRENDS

Many states, nations and regions around the Mediterranean space have undertaken wide-ranging reforms of curriculum, instruction and assessments with the intention of better preparing all children for the higher educational demands of life and work in the 21st Century. To varying degrees, curriculum guidance and assessment systems have begun to focus on a range of 21st Century skills: the abilities to find and organize information to solve problems, frame and conduct research, analyse and synthesise data, apply learning to new situations, self-monitor and improve one's own learning and performance, communicate well in multiple forms, work in teams, and learn independently.

The European Union has adopted different recommendations on basic skills and those required for the labour market. Likewise, the Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly (EMPA) has issued their recent recommendations. The OCDE/PISA indicators are also developing better tools to assess and teach 21st Century skills. UNESCO is strongly recommending cultural and educational diversity, and the Anna Lindh Foundation is developing non-formal education in the 43 EuroMed countries.

Educational policy of the EU

A recent report to the European Council by the Reflection Group on the Future of the EU 2080, of May 2010¹, recommends the quest for excellence and relevance be placed on upgrading education and skills. These remarks can be extended to the SEM (South East Mediterranean) countries. "Efforts to correct the mismatch between the supply and demand for expertise must be placed at the top of priorities for the educational system. This will require a strong emphasis on upgrading skills in order to prepare individuals for employment

transitions as well as for the use of new technologies and skills. A necessary precondition, in turn, will be the realisation of a flexible, life-long learning culture, where individuals are able to return to education under conditions similar to young students at any point in their careers. Learning to learn must become a guiding principle throughout the education system". The European Council Conclusions on the social dimension of education and training (11 May 2010)² have insisted also on the cooperation on the strategic priority of promoting equity, social cohesion and active citizenship, to strengthen social inclusion through education and training, support greater participation of learners from disadvantaged backgrounds, or those with special needs, in transnational mobility schemes, partnerships and projects, in particular those established under the Lifelong Learning Programme (LLP), promote and support comparative research on the effectiveness of policies to increase equity in education and training, widen the knowledge base in cooperation with other international organisations and ensure a broad dissemination of research results, and promote the role of education and training as key instruments for the achievement of the objectives of the social inclusion and social protection process.

Europe 2020 Strategy:
- *the share of early school abandonment should be under 10%;*
- *at least 40% of the younger generation should have their diploma.*

The following are evidence that we are making progress toward achieving these goals:

- The EU Council of Ministers adopted eight basic skills that have been written into the laws of EU member countries³, and have taken action to improve educational outcomes based on the reports from OECD⁴, IEA, EURYDICE, as well as their own indicators. In order to assure that the majority (between 85% and 90%) of school-aged children in these countries achieve satisfactory levels of acquiring these skills by 2020, a series of concrete measures have been put into place, including publishing research results from the field of education.

- The Europe 2020 Strategy related to Education and Training (expected to be approved at the next European Council on 17 June 2010), is the strategic framework for European cooperation in education and training (ET 2020); that is, by 2020, the school drop-out rate should be less than 10% and the share of population having completed tertiary or equivalent education should be at least 40%. It means that
 - the share of early school abandonment should be under 10%;
 - at least 40% of the younger generation should have a diploma⁵.

- The declaration of the 2010 « European Year Against Poverty and Social Exclusion »

- The increasing role of research and innovation at the European Commission level (budget augmentation, the highest directly executed by the European Commission, 3% of the GDP.)

- “Freedom of knowledge” has been added to four other freedoms of the European Interior market: freedom in the movement of capital, of work, of goods and of services.

- The final results of some educational research projects⁶
 - EMILE project studies the fields of Multicultural Education, fighting discrimination in the labour market and Political Participation;
 - EDUMIGROM is focused on the integration of minority and ethnic groups in the general issues of citizenship;
 - YIPPEE will investigate post-compulsory educational pathways among young people who spend at least one of their childhood years in the care of public authorities or child protection agencies;
 - INCLUD-ED, focused on to promote social cohesion at compulsory education level.

These research projects have influenced the educational component of the GO EUROMED⁷ research project, also funded by DG Research of the European Commission.

At the 2006 G-8 meeting, ministers confirmed that “education, skill development, and the generation of new ideas are keys to human development, economic growth and market productivity”. Education is recognized to be an important instrument of inclusion and promotion of human values, including values related to cultural diversity. Information and communication technologies have also been inducing major changes in facilitating local and global access to information and knowledge, as well as learning foreign languages. Education is recognized as an engine for acceleration of North-South cultural relations, and as a communication tool for sharing values to enhance the understanding of others, avoid cultural traps and failures in cultural exchange and enhance the cooperation between culture and education.

EuroMediterranean Parliamentary Assembly (EMPA)

The EMPA⁸ is working on the task of reinforcing Mediterranean educational systems, as explicitly stated in the last Recommendation made on March 12, 2010 at their meeting in Ammam, Jordan. The EMPA has been renamed Parliamentary Assembly of the Union for the Mediterranean, and while the group's recommendations have no legal value, they do have great symbolic, moral and political value. The EMPA is a political and moral forum, and their resolutions lend a great amount of legitimacy to Mediterranean policies, but carry no legal weight and oftentimes are ignored. The “Education and Human Capital Development in Euro-Mediterranean Countries” section of the March 12, 2010 Recommendation put forth by the Economic and Financial Affairs Commission raises education to an important level. This Recommendation promotes quality education and full schooling through high school, with equal opportunities regardless of gender, and advocates for efforts to curtail dropouts and expand studies.

The battle for the validation of diplomas continues between universities and institutions of vocational training, which is grounded in social matters, i.e., economic growth needed to improve conditions for employment and productivity while preparing workers to attain skills

that will prevent the draining of skilled labour through emigration from these countries. This is the basis for EMPA cooperation

While it is difficult for government officials to recognize the parliamentary work that goes on at the European, national or regional levels, the Assembly has finally been given due recognition as the parliamentary dimension of the Mediterranean region. EMPA is unique. However, we are far from establishing a Mediterranean Parliament. Forty-three countries have standardized operations for being able to participate in the Euro-Mediterranean Parliament.

UNESCO World Report on “Investing in Cultural Diversity and Intercultural Dialogue” (2009)

UNESCO’s world report⁹ on cultural diversity features the results of the latest research on world cultures, stressing the value diversity plays in education. In the context of globalization and increasing migration, the interrelated challenges of assuring equality in education and promoting international mobility to meet labour market needs assume a new prominence and urgency. Strong homogenizing forces are matched by persistent diversifying trends. Education and intercultural dialogue is needed for mutual interaction, support and empowerment of educators, teacher trainers and administrators

The report emphasizes cultural diversity as a key element for the new century as inherently positive, insofar as it points to a sharing of the wealth embodied in each of the world’s cultures and, accordingly, to the links uniting us all in processes of exchange and dialogue. For others, cultural differences are what cause us to lose sight of our common humanity and are, therefore, at the root of numerous conflicts. Today, this second diagnosis is all the more plausible since globalization has increased the points of interaction and friction between cultures, giving rise to identity-linked tensions, withdrawals and claims, particularly those of a religious nature (ones that can influence education in a great measure) and which can become potential sources of dispute. The essential challenge, therefore, would be to propose a coherent vision of cultural diversity and, thereby, clarify how to it can become

beneficial to the action of the international community rather than being perceived as a threat.

The role of the Anna Lindh Foundation (ALF) in the field of non-formal education in Euro-Mediterranean countries.

The Anna Lindh Foundation (ALF)¹⁰ is playing an important role in the field of non-formal education in Euro-Mediterranean countries. ALF's main objective is to promote dialogue between cultures through education and youth activities. Their focus is placed on Non-Formal Education and Intercultural Learning, Youth Inclusion and Coexistence, Social Media and Technologies, and Youth Mobility. At a recent ALF Forum, held in Barcelona March 4-7, 2010, the main themes were Education and Youth, Intercultural Learning and Cultural and Artistic collaborations for Dialogue¹¹. ALF is investing in future generations of the region by developing new intercultural learning approaches, tools and programmes, and by creating physical and virtual encounter spaces for educators and learners, in close cooperation with the Council of Europe. Many seminars and meetings have been held between ALF and the Council of Europe in Strasbourg, and ALF has developed partnerships with the Council of Europe and the European Commission in the field of Youth, but not in the field of Formal Education. This is a very small initiative, compared with what can be achieved if a close collaboration were pursued with the UE Council of Ministers and the European Parliament, attempting to open the current European educational programs to the Euro-Mediterranean countries, with special actions and activities to EUROMED countries. It is in this sense that we need to reinforce and increment educational opportunities with the same success as we have had with universities.

TENSIONS

Countries of the Euro-Mediterranean region share the suffering experienced by others around the world – the current economic crisis, the war in Iraq, the Israel/Palestinian conflict - and inequalities are becoming more pronounced; a large part of the population is

succumbing to chronic poverty while another part promotes economic growth that threatens the sustainability of our planet. It is in this context that institutional reforms in the Mediterranean, Europe, and world-wide have been sought during the past few years in order to respond to the great challenges we face in the 21st Century. Calls for reform are being made by the European Union (and by the governments of the European nations) as well as by international organizations (United Nations, UNESCO, MENA, World Bank, International Monetary Fund, OECD) and by organizations of the Third Sector, such as the Anna Lindh Foundation.

These reforms are necessary to reduce the current tensions in the field of education.

Tensions between countries that participate in international assessments that establish quality education indicators (OECEDE/PISA, IEA) and those that cannot participate.

The SEM countries that currently participate in PISA are Israel, Jordan, Tunisia and Turkey. These all have lower results than countries in the EU's southern region (Spain/Catalonia, Portugal, Italy and Greece), even though the results from these countries are low. We all must improve, and there is much motivation in these countries to improve their scores. Those that perform poorly do not meet the requirements to pass the tests – either they lack full schooling through high school, required statistical tools and methods, etc., or face other obstacles.

Catalonia produced reasonable results in 2006 (we will soon have the 2009 results). If we compare ourselves with the other 66 countries, we are among the first 10 or 12 in terms of test averages. We have a great balance in test results, even if those results are in the mid range. This means there is little difference between the best and the worse.

Tensions between UNESCO and the OEDC.

Strong homogenizing forces (OEDC/PISA standards based in 21st Century skills) are matched by persistent diversifying trends (UNESCO cultural diversity, ALF, GO EUROMED) based on

human sciences research. These tensions can be alleviated with adequate actions and scenarios for transition.

Tensions between educational principles and some basic 21st Century skills.

Tensions between sensibility of some administrations that are patterned on diverse ideological, religious and political references, and policies that serve as international educational points of references based on basic 21st Century skills, best practices and pedagogical environments for learning.

TRANSITIONS

Quality control: How can quality control be achieved?

There are deficiencies needing to be addressed in the educational systems of both countries in the South as well as the 27 European countries. The aim is to homogeneously achieve targeted EU key competences and the international 21st century skills recently established by an expert group¹². Step one: to achieving quality control would be to integrate 21st Century skills into standards, curricula, assessment, and teaching in EUROMED countries. In order to accomplish that, a variety of challenges would need to be confronted by the states, nations, regions and cities of the EUROMED countries. To facilitate this task, an examination of assessment policies and practices in different nations suggest a range of potential opportunities for evaluating 21st Century skills in both on-demand testing and curriculum-embedded assessments. The growing move to promote assessment of, for and as learning, rather than seeing testing as a separate disjoint element of the education enterprise may provide opportunities for strengthening the teaching and learning, as well as assessment, of 21st Century skills. Step 2: to increase curriculum equity and use assessments to provide both feedback and feed-forward information. The growing emphasis on school-based performance in many countries appears to strengthen teaching where teachers learn more deeply about how to enact standards by participating in scoring and/or reviewing student work. It may also increase curriculum equity, as all students engage in more common

activities and instructional supports as part of the required assessments. Some assessment policies also seek to use assessment to strengthen teaching by considering how to provide both feedback and “feed-forward” information. They incorporate rich feedback to students, teachers, and schools about what has been learned, and they shape students’ future learning by offering opportunities for reflection from both students and teachers to support learning-to-learn. Technology supports for these efforts are becoming increasingly sophisticated and should be shared across states and nations. Given the critical importance of these initiatives to the teaching and acquisition of 21st Century skills, the EUROMED states, nations and regions, with the support of the European Commission, should facilitate countries’ efforts to develop optimal policy strategies that integrate school-based assessments of ambitious intellectual performances with large-scale assessments that seek to measure problem solving, critical thinking, collaboration, and learning-to learn in increasingly sophisticated ways.

Certification - How to achieve certification.

Certifications at the end of middle school compulsory education should be increased by 50% in order to decrease the number of dropouts by 90% and not waste government educational resources that prepare students for jobs in the labour market. Additionally, graduates of vocational training programmes should be increased by 40%.

Increasing Social Inclusion in the EUROMED multicultural society.

To achieve this important goal, priority must be placed on reducing dropouts, which is a serious problem in MENA countries and in EU countries as well. The education system of these countries is expected to engender competence and flexibility among human capital and meet financing requirements that are parallel to the increased demand for secondary and tertiary education. This is based on the assumption that the success of the education system leads to better knowledge and intercultural exchange. In order to reduce tensions, families and other members of the community should be invited to participate and improve

the educational process, and operations should be improved and made more effective. The EU endeavours to be more responsive and efficient in education and to cooperate more with SEM countries with multilateral strategies and twinning activities in the field of education with the participation of every state, nation and region of countries in the Mediterranean region. Governments of the EUROMED states and regions have to design actions that establish educational priorities.

We should be asking immigrant groups and minority populations (such as the Berbers) how their needs are different from those of the majority population. What specifically do they need? What management systems do they use? Surely, we cannot base our models solely on scientific research outcomes, as realities and scenarios are in constant flux. One can switch from Model A to Model B overnight. Therefore, it is difficult to think about models needed over the long term. It would be a mistake to only use data from the past when thinking about the future. We do not live in a static society and, therefore, we should be thinking about which educational models we want for our future societies that we are able to formulate in the present. We must base those models on Social Inclusion because in 20 years great transformations will have taken place, ones that provide for the well-being of not only minority groups and migrants but for the entire world, especially for groups that are better positioned. This will require public policy that is multidirectional and that reaches all social groups. Another key question to contemplate – how should we hold accountable those who are better situated?

A Case Study for Promoting the Richness of Cultural Diversity

In Catalunya, there are 250 languages spoken, although our official languages are Catalan, Spanish and Occitanian. During the past ten years, we have experienced a population growth, from 6 million to a little over 7.5 million, due primarily from immigration from Latin America, northern Africa and the Maghreb countries, Pakistan and China. Catalunya has addressed the issues of Social Inclusion face on – making it core to our new Law of Education that defines Catalan public schools as inclusive and secular, and as institutions that respect the plurality of our society. This law defines the criteria for pedagogical organization that are based on specific educational inclusion needs and procedures for establishing inclusion as an educational focus for each school. Our schools support strong community learning environments, many of which have a large percentage of their student population who are newcomers to the area from other countries. We provide these migrant children with specialised programmes designed to acclimate newcomers into the classroom settings by giving them language training and cultural orientations. We are proud of our accomplishments – having 1,180 primary and secondary schools that welcome immigrant students with open arms through acclimation programs, immersion in the local language, mediation services, citizenship training and facilitating their co-existing with native students. We have incorporated inclusive methodologies system-wide through projects that encourage inclusion and social cohesion.

Cooperation and networking in education - a win-win action.

Inclusiveness must be fostered in both the classroom and the school environment in general; both parents and the local communities must be involved, and initiatives must be supported by the proposed Euro Mediterranean and International Knowledge Communities. The Knowledge Building International Project (KBIP)¹³ could serve as a good example of creating an educational programme.

EuroMed 2030 in a global framework is seen as a partnership between governments, universities and schools for cooperation and networking with teachers and educators, researchers and administrators in the Mediterranean area with their local government support.

It is important to create networked education via the Internet. Teachers, professors, and students should be able to participate in collaborative knowledge building environments. This type of virtual mobility is already possible and is taking place in several countries around the world, and can easily be integrated into classroom teaching as we wait the crumbling of the walls and obstacles to mobility between countries of the Mediterranean and Europe, and the world. Opening up to the world, be it through virtual connections or in real time, should become a necessity for the Mediterranean countries, and their governments play an important role.

Cooperation and networking in education is normally regarded as a win-win action in which the educational development processes need to include teachers, teacher trainers, researchers and educational systems administrators. These processes of educational improvement can be more effective if the Southern region of the Mediterranean can be strengthened, with these countries taking part in large international assessments and teaching of 21st century basic skills. Countries from the North can extend job practices to a wider base of knowledge and experience, and to well-trained teacher educators, school managers, local and international educational networks to improve processes and results in education and align them with the needs of the labour market.

The benefits of this collaboration are clear: to improve intercultural education, language skills, and information, communication and knowledge-building capacities. But the win-win scenario of EuroMed 2030 needs to be integrated on a global scale, where economic, cultural, scientific and educational exchanges will be continuous. How can countries from the Euro-Mediterranean region profit from their own opportunities in the field of education? What will the educational role be in this Euro Mediterranean space in the framework of new global actors who are more and more diverse? What will be the best way to advance towards a more European, international and universal Mediterranean Area?

More and more, industrial, scientific and cultural creators develop their activities at an international level. In this framework, what needs will education fulfil in this near future 2030?

Towards a EuroMed educational community with support of national and regional institutions for education.

Investing in capacity building by developing Training for Trainers Programmes and “Teaching and Assessment of 21st Century Skills”. Much progress has been made with university networks, but those for schools and training institutions lag far behind. It is necessary to design Euro-Mediterranean educational programming that promotes best practices, teacher exchanges and student mobility as well as the creation of networks for group educational projects. The participation of states, nations, regions, municipalities and NGOs in the EU¹⁴ and SEM countries will be required for a faster change and more complete transformation. The implication of these institutions at national, regional and local levels in Mediterranean countries is necessary to develop cultural diversity policies. The marvellous Euro Mediterranean culture is based on the development of diverse richness, and the national, regional and local dimensions are needed to develop education for social cohesion and sustainability.

Recommendations to improve education in Euro-Mediterranean countries.

These recommendations are suggested by Anna Lindh Foundation to obtain maximum certifications at the end of secondary compulsory education:

- An inclusive education for best coexistence and cohesion can be obtained by developing training programmes with both minorities and majorities in mind, and by creating real and virtual encounter spaces for both teachers and pupils (for example, summer schools/institutes/teachers training institutions, etc.) where they can create new knowledge according the real needs for 21st Century skills and their relation with practical issues. Also, governments can be lobbied to improve policies regarding migrants and minorities.
- Social Media and Technologies. Encouraging online courses for new skills, inside and outside school, and between teachers from different cultures, countries and regions.

- Creating funding opportunities and training resources for using new media and technologies to develop the skills needed to innovate and to create new knowledge.
- Mobility of teachers and pupils, lobbying for facilitating visa procedures and community codes for an active EuroMed Education Space. Creating a EuroMed Mobility Fund for teachers, students and others willing to travel, for learning, for vocational training and for work experience in enterprises. Contacting consular staff, and facilitating the circulation of information about educational exchange programmes.

A final proposal to improve the results of compulsory education and developing 21st Century skills is forthcoming. Create a “Euro-Mediterranean Knowledge Building Network for Sustainable Curriculum and Pedagogical Innovation”. The best solution will be to extend the current European Educational Project LLP to the Euro-Mediterranean countries, as a sort of “Euro-Mediterranean LLP Comenius/Grundtvig/Leonardo Programme”. For the moment, we can start with a less ambitious programme; for example, a few schools and TE institutions working together with some of the 27 EU countries, plus some of the 10 other countries, based on the KBIP model. Other models that can inspire this action can be some of the best research recognising success stories from other countries. We know that in a global world, we need to take our cues from researchers working on inclusion issues and from scholarly successes in different countries. Some countries can show excellent results in improving quality and success in a wide variety of environments - in megacities, medium-sized cities or rural areas. For example, the Harlem Children’s Zone in New York, the Laboratory Schools in Chicago and other places, the charter schools spread across the U.S. Or in Quebec (Canada), the Remote Networked School¹⁵ project, spread to over 100 schools and 23 school districts. Its focus is on providing quality learning experience for remote school students. Online collaboration tools (a forum and a videoconferencing system) are used to improve the learning environment by engaging students in collaborative inquiry and knowledge building within and across classrooms, schools, and school districts.

Labour market intelligence. How to achieve it?

We must invest more in qualifying young people for better integration into the labour market and avoid traps and failures in vocational training exchanges. This will be accomplished through a real educational cooperation at different government levels as well as through non-governmental agencies.

- Homogenization and validation of credits in educational exchange programs as the Erasmus Mundus. (EU with global cooperation).
- Encourage researchers who decide to go abroad to study and do research to return to their country, avoiding the “brain drain”.
- Remove mobility obstacles in the Euro-Mediterranean zone.
- Increase certification at the tertiary education level.
- Increase qualified work experience opportunities for students at both the initial vocational training level as well as for those graduating from tertiary and professional training programs.
- Integrate a culture of business and entrepreneurship in the school curricula.
- Encourage the business world to participate actively in the design of educational material on entrepreneurship, making it available at all levels of education.

Concerning the initial vocational training practices, one good model could be the “Barcelona Declaration on the contribution of regions and territorial authorities in the organization and promotion of mobility training for people in initial vocational training”.¹⁶

Given the current situation in which the importance of mobility in vocational training is stressed and efforts to eliminate barriers in carrying it out are emphasized, the Declaration of Barcelona was approved. Efforts were made to facilitate transparency and comparability of qualifications and professionalism, along with highlighting the growing role of the regional

and territorial authorities in the field of mobility training. With this Declaration, 30 European regions and local authorities constitute the essential agents in the promotion and development of mobility through actions that promote the visibility of internal supply, the optimization of resources, safety and quality, and the framework of transparency and intermediary roles, working together with the economic world. Regarding the certification experiences of mobility training, regional and territorial authorities should facilitate the recognition of training acquired during periods of mobility.

Life-time learning. How to achieve lifelong and lifewide-time learning.

The concept of a life-long learning culture has been the underlying consideration by the Reflexion Group on the Future of the EU 2030 (May 2010). Here, individuals are able to return to education under conditions similar to those enjoyed by young people at any point in their careers. The capacity of 'learning to learn' must become a guiding principle throughout the education system.

One of the ten 21st Century skills is 'Life and career skills' (not mentioned explicitly on the eight EU competencies). The entry level of this skill is, obviously, to develop career goals consistent with individual characteristics and a realistic assessment of requirements and probabilities of achieving career goals during one's life. The aim is an engagement in continuous 'lifelong' and 'life-wide' learning opportunities, and self-identification as a knowledge builder or a knowledge creator, regardless of life circumstance or context. To facilitate this objectives, educational administrations will facilitate or develop a trajectory for knowledge-creating environments.

- Development of programmes in the medium term and long term, with the aim to improve education in languages, computer science, and literacy.
- To improve vocational training programs throughout life and the possibilities of professional readaptation.

- Participation in a program of Euro-Mediterranean scholarships, such as Erasmus Mundus or Averroes, to encourage the mobilization of the adults-students with the aim of promoting innovation, creativity and opening the mind.

The place of the research for improving skills that will sustain better jobs in the EUROMED countries.

More research is needed to integrate 21st Century skills into curricula, assessment and teaching. Technology support for these efforts is becoming increasingly sophisticated and should be shared across states, nations and regions in the Mediterranean area.

Educational and training systems are influenced by an ever-changing knowledge base. We are interested in learning how research can help us transform our current systems into educational systems that best respond to the needs of a continuous societal transformation. For this we need a 'design research methodology' that promotes innovation and is collaborative in nature. This collaboration must involve public education administrative organisms, universities, researchers, teachers and schools that work together to apply research results that truly answer the complex questions in education. We must work to provide not only research results to practitioners but to include them in the research in the field. We are interested in results that are not fixed but rather are constantly evolving to solve common problems from complementary points of view. Public administrators need to be an active part of research, jointly with the other actors and not merely as receptors of results. Students, teachers, principals and administrators need to work together for improving skills that will sustain better jobs. More research is needed to integrate 21st Century skills into curricula, assessment and teaching. Technology support for these efforts is becoming increasingly sophisticated and should be shared across states, nations and regions. They should not only be shared, but utilized to their fullest capacity enabling everyone to work together to build new knowledge for a better Euro Mediterranean Education and a better world.

¹ "Growth through knowledge: empowering the individual", in Project Europe 2030: Challenges and opportunities, A report to the European Council by the Reflection Group on the Future of the EU 2030, 2010. http://www.reflectiongroup.eu/wp-content/uploads/2010/05/reflection_en_web.pdf.

² Council conclusions on the social dimension of education and training,. 3013th education, youth and culture Council meeting. Brussels, 11 May 2010, <http://www.nieuwsbank.nl/en/2010/05/11/R007.htm>.

³ Current EU key competences: <http://ec.europa.eu/education/policies/2010/doc/basicframe.pdf>.

⁴ Range of rank of countries/economies on the science, reading and mathematics scale, in "The Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA)", PISA 2006, "Science Competencies for Tomorrow's World Executive Summary". <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/15/13/39725224.pdf>.

⁵ In the Mediterranean Area we are aware of the difficulties faced in reducing the percentage of abandonment from the current 15% (EU countries percentage, but in some of them we are on 30%) to 10%, and increasing the proportion of the population among 30 and 34 year-olds with tertiary studies from the current 31% to 40%. Other European countries (such Germany) are actively discussing these ratios. A consensus quantifying the indicators for these two proposals will be reached and fixed at the meeting of the Heads of State and of Governments of the 27 member countries, to be held June 17-18, 2010. In any case, we all agree that it will not be easy for us to obtain these results. We are, however, improving our human and economic resources as much as possible for better performance and improved outcomes.

⁶ European Union-funded research on Education Initiatives for Social Inclusion in Europe's Multicultural Society. Presented by Jean-Michel Baer, Director of Directorate for Science, Economy and Society, European Commission/Directorate General for Research, in the "Media briefing EU-funded research" Barcelona, 26 April 2010.

⁷ T. Baudassé and A. Driouchi, "The Variety of Cultural Values and the Role of Education and Research for the Improvement of Intercultural Dialogues, on The Political Economy of Governance in the Euro- Mediterranean Partnership. Deliverable", 2007, Working Package 9: New Challenges: Demography, Migration and Culture, Go-EuroMed Working Paper 0715, www.go-euromed.org.

⁸ Recommendation made on 12 March 2010 during the 6th Plenary Session of the Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly (EMPA) in Amman (Jordan) by M. M. Abou El Enein (Chair of the Committee). Tabled on behalf of the Committee on Economic and Financial Affairs, Social Affairs and Education of the Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly.

⁹ UNESCO World Report, "Investing in Cultural Diversity and Intercultural Dialogue", Paris, 2009, <http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0018/001847/184755e.pdf>.

¹⁰ Anna Lindh Euro-Mediterranean Foundation for the Dialogue between Cultures. Forum 2010, Barcelona, 4th-7th March. www.euromedalex.org.

¹¹ These subjects are central in the civil work within the Euro-Mediterranean space, not only because the region is demographically Young but also because it is a precious investment in the future. The Anna Lindh Foundation is one of the important actors in the 43 countries of the Euro-Mediterranean space working on the third pillar of the Barcelona Process who has tried since the beginning to put Youth at the centre of priorities as advised by the Prodi Group and now by UNESCO recent world report on Cultural Diversity and Intercultural Dialogue, as mentioned before.

¹² The Assessment and Teaching of 21st Century Skills (2010), The University of Melbourne, international project supported by Cisco, Intel and Microsoft. To know the ten basic 21st century skills established by this international expert group.

¹³ Knowledge Building International Project, www.kbinaction.com. Also, article by M. Montané, T. Laferrière and N. Law, "An International Knowledge Building Network for Sustainable Curriculum and Pedagogical Innovation", presented at AERA Annual Conference, Denver, USA, 3 May 2010.

¹⁴ Council conclusions on the contribution of culture to local and regional development. 3013th education, youth and culture Council meeting. Brussels, 10 May 2010 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/educ/114325.pdf

¹⁵ École Éloignée en Réseau, www.eer.qc.ca.

¹⁶ Barcelona Declaration on the contribution of regions and territorial authorities in the organization and promotion of mobility training for people in initial vocational training, (27-05-2009), Department of Education, Catalonia government (Spain). http://www20.gencat.cat/docs/Educacio/Documents/ARXIUS/declaracio_angles.pdf.

4.4 Identity and cultural values

by Nouria Benghabrit-Remaoun

WHAT ARE THE MAIN ASPECTS OF CULTURAL VALUES AND IDENTITIES THAT WILL INFLUENCE THE RELATIONS BETWEEN SOUTH AND EAST BORDERS OF THE MEDITERRANEAN WITH THE EUROPEAN UNION TO 2030 ?

Identities and cultural values of the Mediterranean countries are at the same time diverse, supposed and organised into a hierarchy. In the framework of the neighbourhood European policy, Europe has defined a certain number of values supposed to be shared by all, relying on the acceptance as a basic premise: democracy with pluralism, respect for human rights and for a legally constituted state. The adherence to these values, formalized through the defined conventions' signature by the international organizations, aims to participate to the construction of international community.

1) In the South of the Mediterranean Sea, the emergence of national States has allowed the acquisition of a nationality where there was only 'Muslim subjects' of a colonial empire¹. Today the binationality, an achievement mode of citizenship of the two shores, reveals a strategy of legal crossing of borders. The Mediterranean may constitute a free space transformation. Social maturity, socioeconomic difficulties (decline of purchasing power and decline of oil stock), to be accompanied with the will to manage, among other things through mixed marriage with foreigners or with migrants. The mobility need more and more stronger is consolidated since the adoption of the LMD system by the south Mediterranean countries, writing down the certificative legibility as a condition to the circulation of the academic.

2) A process of «religion exit» is launched perceptible through the appearance invasion, of the formal of the Letter against the spirit². Emphasize on the differences of culture and of religion, set up in the culturalism wall, or on the common values built on the individual freedom issues and on the legally constituted state, allows a pendulum game

where is often cleared contradictory attitudes of State and of the society (Arab Chart of human rights).

3) The increase of the social issue, the demographic transition has to be noted with the heavy arrival of a youth without perspectives and sent to school on the labour market and the new demands in the housing matter. The emergence of strongly individualising tendencies, arises the deviance and the sexuality issue.

4) A weak presence or even the absence of the society.

5) The coexistence of a common Arab-Muslim culture to different countries and of a national culture questions the weakness of the support on the rationalist heritage of the Muslim civilization (Mutazila, Ibn Rushd....) and within which the past is idealized with an ideological use.

The impact on the public opinion of the Palestinian issue, structures the solidarity.

The cultural influence of Middle-eastern TV channels (religious and also mass information and culture), imposes the Arab language, the historical anchorage, and Islam as structuring referents giving a place to the Arab-Islamic Umma facing globalization. However, it is possible to note the emergence of two categories in force, one is of women in demand of equality, and the other is of the youth who have a memory demand.

6) The occultation of the perceptible cultural debts through the school socialisation of the teachings' contents of history. This accentuates the feelings of injustice and of exclusion making the anchorage identity need more and more maintained but defining itself more by opposition than by comparison or search of common points. Suggest that the Islamic civilisation must be really considered as a 'component' of the European identity.

If a society forms itself from a formed identity through an ethnocentric matrix, this one is conjugated in an 'embedding' of regional and civilisation belongings (the family, the tribe, the town, the country), limited or enlarged community. The multiple belongings do not prevent the mobilization in given contexts and the strong affirmation of the one compared with the others.

The collective identity supposes a classification of the individuals and of the groups on the criteria basis such as nationality, language, religion, politics...hard identity tends towards exclusion of any loyalty conflict. The collective identity says « what we are » but also «what we must do», the body and the way of dressing constitute ideal targets of imperative identities; H. Rachik indicates that more the social identity is selective, limited in some sectors or aspects of social life, the more she is soft and weaker is its restrictive power.

7) Feminine predication originally under the Islamists' influence, can end up autonomising and be opposing to conservatives but also to the State. The apparition of a vision meant to be liberating women according to norms and values of Arab-Muslim societies, answers to the question: how thanks to the piety virtues, women's access to the public and religious sphere becomes possible, acceptable and irrepressible?

The resurgence of ritualism and of pietism constitutes an emerging side of the renegotiation of coexisting social ties with the resistance to norms and to the rising of different actions' modalities. The rigidity of a restrictive interpretation of the Muslim Law is more and more put into question.

CONSEQUENCES OF THESE TENDENCIES IN TERMS OF WORKABLE TRANSITIONS

- Growth of exclusion and of injustice feeling in the South for the migrant category to the North
- Impact of demonstrations in the north, considered as linked to the islamophobia and to the arabophobia feelings (the endless veil issue, the situation in the suburbs...)
- Recovery by the extremists' currents

ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN IN THE POLITICAL FRAMEWORK OF THE EUROPEAN UNION THAT MAY POSITIVELY POSE ON THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE SOUTH AND THE EAST OF THE MEDITERRANEAN SEA

- 1) Build the ethics of the meeting to allow to the Muslim countries to recognize each other in the modernity not necessarily abandon its values.

To reach this objective, there must be:

- A revision of the analytical interpretation framework: break up with the stereotypes
 - A recognition in the facts, of the multiple nature of identity belonging, showing how the essential values may be shared
- 2) To accompany the identification of the priority issues according to the national specificities (research)
- Follow closely the evolution of the education system
 - Favour regional exchanges south/south (ideas' and peoples' mobility)
 - Encourage cultural and information satellite channels
 - Promote the change through the link, migrants as cultural mediators between the two shores

SOUGHT AFTER OBJECTIVES

- A best comprehension of the current secularization process in the countries of the south shore and the social processes that accompanies it
- Initiatives tend to play down North-South impulsing mondialisation/globalization in final break with what was the colonial relationship. Aiming at a better articulation of local to national and from national to regional and global levels

- Allow a better understanding of the other and greater understanding among peoples.
- Go towards cooperation and towards ever better exchanges for all.

¹ H. Reamoun: "Le Maghreb comme communauté imaginée 2010".

² M. Benkheira, "L'amour de la loi".

4.5 Gender relations in the Arab world: Progress in a difficult environment

by Cilja Harders

INTRODUCTION

In his first report on women, peace and security, issued in October 2002, the UN Secretary-General Kofi Anan stated: 'Women do not enjoy equal status with men in any society'¹. Gender matters as being a man or a woman globally marks a difference in access to resources and rights. As such, gender issues should not be confused with "women's issues" as they always involve both, women and men. Still, as the situation of women often has been neglected, and differs markedly from the conditions of many men, a special focus on women is an important first step. The gender-dimension is a cross cutting issue which needs to be taken into consideration in fields like health, education, innovation, poverty, labour market, religion and culture, security, participation and governance. This short section cannot possibly describe the many different layers of women's and men's lives in the SEMCs. It can just highlight some major developments, shared concerns and marked differences.

CONCEPTS AND INSTITUTIONAL SETTINGS

Gender relations can be described as social power relations. They lead to culturally, historically, politically, economically and socially specific gender orders and gender regimes.²

Within any society, other categories of differentiation such as class, race, religion, age and ability intersect with gender. Thus, the situation of a well-to-do urban businesswoman differs markedly from that of her young maid or the doorkeeper be it in Berlin or Beirut. Gender issues are at the heart of any society and they are highly relevant on both shores of the Mediterranean. Changes in gender relations can be considered a major driver of social, economic and political transformations. As such it has been and still is often controversial and women's rights issues have a high mobilization capacity as a short look at the long struggle for women's suffrage worldwide shows. In the same vein, intended changes in the

family law in Morocco provoked major demonstrations by Islamist forces in 2003 and 2004. Even though Gender Mainstreaming has become a EU policy and equality issues were important drivers of European integration from the days of the Treaty of Rome, and the empowerment of women constitutes a core task of development policies in the Arab World, Gender is conspicuously absent from the EuroMed project.³ This is troubling because neglecting gender dynamics especially in societies which grow so fast and are so young and at the same time well connected to global flows of information and developments means to neglect a major trend in SEMCs. Thus, the first Ministerial Conclusions on “Strengthening the Role of Women in Society” of the Euro-Med Ministerial meeting in Istanbul 2006 are a timely and necessary step after 11 years of Euro-Mediterranean relations. The policy recommendations should be closely followed up and put into practice.⁴ Gender as an analytical category describes those social processes which shape the attributes of ‘maleness’ and ‘femaleness’ of human beings. Both women and men are constantly engaged in ‘doing gender’.

In addition, developments and debates on both shores of the Mediterranean are deeply interdependent, not only because of substantial Muslim migrant communities living in NWMC. The headscarf issue, marriage practices, religious freedom, the “western values debate”, the lack of integration and support on part of receiving countries leading to the structural marginalization of some parts of these communities led to heated debates and policy interventions. These are even more delicate as the stereotypes concerning Arab Muslim women are deeply intertwined with colonial history and orientalist attitudes. These were revived in the most unfortunate and manipulative ways in the “war on terror” and the interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq with allusions to women’s lib through military action. Thus, any reflection of gender relations is embedded in an ambivalent history of unwelcome paternalistic attitudes and the realities of ongoing gendered discriminations and exclusions on both shores of the Mediterranean.

POLICY ISSUES

The most general measurement of the gendered state of human development is the Gender Development Index. Based on the HDI which combines life expectancy at birth, the adult

literacy rate, enrolment ratio and estimated earned per capita income as indicators of high or low human development, the Gender Development Index (GDI) weights the HDI in a gender specific way. The Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM) can be used as indicator of Gendered Human Security. GEM measures gender inequality in three basic dimensions: economic participation and decision-making, political participation and decision-making power over economic resources.⁵

EU Country	GDI 2007	GDI Rank	HDI 2007	HDI Rank	GEM	Part.% *
Cyprus	0,911	27	0,914	32	48	14
France	0,956	6	0,961	8	17	20
Malta	0,895	32	0,902	38	74	9
Spain	0,949	9	0,955	15	11	34
Portugal	0,907	28	0,909	34	19	28
Slovenia	0,927	24	0,929	29	34	10
Italy	0,945	15	0,951	18	21	20
Greece	0,936	21	0,942	25	28	15
Croatia	0,869	43	0,871	45	44	21
Morocco	0,625	111	0,654	130	104	6
Algeria	0,742	88	0,754	104	105	6
Tunisia	0,752	84	0,769	98	-	20
Egypt	-	-	0,703	123	107	4
Israel	0,921	26	0,935	27	23	18
Jordan	0,743	87	0,77	96	-	8
PNA	-	-	0,737	110	-	-
Lebanon	0,784	71	0,803	83	-	5
Syria	0,715	98	0,742	107	-	12
Turkey	0,788	70	0,806	79	101	9
(Libya)	0,83	54	0,847	55	-	8

Source: Human Development Report 2009 / data from 2007,
Part:Percentage of Women in Parliament according to HDR
2009 / data as of February 2009

Table 14 Gender sensitive development indicators of SEMCs

The table displays a huge gap between the northern and southern shores of the Mediterranean with the exception of Israel. The marked differences between the HDI and the GDI, which indicate to the degree of gender based discriminations can often be attributed to the considerably lower literacy rates of women. In addition, health indicators for women are rather weak with a high average maternal mortality rate. In general, there is an upward trend in the development of the GDI, e.g. in Algeria it went up from 0.688 in 2002 to 0.742 in 2007, the same is true for Lebanon, Morocco, Syria and Tunisia, only the Jordanian GDI is stable at 0.734. Libya has by far the highest HDI and GDI ranks at 55 and 54 respectively.

Education

Educational attainment of women in the Arab World started as a success story. In 1980, only 40% of the Egyptian adult population was literate, in 2005 71% could read and write. The literacy rate of women went up from 25% to 59% in the same period. Whereas only 26% female students were enrolled in secondary education in Algeria in 1980, this ratio grew to be 86% in 2006. Girls often outperform their male counterparts, even though, on average, Arab pupils score below average in international tests in the sciences and mathematics. Still, Egypt and Morocco have the lowest literacy rate for adult women (59% and 41%) compared to 77% in Libya, 87% in the OPT and 75% in Syria (2005). The gap between female and male illiteracy of adults is high in all Arab countries but this trend is not reproduced in everywhere: in Lebanon, there are as many boys as girls out of school, in the OPT, there are more boys dropping out than girls. In addition, the gender gap closes for the enrolment in upper secondary and tertiary education. On average, 1980 55% of all Arab men and 25% of the women were literate, in 2005 this percentage rose to 82% of the males and 62% of the females. Still, there are some 60 million illiterate people in the Arab world and app. 9 million children outside elementary school. Compared to the EU with 96-99% literacy for men and women this quota is low especially as Arab governments spent considerable money and effort for public education services in the last 40 years.

Economic Participation

Labour Market participation of women in the SEMC witnessed a greater increase in women's share in the labour force compared to all other regions of the world (19% between 1990 and 2003, 3% in the world) but it remains constantly low: in 2008, 31% of the total labour force in Algeria were women, 24% in Egypt 23% in Jordan, 25% in Lebanon, 22% in Libya, 26% in Morocco, OPT 18%, Syria 21% and Tunisia 27%. Interestingly, whereas female labour market participation rose within the last 20 years – even though not substantially in most cases – it sank in Egypt (1990:26,3%), Lebanon (1990:31,8%), and Syria (1990: 26,2%) (POGAR). Most women work in agriculture and services. There is some variation in the pattern between North and South. Whereas in Italy, only 5% of the female labour force is employed in agriculture, this ratio is 18% in Greece, 10% in Slovenia and 14% in Portugal compared to 56% in Turkey, 26% in the PA and 39% in Egypt⁶. The generally low participation of women in the formal waged professions is due to a host of reasons. On both shores the Mediterranean segregated labour markets, lower wages for women, and insufficient child care facilities hinder women's equal access to the labour market. E.g. the German tax system privileges married couples, where one partner – normally the husband – earns most of the money and the other – normally the wife is encouraged to “support” the family income. In fact, equal pay issues were at the heart of early EU policies and in the German case, the European Court of Justice rulings were crucial in overcoming discriminatory practises. In the Arab world as in some parts of Europe, cultural perceptions reinforce traditional gender relations. This can render staying at home (which is not equivalent to not working and contributing to the family income!) a rational choice for many women and their families especially in the lower echelons of society. Even though the unpaid care-work of (mostly) women is excluded from statistics and assessments of economic performance of nations it is obvious that societies rely on the “private” reproduction of labour. Current gendered migration patterns reflect the fact that in the North but also in the Gulf countries formally unpaid care work is monetarized and/or outsourced. This trend will strengthen tremendously in EU countries due to demographic change with a growing need of care for the elderly. Young men and women on both shores aspire for good education, financial independency and work experience as much as they wish to balance family obligations and their career. Demographic change in SEMC will bring traditional gender orders under pressure as better educated women claim their

share in formal labour market. The general weaker endowment of women with formal education, access to health care and the labour market renders women more vulnerable to poverty. There are huge differences between and within SEMC countries, e.g. in “rural Egypt and Morocco, one in four people is poor, compared with one in ten in urban areas, and families supported by women are much more affected by poverty than those supported by men”. Women are also more prone to be unemployed than men.

Religion and Rights

The state played an ambivalent role for women in the region. Most regimes made enormous efforts in order to better the health, education and labour market participation of women. State feminism recognized women’s important contribution the struggles of national liberation. At the same time, it curtailed independent women’s activism and institutionalized ambivalent and conservative gender orders. Most constitutions contain clauses, which stipulate equality of women and men. At the same time, all Arab constitutions except the Lebanese consider shari’a law the main legal source. Thus, today’s family laws represent a mixture of the discriminatory provisions of the mostly French model, which was used when Arab states codified their law systems, and traditional Islamic law e.g. some Arab civil laws do not permit women to conduct independent business as a reflection of a common European perception of that time that marriage gives the husband the right to the body and property of a woman – a stipulation which is not commonly shared in traditional Islamic law.⁷ Traditional Islamic law has been shaped by the idea of the complementarity and fundamental difference of the sexes, which in turn legitimize different legal treatment of men and women. Thus, women in SEMC countries with the exception of Tunisia and to a certain extent Morocco enjoy lesser rights in terms of choice of marriage partners, access to or protection from arbitrary divorce, to right to child custody after divorce, access to alimony, inheritance and the right to transfer the nationality. Activists have been lobbying in almost all Arab countries for changes in these systems. Reform efforts were successful in Morocco (2004; new family code), Egypt (2000: better access to divorces, 2004 nationality law, travel without husband permission), Jordan (rise of legal marriage age), whereas parliamentarians in Jordan blocked changes in family law. Women’s representation in the

judiciary grew considerably, in Egypt a woman was appointed to the Supreme Constitutional Court and in Morocco, women represent 50% of the judiciary.

Political Representation and Citizenship

In authoritarian regimes, men and women alike suffer from restricted access to political decision-making, articulation of interests and representation in the organizations of the state and society. Repression of independent activism, human rights violations and impaired elections render participation in the official system ambivalent for all citizens. Women in SEMC enjoy full civil rights since the fifties and sixties with Lebanon the first country to grant full voting rights in 1952, same year the Greek women were granted this right. Syrian women were granted the right to vote in 1946, four years after French women gained full rights. Liechtenstein (1984) and Switzerland (1971) are the European latecomers in women suffrage, in the Arab world, the Gulf countries take this role with suffrage for women in Oman and Qatar 2003 and Kuwait as late as 2005. Most constitutions claim equality of women and men, too. In practice, gendered perceptions of politics and exclusionary practices of parties, unions and other formal bodies lead to a serious under-representation of women in most formal organizations and institutions. Some governments used women's quotas in order to enhance representation (Egypt, Morocco, Jordan, Tunisia, PNA party quotas). On average, the proportion of women MP's in Arab countries is 11% whereas the world average is at 19% with the Nordic countries scoring highest (over 40%) and the EU hovering around 20%. There are substantial variations on both shores: Egypt, Morocco and Algeria figure in the group with low percentages between 4% and 6%, followed by Malta (9%), Slovenia (10%), Turkey (9%), Libya (8%), Greece (15%), Tunisia (20%) and Israel (18%), whereas only Spain has more than one third of female MPs (data for current parliaments, IPU 2010). In addition the thriving NGO sector of the Arab World is marked by major activism of women as do the new avenues of mobilization and information in the internet. Obviously, class is a major factor which influences access to these resources. Women gained representation in the most influential social movements in the region – Islamist organizations of different currents in Morocco, Egypt, Turkey, PNA, and Lebanon to name only those which made a very successful effort to include and mobilize women.

Violence against women

A shared concern on both shores of the Mediterranean is violence against women to which women and children are subject to different degrees in all societies. Physical, sexual and psychological abuse cuts across lines of income, class and culture and deprives women of their human rights and fundamental freedoms. Vulnerability of women and children towards domestic violence is enshrined in gendered divisions of violence which accords different roles and powers to men and women (and not to biology). E.g. most victims of public violence (murder, violent attacks) are young men which are attacked by other young men and thus, the majority of prison inmates are male, too. Depending on legal regulations and social practices of the police, courts and citizens, the degree of domestic violence varies. Among others, irregular domestic workers, poor women, children in difficult circumstances, and homeless people are extremely vulnerable to this type of violence and their protection is a major legal and social issue.

¹ United Nations Organisation, "Women, Peace and Security: Study submitted by the Secretary-General Pursuant the Security Council Resolution 1325(2000)", 2002
<http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/public/eWPS.pdf>

² Gender as an analytical category describes those social processes which shape the attributes of 'maleness' and 'femaleness' of human beings. Both women and men are constantly engaged in 'doing gender'.

³ Euromesco, "Women as Full Participants in the Euro-Mediterranean Community of Democratic states", Lisbon: Euromesco Report, 2006. Also C. Harders, "Gender and Security in the Mediterranean", Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 8, No. 2-3, 2003.

⁴ Gender as an analytical category describes those social processes which shape the attributes of 'maleness' and 'femaleness' of human beings. Both women and men are constantly engaged in 'doing gender'.

⁵ GEM counts economic participation and decision making by using the number of female professional and technical workers. It measures political participation by counting seats in parliament held by women, the number of female legislators, senior officials and managers. Finally, it measures economic decision-making power as the ratio of estimated female to male earned income see UNDP, Human development Reports.

⁶ Euromesco, "Women as Full Participants in the Euro-Mediterranean Community of Democratic states", Lisbon: Euromesco Report, 2006.

⁷ German Development Cooperation, "Women's Rights in the Arab World", Eschborn: GTZ, 2004.

5. Experts' proposals

5.1 *Recommendations for sustainability*

by Sébastien Abis

This document aims to present a cross-cutting synopsis of a series of exploratory avenues and concrete measures regarding a sustainable development strategy for the Mediterranean region. Given the magnitude of the subject and the tasks that need to be addressed to steer the Mediterranean towards more responsible development in the environment field, this document seeks essentially to set out and summarise the main recommendations that are regularly put forward in policy statements and scientific studies. Its purpose thus is not to discuss the major environmental issues in the Mediterranean or to specify how tensions over water, ecology, agriculture and energy are multiplying.

The aim is to provide a forward-looking analysis of Mediterranean cooperation on sustainable development by 2030 and thus to contribute to the necessary debate on realistic options for action in a region where all of the warning signals are flashing red. The paper is organised in three complementary sections: a survey of Euro-Mediterranean cooperation in 2010; a series of prerequisites for implementing a multilateral sustainable development policy in the Mediterranean; a list of technical measures and policy recommendations (14 initiatives) to be implemented with a view to sustaining and promoting sustainable development in the Mediterranean.

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS ON EURO-MEDITERRANEAN COOPERATION

Fifteen years after the Barcelona Declaration, which established the European-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), disappointment and frustration by far outweigh confidence and results. In most cases the major problems of the Mediterranean region have worsened. The region is defined as a precipitate of world tensions rather than an area where

development and prosperity are shared. The presence of the United States is evidence of the geostrategic centrality of the Mediterranean, which continues to prevail in 2010.

The European Union (EU) is stepping up its initiatives to redefine and give new impetus to regional cooperation. Although new ambitious projects ranging from the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) to the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) have been launched, tangible results are not as yet forthcoming. The rapid emergence of Europe-power has yet to take place. The southern and eastern Mediterranean countries, which have widely differing features, lay emphasis on the bilateral approach in their relations with the EU, but, politically, their openness is limited. The United States is still very present in the region for geostrategic reasons. To this is added the economic – and diplomatic – penetration of the emerging countries (China, Brazil and India) in the Mediterranean region, where Europe's influence is waning to some extent. What is more, only a fractional amount of budgetary means are being mobilised to promote Euro-Mediterranean cooperation. The economic crisis which most European States are going through and which is also hitting the southern and eastern Mediterranean countries is compromising development prospects in the region. All of these factors are thwarting the implementation of genuine Euro-Mediterranean integration.

The geopolitical vision developed in Barcelona, the project of making the Euro-Mediterranean region a macro-region that can bring its weight to bear on the geo-economic world map, now seems to be compromised. Yet Euro-Mediterranean cooperation can still make sense when it is seen as a strategic tool whose essential purpose is to contain and ease the numerous regional tensions that are bound to mount over the next few years. Euro-Mediterranean relations would thus act as a shock absorber attenuating regional shocks, a mechanism for joint management of the risks and tensions that are stirring the region.

In this context, the efforts to promote Euro-Mediterranean cooperation could focus on the potential instabilities that are connected with climate variations, water shortages, food shortages and highly prized energy sources. These threats are arising at the interface where the three dimensions of the concept of sustainable development meet, the arena where there must be a virtuous merging of social, economic and ecological concerns. But in the Mediterranean, maldevelopment policies are generally weakening policies of sustainability.

And this is perhaps where the primary challenge arises for the EU and the southern and eastern Mediterranean countries: that of managing the environment, managing resources and limiting crises in the Mediterranean region by accepting the collective approach, relying on multilateralism and seeking more synergies in this field.

STRATEGIES FOR A MULTILATERAL SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT POLICY

The Mediterranean region is in jeopardy: water shortage, climatic accidents, ecological migration, desertification and energy needs are growing risks for the riparian States and for regional stability. Furthermore, it is now an established fact that environmental degradation has harmful economic and social consequences. The geopolitical dimension of sustainable development is amply illustrated by the Mediterranean case. But there are several preconditions that must be met if these tensions are to be contained and progress is to be made along the road to sustainable development in that area.

Integrating policies at both sectorial and regional level. As a strategy that proposes a dynamic approach in which socio-economic, geo-economic and ecological imperatives are closely linked, a sustainable development strategy must be planned as a comprehensive intersectorial strategy. At the same time, sustainability policies will have to be varied according to several spatial scales (the regional, the national and the local scale). It thus is not a question of promoting one single sustainable development policy but of developing specific actions and integrated policies that are juxtaposed and must be combined.

Mobilising all actors. Sustainable development is actually founded on a participatory approach involving all of the stakeholders in the life of a country (State and public services, economic operators, citizens and civil society, and so on). All of these actors need to be involved in a move to rethink economic growth from a viewpoint that takes the environmental and social aspects of development into account to a greater extent.

Values. Sustainable development is based on principles, where emphasis is on the collective rather than the individual and on the essential rather than the superfluous. Efforts to develop medium/long-term visions must take precedence over stop-gap measures, which

are sometimes ineffective for stimulating in-depth change. Concepts such as precaution, participation and debate form the core of the process that will lead to more sustainability. What is more, promoting more responsible attitudes becomes the mantra for both collective public action and private initiatives. Firms would be well advised to adopt codes of conduct for social and environmental responsibility, just as individuals can contribute to sustainability dynamics by launching various initiatives.

Courage. Public policies must be reformed and transitions must be set in motion to gradually change lifestyles and induce people to break habits that compromise the sustainability of resources (especially energy resources); there must be no evading of an advancing environmental regulation process. One of the difficulties with sustainable development is to find operational and equitable solutions for facilitating this overall adaptation so that people learn to change their way of doing things. Fear and distrust are syndromes observed in a society that is plagued by maldevelopment. Embarking resolutely on the course of sustainable development, on the other hand, means refusing the status quo and building the future in the present. It is thus a question of combining determination, courage and vision in order to improve everyday life for all and to prepare for the future. The question of governance in the Mediterranean countries is one that clearly arises here.

Multilateralism. Given the magnitude and complexity of environmental challenges, whether they be technical or concern institutional structures, it is illusory to believe that any Mediterranean country can cope and meet them on its own. We must think in regional terms and act at the Mediterranean level. There must be union in adversity, union that is founded on de facto solidarity when emergency and the hazards of instability call for collective responses. Furthermore, confidence is absolutely essential in this context.

Pragmatism. The current budget difficulties of the southern and eastern Mediterranean countries must be taken into account as must the absence of more sizable financial prospects that could govern cooperation between those countries and the EU. Constant efforts to adopt a pragmatic approach in the measures that are taken will necessarily entail setting priorities for cooperation activities and pooling the means allocated to promoting sustainable development in the Mediterranean region. If the ambition is to construct a real partnership in which the variable geometry of projects is accepted, all of the countries in the

region, including those in the South, will have to provision the financial fund for supporting Mediterranean cooperation. This joint effort will provide a basis for overcoming the North-South logic, which has prevailed too long in Euro-Mediterranean relations.

A forward-looking approach. There are three ways of dealing with the mounting tensions in the environment field and the growing regional uncertainties: passively (suffering change and remaining exposed to hazards), reactively (awaiting change in order to react and cope with crises), and proactively (preparing for change and stimulating breaks in order to introduce desirable change, mitigate threats and reduce risks). It is of course the proactive approach that must be envisaged in Euro-Mediterranean cooperation with a view to sustainability. In this connection, support must be provided for observatories and analysis centres, which work towards better knowledge of regional phenomena affecting the sustainability of resources.

An ambitious Europe. Europe must be strong, that is to say united and ambitious, if Euro-Mediterranean cooperation is to be given new impetus, if progress is to be made as regards the sustainability of resources, and if the stability of Europe's neighbours is to be sought. Based on intentions of solidarity and cooperation, its power will become the driving force for responsible action in the Mediterranean. In this context, the efficient coordination of policies of regional cohesion within the EU and neighbourhood policies will bring benefits.

FOURTEEN INITIATIVES FOR CONSTRUCTING A POLICY FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

In accordance with the above considerations, the purpose of this paper is not to draw up an exhaustive list of the technical measures required for sustainable development in the Mediterranean. The aim is to take account of the realities, constraints and opportunities of regional cooperation between the EU and the southern and eastern Mediterranean countries by proposing a series of "14 initiatives" that should be taken in the next two decades (2010-2030). These measures are grouped around seven themes: water, land, energy, biodiversity, agriculture, scientific research, education and information.

a. Water

1) Using water resources more efficiently: Supply policy still offers several opportunities. One avenue for countries that can afford it is to develop seawater desalting techniques in order to increase water resources for human consumption. Progress can also be made in the reuse of waste water, particularly municipal waste water, with a view to using it in agricultural irrigation. And lastly, the quality of these water resources must be enhanced: sanitation is an absolute necessity in several countries, as are measures to provide wider access for the population to drinking water. The private sector can play a socially responsible role here.

2) Water savings – a demand management policy: In order to accelerate the transition that is under way, efforts must focus more on developing a demand management policy, which goes much further than simply organising supply. For the potential for new water sources lies in water economisation. Too much water is still being wasted due to technical deficiencies, and these losses must be reduced. The widespread use of precision irrigation must be encouraged in agriculture. At the infrastructural level, water supply networks must be modernised. As regards policy, trade-offs between the various uses must be based on the cost-benefit ratio and must take account of negative externalities, particularly in the environment field. A certain degree of subsidiarity must be promoted, management bodies must be set up at catchment basin or aquifer level, and user associations must be promoted at the local level. Demand management also presupposes innovation as regards pricing. Water pricing can generate additional funds for financing water development schemes while at the same time inducing users to use water more economically. But it must be fair and must take account of the fact that water is vital to all: it is essential that care be taken to avoid denying the poorest population segments access to the resource. In the agricultural sector, where there is considerable potential for water savings, stepped pricing can be a solution for preventing small farmers – who are in the majority in the southern and eastern Mediterranean countries – from being placed at a disadvantage. And lastly, the concept of virtual water could be a field for joint EU-SEMC analyses with a view to possibly developing it as an instrument for supporting sustainable water demand management.

b. Land

3) Containing soil degradation: fighting drought and desertification: Both the availability and the quality of soil in the Mediterranean region are jeopardised by desertification (salinisation, wind and water erosion, deforestation, degradation of rangeland and cropland, and so on). Desertification is the term used to denote the irrevocable decline or the destruction of the biological potential of land and its capacity for supporting or feeding populations. In the southern and eastern Mediterranean countries, agricultural production capacities are already limited by the countries' natural endowments. The land resources situation, which is already critical (90% of the arable land is already being farmed), is becoming more complex because 80% of arid or dry land is affected by desertification. Drought is a further adverse phenomenon, which is already recurrent but is liable to become more acute with the impact of climate change. Desertification, soil degradation and drought are thus jeopardising people's security, since they are depriving them of a livelihood; the economic impact is thus considerable. This is compounded by the predictable increase in human migration as the result of climate change in the region. A comprehensive plan for drought preparedness in the Mediterranean was recently drawn up through a large-scale EU-sponsored scientific cooperation programme (Medroplan). Strategy guidelines were devised, and the recommendations they comprise should be taken into account in the schedule for the measures to be deployed in the region with regard to cooperation on sustainable development. In addition to establishing preventive warning systems, using drip irrigation or opting more frequently for crop varieties that are less water-greedy are tangible ways of stemming the advancing desert. Relying on scientific research is also a decisive means of fighting drought. At the same time, the commitments made through the various United Nations conventions requiring the parties to adopt national action plans for adapting to climate change as well as plans for protecting biodiversity and plans for combating desertification must be honoured. These plans, in which civil society should be involved as closely as possible, must now be resolutely applied in the Mediterranean region and coordinated more efficiently at the national and regional level.

4) Organising the land scene and regulating urbanisation: Anthropogenic activities are augmenting pressure on the Mediterranean land scene. The urban sprawl, which has been steadily growing for years – the first symptoms being residential development in coastal belts and the urbanisation of coastal zones – has encroached upon land that in many cases was suitable for farming. A facility should be created for the dynamic monitoring of land developments in the Mediterranean (a regional observatory with a database that is regularly updated would be a welcome initiative). Similarly, it is also imperative to strengthen legislation and enhance its efficiency so that a clear distinction is made between agricultural arable land and building land. Ways and means must also be found of regulating foreign land investments, which are developing in the region (and in which agricultural land is purchased by external actors, both public and private – a phenomenon known as “land-grabbing”). Furthermore, more protected areas must be developed, and the exploitation of the coastal areas must be rendered more sustainable. It is imperative to regulate urbanisation in the Mediterranean region, and in this context measures to restore a balance (in both demographic and economic terms) by attracting people back to the inland zones would be advisable in some countries. Action to promote biodiversity and environmentally friendly rural tourism pursues a similar goal. In urban areas, ecological efficiency will be one of the most responsible actions that local authorities will have to promote in the years that lie ahead. This is where decentralised Euro-Mediterranean cooperation in the field of sustainable development (general implementation of local programmes on the lines of Agenda 21, establishment of green infrastructures, exchange of best practices and sharing of experiences with projects that have been effective in urban planning terms in the context of a network of ecologically responsible cities on the Mediterranean) will undoubtedly play a leading role.

c. Energy

5) Increasing the share of renewable energies: The challenge here is to diversify energy sources in the Mediterranean countries. The unsustainability of development is illustrated by the pressure on fossil resources (oil and gas), which are known to play a role in greenhouse gas emissions. Fossil fuel reserves in the Mediterranean are running out, but in view of the

growing demand for energy in the region hydrocarbon consumption level will remain high and predominant – gas consumption will no doubt rise. (In this context, electricity grid interconnections in the region will be of decisive importance.) But efforts must be made to improve energy efficiency (to improve yields throughout the production chain, from production to consumption) and to decouple economic growth and growth in energy demand. As for nuclear energy, action to develop this energy source in the riparian countries is not to be recommended in view of the structural instability of the Mediterranean region. On the other hand, however, there is considerable potential in the renewable energy field. The rapid development of wind and solar energy is proving strategic for diversifying consumption and thus reducing energy dependence but also for combating global warming and prompting the creation of new jobs in the sector. Given continuing urbanisation and the inevitable housing renovation cycle, bioclimatic buildings are an option that should be chosen more frequently. Furthermore, an institutional framework that is innovative in both legal and fiscal terms would stimulate the private funding required for green investments to accelerate the energy transition. The development of renewable forms of energy must be given clearer precedence in Euro-Mediterranean regional cooperation, where actors are already aware of the fact that more partnerships between the EU and the southern and eastern Mediterranean countries are imperative for regional energy security. In order to promote renewable forms of energy, existing networks through which analyses, training, know-how, and strategies are shared must be strengthened and national energy efficiency agencies must be set up in countries in the south and east. It is also essential to broaden regional coordination. This means that the broader issue of energy in the Mediterranean and the rapid development of a common European energy policy must not be treated as two separate issues. The EU's '20-20-20' objective with its climate and energy package – which may take until 2030 to become operative rather than 2020 – must therefore be achieved by maximising synergies with the Mediterranean region.

6) Going for solar energy: Support for efforts to develop the Mediterranean SOLAR plan must be established and confirmed. All studies concur in indicating that there is tremendous potential for reducing dependence on external supplies, limiting greenhouse gas emissions and creating employment at the local level as well as economic growth around that activity.

Public policies, which can create a favourable framework for private investors, play an essential role here. The technological option on which efforts should focus will no doubt have to be decided on, bearing in mind that concentrating solar thermal power plants (avenues proposed by the Desertec consortium) would seem to be more effective than photovoltaic panels for stocking heat. Furthermore, the establishment of solar infrastructures in the southern and eastern Mediterranean countries could be profitable in rural areas where at the present time measures must be taken to diversify activities and bring a new dynamic to the regions. The production of solar energy could also be of service to agriculture. What is more, research and experimentation must be continued in order to refine the emerging systems for using solar energy to run seawater desalting plants. Saudi Arabia seems to be planning to invest in this field, and would be very much in the interests of both the EU and the southern and eastern Mediterranean countries to bring about technological cooperation on the subject in view of the potential regional spin-offs of this type of process both at the economic level and in terms of ecology and energy.

d. Biodiversity

7) Protecting marine resources: Marine biodiversity contributes to the wealth of the Mediterranean region. But the diversity of the species and sustainability of fisheries in the Mediterranean are being jeopardised by overfishing, pollution, the invasion of external species (which is resulting in tropicalisation that is harmful to the original ecosystem), and the degradation of the marine environment. These problems are common to all Mediterranean countries, and a joint response is a sine qua non for resolving them. These countries must therefore combine their efforts to implement more actions to conserve marine resources, to exchange information on experience with regulations with which sustainable fisheries can be ensured, but also to improve the sector's participation in the designing of policies and development of scientific capacities (in particular by sharing and standardising the statistics on the state of fish stocks). Since fisheries remain a fundamental socio-economic activity for most Mediterranean countries, care must be taken to ensure that more responsible fishing practices are developed in view of the depletion of resources (as in the case of bluefin tuna). Aquaculture is the only production method that offers the

prospect of increasing production in order to meet consumer demand. But there again, knowledge of aquaculture's interaction with the marine environment must be improved so that the development of the sector can result in high-quality products while avoiding environmental impacts. An ambitious integrated policy must be developed on the safeguarding of marine biodiversity focusing, for example, on establishing numerous protected marine areas throughout the Mediterranean.

8) Promoting varied crop systems and protecting woodlands: Maintaining biodiversity is often related to maintaining crop-growing practices and traditional know-how. Agriculture does not only contribute to climate change and suffer the consequences – it can also be part of the solution. It is essential here to promote crop-growing methods that are suited to the constraints of the Mediterranean region. In addition to the fact that the use of ancient and local varieties helps to preserve biodiversity in the Mediterranean, efforts must be encouraged to extend crop-growing systems which can adapt to the constraints of the geometry of the region. That is sometimes what is at stake in aid for traditional peasant farmers in the region, many of whom use farming techniques that have been developed to cope with aridity, the changing nature of the climate, and drought. Farmers in Europe, where the effects of climate change will be felt on crops, can learn a great deal from small farmers in the southern and eastern Mediterranean. Introducing varieties that are more heat and drought-resistant will also be a major challenge for the Mediterranean region in the years that lie ahead, and this will also raise the thorny issue of possibly using genetically modified organisms in the countries of the region. And lastly, it is also vitally important to conduct Euro-Mediterranean cooperation projects to protect wooded ecosystems in the Mediterranean. The fact must be recognised that woodlands provide considerable ecological services (soil and water protection and protection of biodiversity, flora and fauna). One of the measures that should be encouraged is action to fight forest fires, whose socio-economic and environmental consequences take a heavy toll on Mediterranean countries. Anthropogenic pressure and the effects of climate change could actually result in an increase in the number of forest fires. In addition to collaboration on preventing and fighting forest fires, regional cooperation could take the form of the establishment of a rapid reaction force in which logistic means (in particular aerial fire-fighting equipment) are pooled through a system of

joint interoperability in procedures and decision-making. In the last analysis, the economic aspect of Mediterranean biodiversity must be explored more thoroughly, since the loss of that diversity could have considerable consequences in view of all of the services that are indirectly related to it.

e. *Agriculture*

9) Promoting strong agricultural and rural policies: Agriculture and rural development are absolutely interlocked with the broader issue of sustainability and are thus of strategic importance for the Mediterranean region. Most Mediterranean countries actually depend on external markets and are having to import increasing volumes of products, particularly staple commodities (cereals). This fragility of food supplies, which can trigger revolts and social unrest, will increase on the whole, given the depletion of (soil and water) resources and the accelerating pace of climatic and sociodemographic change. In this context, measures should be launched to re-establish regional balance by promoting rural areas, either through public action or private investments in order to bring life to these less favoured regions and support the different forms of agriculture (family farms and capitalist farms). States must reintroduce strong agricultural policies in order to guarantee a minimum of national food sovereignty and to contain rocketing bills in the agro-food trade. Euro-Mediterranean cooperation must furthermore be promoted with a view to reducing hazards and developing good relations in the food field: this cooperation should concern efforts to build up regional food stocks to contend with price volatility, the progressive convergence of health and phytosanitary standards with a view to bringing about and facilitating trade liberalisation, and action to strengthen scientific and technical networks dedicated to managing natural resources (water and soil).

10) Adapting eating habits: returning to the Mediterranean diet: Knowing what a healthy diet is and knowing the origin of the products on one's plate are both connected with the broader issue of sustainable development. For the changes that are taking place in eating habits, which have become westernised in the Mediterranean region, are tending to

diminish the availability of natural resources. A diet that contains more meat is actually a less responsible diet in ecological terms. Dietary patterns that take no account of product origin or seasonality leave their mark on the environment. Apart from the virtues of the famous Mediterranean diet for the health, which are internationally recognised, the frugality of that diet is also an efficient way to contribute to sustainable development in everyday life. One of the primary measures for adapting to the growing climate constraints in the Mediterranean region would perhaps be for individuals to return to eating habits that are more in keeping with the conditions dictated by local realities. Measures to develop organic agriculture and promote traditional local products are concrete means of promoting Euro-Mediterranean cooperation.

f. Research

11) Investing in research and producing knowledge: Implementing sustainable development policies that are both effective and operational presupposes considerable capacities for researching the major environmental problems of the Mediterranean. Each country will have to invest in research, for although technologies must be transferred and knowledge must be disseminated, it is just as important to guarantee a minimum of endogenous scientific production in order to nurture a scientific culture in each country. This research must produce results, further science and complement knowledge. It must also provide a means of anticipating future ecological disruptions and adapting to change (climate constraints, depletion of resources, and preservation of biodiversity). The task is thus enormous, yet research facilities and funds are limited in the Mediterranean countries. It is therefore essential that research efforts and scientific capacities be pooled. In concrete terms, this means that the aim must no longer be to produce knowledge everywhere about everything; on the contrary, research in the Mediterranean region must be strategically intermeshed, each country and/or each national scientific body contributing its knowledge and skills in order to complement those of its peers. This vision of a Mediterranean research network would seem essential if the scientific challenges posed by the environmental equation in the region are to be met. In the field of agriculture, for example, researchers could study how to produce larger quantities (a quantitative requirement connected with

population growth) more efficiently (a qualitative requirement connected with sustainability) thereby using fewer resources (a geographical requirement connected with the depletion of water resources and of arable land). In this context, the launching of several ERA-Net programmes on a Euro-Mediterranean scale (concerning water, land, renewable energies, biodiversity, agriculture, and so on) would be an undeniable asset for promoting these synergies and sharing knowledge.

12) Inventing new indicators: Analysing environmental dynamics will undoubtedly involve constructing innovative indicators to monitor the progress of development in the Mediterranean region. This is where observatories and analysis centres will play the role of producing series of relevant aggregate statistics on the Mediterranean as a whole but also of proposing new indicators that are adapted to the specific constraints of the region. These efforts to construct proactive monitoring of the main trends and those that are emerging must enable both public and private actors to distinguish between what is proving to be sustainable or, on the contrary, untenable from the point of view of resources. Thought should be devoted to how sustainable development is to be measured so that the present list of monitoring indicators can be complemented and the manifest uncertainties that persist as to certain data collections that are based on doubtful methods can be reduced. Furthermore, the national scale is often used for comparative analyses of countries. But environmental realities within a country vary, and indicators that are aggregated at the national level sometimes mask regional disparities. There again, indicators that sometimes focus more on regional aspects would be appropriate for furthering knowledge and finding local solutions to sustainability issues. In the final analysis, these innovative indicators must be very closely correlated to those used for studying improvement in people's living conditions. Euro-Mediterranean co-operation would stand to gain in political capacity, since sustainable development must be constantly validated and confirmed (a forward-looking approach is based on hypotheses and not on certainties), and the system for producing the information that governments rely on for taking action is sometimes so static that the very choice of indicator is invalidated by structural or economic trends.

g. Education and information

13) Educating and training people: lifelong sustainable development: Sustainable development cannot be decreed; it is gradually built up and constantly shaped. Every individual must contribute to this process. In the comprehensive participatory approach, sustainability policies must take account of the variables of education and training, which are of decisive importance if policies are to be able to gradually modify trends and change people's behaviour. It would be very much in the interests of the Mediterranean countries to consolidate teaching about the environment and sustainability from the first years of learning right up to the end of secondary school. Furthermore, universities and colleges of higher education must offer more specialised training in sustainable development professions. These measures at the national level will form a basis for boosting regional cooperation. For the establishment of scientific research networks where the Mediterranean countries pool their skills and knowledge and thus create synergism will obviously be facilitated if they share the objective of mobilising more means for training courses relating to the sustainability of the region's resources. In this context, one of the measures which could generate multilateral regional cooperation would be to devise a network-based university course on sustainable development, in which a consortium of universities and colleges of higher education in the countries of the Euro-Mediterranean region participate. This course would lead to a Professional Master's Degree combining geopolitical analyses and technical knowledge of environmental challenges and would be run at the Euro-Mediterranean University of Portorož in Slovenia (EMUNI), which has already launched training courses on the subject and which should be strengthened. And lastly, short-term training modules (using distance learning methods) on sustainable development issues should be set up within public or private operators that are active in the Mediterranean region so that their agents and employees can familiarise themselves with the concept of social and environmental responsibility and improve their knowledge of the field. These training modules could be taught by young graduates holding an ad hoc master's degree from the EMUNI and could thus be supported /recognised in the Euro-Mediterranean cooperation framework.

14) Informing and raising awareness: the role of the media and of communication: It is equally important to promote information on sustainable development that targets public opinion and reaches all segments of society. Although this movement has been making headway for several years, awareness efforts must be continued, for there is also growing scepticism (climate change and the reality of environmental hazards are sometimes disparaged as new ideologies). It has been seen how documentaries or daring publicity campaigns have succeeded in getting the message across to people about the urgency of climate change and ecological preservation issues. Specialists and the media must find the right tone so that they can continue to popularise the idea that sustainable development is an imperative for all societies and for every individual. Public opinion must always be made to realise that natural resources are scarce and can run out. Broadcasts on the environment should be supported, and specific programmes for the Mediterranean region could be proposed, for example, on the Euronews channel (which has recently started to broadcast in Arabic). Furthermore, it is time to improve efforts to inform the millions of tourists who spend their vacation on the shores of the Mediterranean each year and to raise their awareness of sustainable development issues; the conduct of these tourists is not always appropriate as regards use of the region's resources (ranging from overconsumption of water to carelessness in forest areas). Similarly, when tourist pressure on a site increases, the deterioration of the landscape is harmful in the medium term, for several highlights of the Mediterranean's cultural heritage are in jeopardy as the result of the influx of visitors. The non-sustainability of a tourist site is also unfavourable for development in the Mediterranean due to the economic rent phenomenon that inevitably develops around tourism. Here again, it would already suffice to draw the attention of tourists who travel in the Mediterranean region to the fact that they are entering or travelling in a fragile area which has a wealth of biodiversity but which is in jeopardy. A flyer containing information along the lines of a charter of ecologically responsible tourism that is placed on each seat of the planes, trains and buses bound for the Mediterranean and in each hotel room would not be a just a gimmick – it would be a tangible form of Euro-Mediterranean cooperation.

5.2 Proposals on demographic change and economic development

by Joaquín Arango

Formulating proposals on demographic change and economic development for the Euro-Mediterranean area in the perspective of 2030 is a daunting, most difficult task. There is a risk of incurring in wishful thinking, and an even greater one of incurring in overgeneralization, given the marked differences to be found among countries not only across the sea but even within each shore. As for the scope of the possible recommendations, it has to be confined to the economic-demographic interplay. Indeed, making recommendations about macroeconomic policies would be unwise, on account of the myriad of international organizations, specialized government departments and think tanks that more or less regularly do so. On the other hand, demographic change is well under way in the region and the possibility of significantly altering population trends is minimal. In any case, the effects of any induced alteration would be likely to have a limited influence, given the time lag that usually separates births from entrance in the labor force. In any case, employment, which is the major link between population and the economy and the focal point of demographic-economic interactions, is the foremost development issue in the region, as attested in the Trends and Tensions sections.

The countries of the Northern rim face rapid aging and growing labor shortages. Population aging appears as inexorable, as prospects for a significant increase in fertility are dim and declines in age expectation unlikely. In the absence of immigration, the active population will tend to shrink in the coming decades, according to projections. In such a scenario, employment would not only fail to contribute positively to economic growth but would have a negative impact on it. Productivity gains alone would be insufficient to secure vigorous economic growth. Therefore, labor immigration, especially once the present crisis is over, appears as an inescapable necessity in order to maintain living standards and competitiveness.

At the other side of the Mediterranean, two contrasting features stand out in the demographic context of the SEMC. The first one is very high rates of growth of the active

population, of the order of 3 percent per year, which means that, if maintained, its size would double every 23 years. The second is a demographic opportunity window – a demographic dividend or demographic bonus –, arising from the very low dependency burden that, both in the present and in the near future, adults will have to bear on account of a combination of declining fertility and the still relatively low proportion that the elderly make in the population. Should education and the economy work satisfactorily in the two coming decades, there would be a significant opportunity to take advantage of such a bonus. Both contrasting features point to the crucial importance of employment.

Yet, the magnitude of the challenge presented by the first feature has few precedents in history, if any. The number of additional jobs that will be required in the SEMC just to provide jobs for the plethora of youngsters that will be trying to enter in the labor market every year from now to 2030 will be astronomical. It goes without saying that it will be even higher, in addition, if the very high unemployment rates that prevail today, especially among young people, are to be lowered, and the very low labor force participation rates, especially among women, increased. Creating such a volume of employment would require very high and sustained rates of economic growth, well above those registered in recent times. At the same time, productivity levels should be raised for the economy to be more competitive. Pursuing these two goals simultaneously – raising productivity and greatly enlarging employment - will entail formidable dilemmas, as some of the necessary reforms would tend to be labor-saving. In order to improve economic performance, economies will need to be more efficient, open and diversified, and this will not be possible in the absence of a host of structural reforms.

Such a context enhances the importance of migration for the SEMC, even if, admittedly, it can only absorb a fraction of the surplus of domestic labor supply and be no more than a partial solution. Yet, in addition to alleviating unemployment, migration can contribute to development through remittances and the transfer of skills.

Therefore, both sides of the Mediterranean could benefit from increased migration flows. They could also benefit from better managed flows. A win-win-win scenario, including migrants themselves among the beneficiaries, is conceivable. Yet, translating the existing potential of complementarity into migration flows would require change in several areas. To

start with, political constraints and an unfavorable social and political atmosphere towards migration – which reinforce each other - in the EU, hamper the realization of the win-win potential. But even if such constraints were to disappear, the mismatch that exists between the skills demanded by the EU labor markets and the skill profiles prevailing in the labor forces of the South and East would severely limit complementarity. Substantial reforms are therefore necessary at both sides.

OVERCOMING OBSTACLES IN THE NORTH

The reforms that are required in the North have primarily to do with the predominantly negative social climate which surrounds immigration and with the policy regimes in which it takes place.

Negative attitudes towards immigration, or even decidedly anti-immigrant feelings, seem to be on the rise in many European countries. The ascent of populist, xenophobic parties is an indicator of such a climate, while at the same time a factor that fuels it. A far from satisfactory record of integration of past immigration, and a negative evaluation of it, contributes to it. In the case of populations of immigrant origin from the SEMC countries, stereotypes and misrepresentations often contribute to negative feelings. In general terms, it can be said that migration is seen more as a risk than as an opportunity. In recent years it has undergone a process of securitization. Irregular migration has become the embodiment of most of such fears and misgivings. In turn, it seems to justify restrictive policies.

Existing immigration policies are hardly adequate for the realization of the win-win potential. In most European countries, admission policies are highly restrictive, particularly as far as labor migration is concerned. In itself, this is a major obstacle for the realization of the win-win potential. In addition, highly restrictive policies give *de facto* precedence to entitlement-based entries – i.e. family and asylum -, and to irregular migrants, who tend to have less risk-aversion and to be less skilled. Both effects contribute to the perception of migration as unwanted or *subie*, as it has been recently termed, and therefore to the aforementioned adverse climate.

Overcoming obstacles in the North, if a certain migration arbitrage is to take place, would require a number of changes that would aim simultaneously at devising better, more balanced migration policies and to change the atmosphere in which it takes place.

The necessary change in the orientation of migration policies could start by taking seriously the Global Approach to Migration - promote legal migration, reduce irregular migration and cooperate with third countries - formally adopted by the EU since 2005. Doing so would entail redressing the balance between promoting legal migration and fighting irregular migration, a balance that so far has been severely distorted in favor of the latter, and investing more heavily in cooperation with third countries.

Ideally, the EU would develop a proactive and inclusive common immigration policy, one that hopefully would be later followed by member states. It would enlarge the avenues for legal migration, therefore breaking the vicious circle of increasing restriction and more unwanted migration. Its cornerstone would be an adequate immigrant admission and selection system which would combine short-term considerations with a mid-term outlook presided over by active population and skills considerations. In so doing, it would do away with the prevailing admission systems which are presided by short-term considerations, above all those directed at filling vacancies in the labor market, a cumbersome paradigm that generates a host of unintended consequences and does not secure the satisfaction of labor market needs in the medium-term. The new admission paradigm would not only look for the highly-skilled immigrants, but also for low-skilled and medium-skilled. The Blue Card should be improved and complemented by other programs. The medium-skill level is likely to be crucial. But there is also a clear need for low-skilled immigrants as well, and it should be adequately recognized, and suitable avenues for their entry established. This should not only cater to existing needs, but could contribute to reduce irregular flows.

Circular migration could prove to be a win-win formula. As far as receiving countries are concerned, it could provide a flexible scheme for changing labor market needs. In addition, it could allay part of the reluctance that some countries show towards permanent migration, especially of the less-skilled. For source countries, it may lower the costs of outmigration, reduce the brain drain, and contribute to the transfer of skills. And it may afford valuable additional income to families. Yet, in order to exploit its potential, the idea of circular

migration should be taken seriously, beyond the mantra that it constitutes today. A new legal framework is needed to make circulation possible. In addition to Mobility Partnerships, legal changes are needed if it is to be a real option, starting with multiple-entry visas.

An adequate migration regime, able to orderly channel migration and to better satisfy the needs of the labor markets, might allay some of the reservations of a hostile public opinion and contribute to changing the social perception of the costs and benefits of migration.

The latter would also require a new impulse to integration policies. Integration is necessary for social, political and moral reasons, but also for economic ones, and to upgrade the perception of existing immigration. The comprehensive approach put forth in the EU Tampere summit of 1999 should be retaken and invigorated. The principle of fair treatment, established therein, should be given its full weight. The importance of integration for social cohesion does not need to be pondered. It is also essential for the wellbeing and the life chances of citizens of immigrant background. The management of migration would benefit from mainstreaming it, i.e. introducing the issue in all areas of EU policy, including external relations.

FOSTERING COMPLEMENTARITY IN THE SOUTH AND EAST

In addition to removing the obstacles that stand in the way of increased immigration in the North, reforms in education and skill formation are required in the South and East in order to foster effective complementarity.

Improvements in education, and especially in skills formation, are necessary for the improvement of economic performance. Investing in human capital to raise productivity is a must everywhere, but particularly in countries where levels leave much to be desired. Yet, they are also necessary to facilitate migration. In the recent, and not so recent, past progress in education in the SEMC has been considerable, and large financial efforts have been devoted to it. Yet, the extension of schooling has absorbed the lion's part of it, to the detriment of quality. Additional efforts, admittedly hard to produce, are needed to raise the

quality of education, especially in terms of skills, and to make it more attuned to the needs of the economy.

Educated youngsters in the SEMC are often unemployed or underemployed. In principle, this supply could find its counterpart in the European demand for graduates. Yet, the skills demanded often do not coincide with those of the potential candidates. This mismatch calls for a vast effort to upgrade the skills of graduates.

Such an effort could be part of a more general drive for improving education, and for making it more geared to skills than to diplomas. It would raise the qualification and employability of youngsters, including potential migrants. Educational systems are ill-connected to the labour markets. Vocational education usually lags behind. The proportion of students in the sciences, technology, and related areas is generally low. All this hampers the employability of graduates, both at home and abroad.

Improving the employability of educated youngsters would also benefit from better information about labour market needs, skills and labour force outputs for different educational profiles. The match between labor supply and demand could be aided as well by pro-active labor market measures and by more intermediation by public agencies. A better allocation of labor resources would in turn encourage human capital formation.

SKILL FORMATION THROUGH EURO-MEDITERRANEAN COOPERATION

It can be surmised that a better match of skill mixes across the Mediterranean would facilitate migration, and that skill formation could increase labour force complementarity. In turn, skill formation and upgrading could be fostered through Euro-Mediterranean cooperation. The medium-skill level might be the most promising one. Research about the connection between skill formation and migration, and about the instruments to promote it, could be especially fruitful. The EU's Action Plans for international cooperation with third countries could constitute an able instrument. Mobility Partnerships could be another one, if construed in broader terms than up to now. There is ample room for Euro-Mediterranean cooperation in this area. This cooperation could also provide compensation, via generation

of additional human capital, to source countries for the loss of human capital that often results from migration.

The translation of complementarity into actual migration could be facilitated as well by better knowledge and information about labor needs and human resources at both sides, including the identification of labor needs in EU countries, at all skills levels, better knowledge about stocks and flows and especially about skill needs and possible skill shortages, and information about the pool of human resources available for different skill levels.

Euro-Mediterranean cooperation could also extend to this realm. Ideally, a sort of 'clearing house' agency would fulfil this intermediating function, with participation of the social partners. It would foster, and contribute to, the development of proper information systems. It could have websites in which employers and candidates to different jobs could register. It could put forth suggestions for skill development. It would provide information to potential migrants in source countries, possibly combined with training.

ENHANCING DEVELOPMENT EFFECTS

Through remittances, migration can contribute to development, or at least to poverty reduction. Maximizing them requires lowering transaction costs. Strategies for increasing the transfer of skills should be explored.

INTRA-SEMCs MIGRATION

SEM countries could also benefit from increased migration among them, not only to Europe and the Gulf. This could alleviate regional mismatches and solve shortages in certain skills. Complementarities among them could also be explored and fostered.

A PARTNERSHIP APPROACH

For all the preceding, better governance of migration is required, if all parties involved – source countries, receiving ones and migrants – are to benefit from it. An international legal framework, accepted by all, for the management of migration is called for. As the recent work of the UN, the Global Commission for International Migration, the International Organization for Migration, the OECD and other international bodies attest, cooperation between sending, transit and receiving countries is increasingly seen as essential for the governance of migration. And it has to be reminded that the third pillar of the Global Approach of the EU is precisely cooperation with third countries. It is doubtful that the existing frameworks for cooperation in the region constitute an adequate forum for the degree of cooperation that is required. A partnership approach is clearly necessary. And an institutional framework for multilateral cooperation on migration and related matters in the region could be most useful. Experiences such as the Puebla Process in North America could provide hints. A modest precedent, insufficiently developed and used, is the Tunis Declaration (2002). The process started in Rabat in 2006 could also be of interest.

5.3 Cultural cooperation in the Euro-Mediterranean region

by Saloua Zerhouni

INTRODUCTION

The existence of cultural diversity is a characteristic typical of most regions of the world. The Mediterranean basin is no exception to this rule. Societies on both sides of the Mediterranean have historically been culturally very diverse and have become even more so over the years. The different waves of migrations have rendered the idea of the existence of a 'homogeneous culture' within newly created nation states more part of an ideological construct or an 'imagined community'¹ than part of an actual historical reality. Besides migration flows, the cultural effects of globalization, EU enlargement, the advances of means of communication, the historical coexistence of diverse value systems and religions are all factors that have contributed to changing, transforming and 'diversifying' the cultural landscape in which the people of the Mediterranean have lived over centuries.

While political cooperation and economic relations between countries of the two shores of the Mediterranean have been at the center of their relations, cultural cooperation was not a priority on their political agendas until the more recent years. The 9/11 attacks, the increasing media coverage of incidents of racism and discrimination, the heated debates and controversies on value systems, have been all contributing factors for initiatives aimed at promoting dialogue between cultures.

Intercultural dialogue (IDC) has been identified by the European Commission as "a tool contributing to the governance of cultural diversity within European societies, trans-nationally across European countries and internationally with other world regions."² In the framework of Euro-Med cooperation, IDC has been conceived of as a tool to enhance security, regional integration, conflict prevention and as 'a Confidence Building Measure',³ if successful, it would have a positive impact on other aspects of cooperation.

This general view and perception of IDC should however be nuanced. There is no doubt that 'dialogue between cultures', as a diplomatic way of preventing conflicts in a multicultural world, is a positive step forward; yet, this particular means of bridging the 'cultural gap' is

only the window through which problems could be addressed but not necessarily resolved.⁴ Engaging in IDC is mainly a way of dealing with the symptoms of a problem rather than dealing with its causes. There are fundamental structural and ideological issues that are the real basis of the challenges that hinder successful cooperation in the region and these structures are still not seriously and effectively touched upon.

That said three major questions will be raised in this paper: first, what are the conditions for an effective management of cultural diversity in the Euro-Med region? Second, what are the existing opportunities that should be benefited from? Third, what are the concrete measures to be undertaken in this field?

CULTURAL COOPERATION: SOME PREREQUISITES

For a better cultural cooperation between countries of the Mediterranean region, a number of points need to be taken into consideration:

First, improve our understanding of culture and cultural diversity: we need to start rethinking the concept of “culture”. Also, it is important to look at cultural questions not mainly as part of a *problematique* that concerns the present but that is part of how the past is conceived and how it needs to be rethought.

Second, rethink our approach to dealing with cultural diversity and cultural misunderstandings:

When dealing with “cultural issues”, it is clear that it is not the “inherent nature” of a culture per se that is at stake, but rather its ideological instrumentalization, the politics and the policies behind how cultural diversity is dealt with, promoted or simply ignored and repressed. The point here is that we need to be critical of the purely “culturalist” visions in dealing with the question of culture and in the design of cultural policies.

Despite some of the achievements of inter-cultural dialogue, we might, as suggested by some scholars, have to depart from “the rhetoric of ‘inter-cultural dialogue altogether.”⁵ Some critics suggest that IDC reproduced, unintentionally, the Huntington thesis of 'clash of

civilizations'. Yet, we would have to go beyond the 'civilizational approach' which has historically and intellectually constructed notions of identities as if they are part of coherent and unproblematic categories. The notion of 'civilization' is clearly outdated because it has created a historical narratives that looks for "cultural essences" (i.e. 'Western civilization', 'Islamic civilization') that have sidestepped the historical realities of cross-cultural exchanges and mutual influences. Dialogue is important, but we need to rethink its foundations so that it can achieve some of its expected outcomes.

It would be misleading to present the problems of cultural misunderstanding as an issue that posits the 'North' vis-à-vis the 'South'. Putting the debate in this dichotomous manner would in fact reinforce the problem.

Third, promote a framework of plural democratic values and socio-economic equity: this is a must for successful cultural cooperation. Talking about dialogue between cultures is meaningless when most Arab societies live under authoritarian rule. Cultural diversity stands in many ways for a desire to find the political norms and institutions through which the possibilities of heterogeneous cultural expressions are not constrained by the stifling measures and political instruments of non-democratic rule. A very important avenue for cultural expressions resides not only in the ways in which knowledge is freely produced but also how it is transmitted through the ideological state apparatus. Whether on the northern or southern parts of the Mediterranean, cultural diversity in its very large meaning (to express your political views, to be able to be different, to oppose established views, to be an atheist, to be a women and dress up with or without veil, to be an Islamist who respects the rights of others to be different, to be a hip hop or heavy metal singer...etc) requires the establishment of a new concept of 'cultural citizenship' that calls for full participation in a new democratic civil and political society.

EXISTING OPPORTUNITIES

EU interest in 'improving mutual understanding among the peoples of the region' was stated since 1995 in the Barcelona Declaration. However, important initiatives aiming at promoting trans-cultural dialogue were undertaken mainly during the past decade. Attempts at defining

measures for a meaningful cultural cooperation should take into account previous actions and make a good use of 'existing opportunities'. We need to capitalize, encourage, reinvigorate, evaluate and learn from initiatives, projects and programs that have been carried out. In the following, I will point out to some of the positive achievements we need to build upon as well as initiatives that need to be further advanced, I will mention just few:

The variety of established institutions, programs and forums is an important asset that should be further strengthened. (The EuroMesco, the Euro-Med non-Governmental platform, the Euro-Med Youth Platform, the Euro-Med heritage program etc.), these programs and institutions are a mechanism for guaranteeing the continuity of dialogue between cultures and a tool to ensure the implementation of cultural policies. At this level, more coordination measures are needed.

Cultural exchange should be encouraged more because of its importance for improving our knowledge about cultural differences. The mobility of intellectuals, researchers, artists and academicians contribute significantly to clarifying misperceptions and correcting stereotypes in both sides. The success of cultural exchange is very much related to the simplification of visa procedures for participants from South Mediterranean countries.

The establishment of a Euro-Mediterranean University is certainly another good step forward in the process of dialogue between cultures. This university can provide countries of the Mediterranean with an ideal space for learning about one's own culture as well as the other's culture. This space is ideal for interaction among students with different cultural backgrounds.

The Anna Lindh Foundation for the dialogue between cultures (ALF) is another acquis that needs continuous support for achieving its objectives. Events and programs initiated by ALF have been of great importance for promoting trans-cultural dialogue such as the 1001 Actions for Dialogue and its contribution to Euro-Mediterranean year of intercultural dialogue. The survey on intercultural trends 2010 deserves a specific attention and its findings will be of great guidance in designing cultural policies in the region.

The involvement of civil society actors in the process is very important. Nevertheless some changes should be made to the EU approach in supporting civil society actors⁶. If we take the

example of the ALF, civil society participants are chosen directly by the national governments, very often, exchanges are done between cultural elites. The elitist character of cultural cooperation is an important limit to its success. Also, Islamist NGOs have not been favored by the EU. This kind of discrimination might have a negative impact on cultural cooperation.

PROPOSALS FOR CULTURAL COOPERATION

It is beyond the scope of this paper to suggest a cultural agenda for cooperation in the Euro-Med region up to 2030 because of the specificity and complexity of this field. Rather I will try to point out to some of the measures that should be undertaken by different countries in order to manage cultural diversity. My suggestions are based on the recommendations, conclusions and reports of different groups that have tackled this issue⁷.

Before speaking about potential measures to undertake, it is worthwhile mentioning that the actions to manage cultural diversity in the Euro-Med region should be prescribed within a long-term strategy that encompasses both dialogue between cultures and cultural policies. The management of cultural diversity should be thought of as a progressive process that needs time to establish the foundations for its success such as trust, a strong political will on the part of different actors, ownership of the process.

The main drivers for cultural cooperation have been brought into focus by different working groups that are in:

- Education,
- Youth programs,
- Women and gender issues,
- Empowering of civil society,
- Mobility and cultural exchange,

- The media as an instrument for mutual knowledge.

For instance, to strengthen the capacities to acquire and communicate knowledge in the region one should think of:

- Reworking of syllabuses and including subjects that help to shape cultural identity like history, comparative study of religion, literature etc.
- Strengthen networking among individuals, groups and institutions,
- Establish centers for cross-cultural learning in both shores of the Mediterranean,
- Establish MA and PhD programs on European studies in the South and Middle Eastern studies in the North,
- Provide more resources for language learning both within European countries and in Southern Mediterranean countries,
- Make use of internet as a virtual space for debate and exchange of ideas.

Cultural policies should be thought of according to sectors as mentioned above. Actions and policies might differ from one actor to the other. In the framework of the Euro-Med cooperation, what the EU should do is not necessarily similar to what South Mediterranean countries should engage in. Also, economic and social policies should all include a cultural dimension. The implementation of cultural policies should be done in coordination with policies in other social areas.

The success of cultural policies and cultural cooperation is very much related to our approach in dealing with cultural issues, this is why we think that the following should be taken into account:

Assess national approaches to cultural diversity. This kind of investigation was done by some institutes but only at the level of European countries⁸, so far, no research was conducted about the situation in southern Mediterranean countries. Before engaging in collaborative work, we need to understand national approaches to cultural issues, learn about the best practices and understand national approaches to cultural issues.

We need also to assess projects and programs implemented in the Euro-Med region, establish mechanisms to ensure concrete follow-up to different initiatives and recommendations that were adopted by different groups in different meetings. The establishment of structures and institutions should be done at the national level but also at the trans-national level to facilitate, coordinate and evaluate actions, initiatives, programs aimed at improving cultural cooperation.

Develop a common approach to dealing with our cultural differences, develop a common language and agree on the meanings of basic and fundamental concepts.

Mobility should not be one-directional, we need to encourage mobility between the South, the East and the North of the Mediterranean.

Decentralized cooperation in the Euro-Mediterranean area should be open to small and medium-sized initiatives.

Disseminate information about existing opportunities for cultural cooperation.

The EU should harmonize its discourse and action when it comes to trans-cultural dialogue. While advocating for inter-cultural dialogue, the EU adopted a number of measures (migration law, anti-terrorism regulations) which made the mobility of individuals and groups very difficult (especially students, researchers, journalists, artists, etc). These kinds of measures will not contribute to building bridges but rather widen the gaps between the two shores of the Mediterranean. It also affects the credibility of the EU and of the dialogue itself.

Internal policies adopted at the state level should be compliant to the ideal of promoting cross cultural dialogue.

European leaders should become more vocal when racist comments are made about the Islamic values or when Muslims are targeted.

Last but not least, provide the necessary financial resources for cultural cooperation. Despite increasing importance given to cultural cooperation during the past decade, its chances of success are very much related to the resources that will be allocated to implement proposed actions. The importance accorded in terms of financial support is very low compared to the budget allocated for political and economic cooperation.

¹ As formulated by B. Anderson, "Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism", Verso, 1991.

² The European's Commission Agenda for Culture in a Globalizing World, 2007.

³ S. K. Isaace, "The Quest for Intercultural Dialogue in the Euro-Med Region: Opportunities and Challenges", ISPI Commentary, 2010, http://www.ispionline.it/it/documents/Commentary_Isaac_8.7.10.pdf.

⁴ For instance, in the conclusions of the Ministers of culture meeting in 2008, it has been stated that dialogue is "an essential tool for promoting mutual understanding, tolerance and reconciliation, as well as fighting against discrimination, racism, xenophobia and extremism."

⁵ R. A. Del Darto, "Setting the (cultural) Agenda: Concepts, Communities and Representation in Euro-Mediterranean relations", Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 10, No. 3, 2005.

⁶ R. Youngs and T. Schoefthaler, "The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership-Success or Failure?", Europe's World, No. 4, 2006.

⁷ See references for the reports used in this paper.

⁸ "Sharing Diversity, National Approaches to Intercultural Dialogue in Europe", Study for the European Commission by the European Institute for Comparative Cultural Research, ERICarts report, 2008.

5.4 Education, science and innovation

by Rafael Rodriguez Clemente

WHAT THE DIFFERENT LEVELS OF ENGAGEMENT MIGHT MEAN AT SECTORIAL LEVEL

In the actual legal and political context of most of the Mediterranean Countries, the three concepts: education, science and innovation, are formally linked through the provisions of different laws and planning. The overall objective of this streamlining is the improvement of the competitiveness of the countries and their insertion in the global economy. Globalisation increases both opportunities and competition, and every nation needs to be able to compete at a global scale. This urges policy makers to better understand the potential and the mechanisms of innovation, forcing them to establish innovation strategies and make them produce socio-economic benefits for the society. Globalisation “can be a force for good and has the potential to enrich everyone in the world, particularly the poor”, but if not adequately managed it can have “devastating effect on developing countries, and especially on the poor within those countries”¹. The emergence of a knowledge-based economy, where knowledge is the basic strategic resource to achieve growth, defines a new era in development and growth. Changes in several domains and sectors pose serious challenges for the developing countries and for MPCs in particular. With knowledge and innovation at the core of the competitive advantage in the global economy, the capacity to innovate is considered by most nations as an optimal response to both current and future challenges. An innovation system is not only composed by enterprises, as the main actor operating in the system, but also by the educational system, the technical and scientific centres, the technical training facilities, the intermediate organisations, and the institutions and rules of economic organisation. The specific configuration of an innovation space depends a lot upon the sector specialisation in the country. Within this perspective, it is not surprising the effort of the Mediterranean countries to foster their Innovation system by supporting it with an educational and research policy.

This strategy to foster innovation makes an implicit recognition that it cannot be a top-down political decision, but the result of a cooperative process coming from a careful analysis of

the actual situation in the three sectors, education, research and innovation, and the ways how they can positively interact to obtain the desired goals.

So, a first evaluation of the higher education system is necessary to set the stage of any Innovation policy, even more than the research system, which in many aspects is a consequence of the higher education policy and goals. Therefore, a national strategy of Innovation or, even more, a national strategy of development must identify the real potentials and weakness of its educational system, and the first step to be done must be an improvement of this basic system as the only way to guarantee successful actions based on the national potential. In this sense, it worth mention the important role of the UNDP and World Bank in these issues in all the region particularly in bridging the gap between Higher Education and labour and knowledge economy.

These basic actions face many problems inherited from the past that conform the actual situation. For instance, in Egypt the level of quality of Universities is low and they are crowded. Promotion is not based on merit and performance; the students are evaluated on the basis of memory. The report of the OCDE-World Bank Higher Education in Egypt, 2008-09 International Review points: "To build and modernise the nation, the Government of Egypt has driven major reforms in macro-economic policy to attract foreign direct investment, monetary policy (including floating the Egyptian pound), taxation reform, trade liberalisation (including tariff reductions and international trade agreements), and public sector reform (including privatisation of state-owned enterprises). The higher education system remains unreconstructed in this context. It continues to produce largely for the economy of the past, and community expectations of it reflect outdated understandings of its role." This report recommends improving its economic competitiveness through advanced human capital formation and smart innovation, and expand and raise quality of Higher Education while catering more effectively and equitably to a more diverse student population, because at this moment graduates are not fitting labour market needs, research is disconnected from the national innovation system, the higher education system is too narrow and rigid, policy and financing frameworks are stifling change, Institutional governance is non-strategic and, finally, National steering mechanisms are fragmented.

The problems detected in Egypt are not limited to this country, but the common goals of improving the performance of the economic system are forcing political measures to overcome this serious hurdle for Innovation. In this sense it worth mention the national position of Tunis established by President Ben Ali in January 2010 where a number of national priorities were defined among which:

- Improving the quality of higher education and bringing it up to international standards,
- Enlarge vocational Master's programs and diversifying them in partnership with the economic environment,
- Adopt training contents that meet the needs of the job market and the requirements of quality in all diplomas having an applied and professional dimension,
- Reaching the percentage of 18% of university graduates in sciences and engineering from the 20-29 age group in 2014, compared to 11.7% in 2008,
- Increase, once again, the GDP share of scientific research and technology from 1.25% to 1.5% in 2014,
- Establish a program in each sector to maximize the value of the results of scientific research and encourage competition in this field,
- Develop a plan to establish a quality system in research centres according to international standards,
- Enter a new phase in the industrial upgrading program, involving the integration of applied research into promising sectors with high added value,
- Promote Tunisia's adherence to local and international scientific research and technological innovation networks.

In the Kingdom of Jordan, the Law of Higher Education and Scientific Research No. (23), for the year 2009 also establish in its Article 3 the following objectives:

Preparation of qualified human resources who are specialized in various fields of knowledge to meet the needs of the community. Encouraging, supporting and upgrading the scientific research especially the applied scientific research aims at community service and development. Establishing a scientific technical and national nucleus capable to develop the

scientific research and technology outputs. Enhancing the scientific, cultural, artistic and technical cooperation in the field of higher education and scientific research with other countries, international organizations, Arab Islamic and foreign organizations, coincided with the expansion of such cooperation in the modern and developed directions. A Scientific Research Support Fund is established with a distinguished financial and administrative independency that aimed at encouraging and supporting the scientific research in the kingdom.

Similar provisions are found in the national laws of Morocco, Algeria and other Med countries. From this quick review of the legal frame we can say that there are formal engagements at the legal and political level for the purposes of connecting the Higher Education System, with the entrepreneurial and research system. The real issue is that political and legal measures are not enough to guarantee the expected results.

THE CONCRETE ACTIONS THAT SHOULD BE ENVISAGED AND HOW THEY SHOULD BE

As A. Djeflat stated: “One of the factors that explain the backwardness of the southern shore (of the Mediterranean) is the inexistence of national innovation schemes that are thorough, operational and competitive”. The new awareness of the issue reached by both the public authorities and economic actors of the Southern Mediterranean countries has led to intensified efforts in the production of knowledge and technological research and development. The three Maghreb countries have begun a series of reforms with a view to simplifying procedures in order to allow greater celerity for investment and the transformation of ideas into projects and thus into investment. By way of illustration, according to a World Bank report (Doing Business in 2006), Morocco has reduced the number of steps required for registering a trademark or patent to 4, as opposed to the 6.6 required on average by the rest of the subregion, and the average of 4.7 steps registered by OECD countries.

An important weakness detected for the lack of connexion between education-science and innovation is the absence of motivations (economic rewarding and professional progression) of the scientific and educational stakeholders and the top-down approach created in most of

the countries, which is perceived as a non-independent rewarding system. It must be said that, for instance, in Morocco, there are legal provision (Loi 01-00 de 2000 on the organisation of higher education and its objectives) to supplement salaries of the personnel of Universities with funding coming from the exploitation of intellectual property and other resources obtains from services. However, the reality is that the technological production in the Southern Mediterranean countries is, as Djeflat described, very poor: In Morocco, 48 patents have been registered by 24 laboratories or laboratory groups in the past ten years, not including the fields of computer science and mathematics. Yet globally, 561 patents were registered in 2004, of which 104 were by nationals: 72% were registered by individuals. In Tunisia, 579 have been registered since 1990, 16%of which were registered by research institutions, 20%by businesses and 64% by individuals. In 2005, there were only 56 patents. If we consider the number of patents registered with the USPTO (US Patent and Trademark Office), the proportion was slightly over 0.1% per million inhabitants in 2002, identical to that of Egypt. This is very poor in comparison to Belgium (70.4%), France (68.1%), Italy (30.3%), and Spain (8%). In this field, like in many others, the “appropriation” of results by the stakeholders is fundamental to increase motivation and put in the hands of the knowledge owners, with the support of the intermediate actors such as consultants, the mission of valorising the results of research and also of good education and training in the Universities.

Following Djeflat, concrete measures to support this endeavour could be:

- Creation of Networks: such as the Maghtech Network, this is exclusive to the Maghreb. In Morocco, eight thematic networks and six skill clusters existed in 2006. In Algeria, six thematic networks were launched and their number is growing exponentially.
- Growing Participation and Interest of the DIAST (Scientific and Technological Diaspora). More and more programmes to involve expatriates in the transfer of know-how are being planned, such as TOKTEN (“Transfer Of Knowledge Through Expatriate Nationals”), which is operating in over 40 countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America. Other national programmes exist. Tunisia’s Ministry of Higher Education, Scientific Research and Technology has launched a programme for cooperation with Tunisians

residing abroad; and Morocco has the FINCOME programme for collaboration with skilled expatriates (International Forum of Moroccan Competences Abroad).

- University - Business Partnerships for Enhanced Research. In Algeria, an agency has been created to manage this interface – the ANVREDET (Agence Nationale pour la Valorisation de la Recherche et du Développement Technologique, i.e. National Agency for Research and Technology Development). In Morocco, university-business interface structures were created within the framework of the 2000- 2004 Development Plan. There are 15 interface structures at present. In Tunisia, such liaison also involves foreign enterprise. Dassault Systèmes has signed an educational partnership with the University of Tunis according to which it will supply product development software.
- Onset of Multinational Investment in R&D in Southern Mediterranean countries. In Algeria, a number of foreign companies are carrying out research in the field of hydrocarbons. In Morocco, there are several companies that have set up R&D facilities: STMicroelectronics, Matra Automobile Engineering Casablanca and Lead Design in the field of integrated circuits, as well as Teuchos, a subsidiary of the European Safran Group, working in the field of aviation and aerospace component conception.

Innovation sometimes is perceived as an activity linked to emerging technologies and products. Far from this restricted vision, innovation must be perceived as an “attitude” of permanent improvement of productivity and answer to the challenges of the market. Many of the provisions of the legal frame in the Med countries mention the need to foster sectorial development besides a general indication on supporting emerging technologies, products and services. Sectors differ in productivity growth and patterns of structural change. “Structural change in innovative activities is the result of the co-evolution of the relevant variables that compose the specific sectoral system. Thus a micro, technological and institutional “bottom up” perspective along the dimensions of a sectoral system can be conducive to a better understanding of the observed sectoral differences in innovation and consequently in the overall performance of countries”². The focus on sectors and technologies composing the national innovation system places a lot of emphasis on inter-sectoral and intra-sectoral links (both national and international), on how new technologies are adopted and diffused in established sectors (the learning process of industries) and how

effective is the presence of high tech in low tech production. Local and international interdependencies among sectors should not be seen in isolation, but related one to the other in various ways, both within the same country and at the international level.

The Jordan Law of Higher Education and Research proposes interesting measures such as identifying and measuring the performance indicators of its goals. Evaluating service recipients' satisfaction and increase the percentage of their satisfaction, and evaluating employee's satisfaction and increase the percentage of their satisfaction by training and qualifying them and awarding them incentives and rewards. As mentioned, the Moroccan Law 01 of 2010 also support the creation of economic incentives and it considers evaluation as an eligible activity of the National Fund for research. Other interesting items of the Moroccan Law is the possibility of Universities and research Institutions to establish "Groupement d'Interet Economique" (Groups of Economic Interest) as non-profit institutions that could act to promote the exploitation of knowledge, the creation of start-ups and "clusters" around the activity of the Universities.

As Pasimeni et al. stated³, in the process of setting up innovation policies in the Mediterranean Countries, it seems necessary to identify the key sectors at local level, those with the best potential for competitiveness and job creation, as well as to find the delicate equilibrium between supporting traditional sectors, offering strategic competitive strengths, and promoting new, more "innovative", ones. There is no reason to shift drastically from the traditional manufacturing or service sectors to those that appear more "glamorous". Innovation can also be developed in traditional sectors. And it is more likely to be developed and to generate socio-economic benefit in those sectors in which the local economic system has more experience, practice and "culture", than in totally new industries, barely known and understood by the local population and by the work force. If the innovation system in its entirety is developed and well functioning, then a widespread innovative capacity is generated, and it affects all industries of the economy. Of course, some sectors would be more likely to develop innovations than others, but if in a given country there is no tradition, no culture and no common understanding of that sector, it will be difficult to see it generate socio-economic benefit. At the same time, the ability of the policy maker is to support innovation in local strategic sectors, while promoting, at the same time and with far-

sightedness, innovative sectors capable of generating in the long term competitive skills and sustainable advantages, in the view of an international competition.

An important issue is how problems and challenges of the traditional industry, usually SME, or, even, the acquisition of emerging new knowledge by these companies can be addressed by the research system. This is a fundamental question because, usually, the intellectual interest of the Higher Education System and the Research System is directed toward global challenges identified and studied by the international scientific community. The point here is how common interest between the industrial sector and the scientific community can be created. There are two key questions: the conceptual and language barriers between the two sectors, and the expectation of benefits for both of them. The first question must be addressed by considering the chain of stakeholders in the knowledge transfer process: technical sectorial laboratories, created by the entrepreneurial sector, the administrations or, even, private services providers, are very useful in interpreting the needs of industrialist, particularly the SME, in terms understandable by the scientific community; even the translation of knowledge into practical industrial procedures is better done by engineers than by scientists. The other point is that the expected benefits that an innovative action can bring to the final beneficiaries, the industry, must be shared by the intellectual supporting frame, such as Universities and research Institutes and the positive results of this interaction must be included in the valorisation of the 'curricula' of the Academy. Many times the final product is not just a patent, difficult to produce and, specially, defend in the competitive international arena, but 'know-how' or, better, the assurance of the companies about a reliable support system in their own environment. The setting of this cooperative frame and the building of trust between the actors are fundamental steps in the creation of a national innovation system.

The Universities cooperation in the Mediterranean is another important driver to impulse the modernization of the academic system in the Med countries. As Lahrech described in his analysis of such cooperation. The Tampere University Rectors' Conference (Finland 9-11 October 2006) proposes a road map to move from the Tarragona Declaration to the Creation of the EuroMed Permanent University Forum/EPUF. The Tarragona Declaration aims to enhance university institutions' contribution on both sides of the Mediterranean and "foster dialogue between the region's cultural traditions, disseminate a culture of human rights and

democratic citizenry and promote the sustainable development of scientific and technological exchanges.” The Declaration is committed to “creating a Euro-Mediterranean Area of Higher Education and Research that contributes to the promotion of a knowledge society, encourages collaboration and dialogue among educational institutions, increases the institutions’ efficiency and ensures quality of teaching and research, education based on equality and further involves civil society in the knowledge society.”

The initial measures to be taken proposed in the Declaration were:

- The mutual recognition of titles and diplomas, which involves promoting the Bologna process for the application of the qualifications reform (Degree, Master’s Degree and PhD). Given the difficulty of a widespread implementation of the new system in the short term, mobility may be possible through specific programmes adapted to the Euro-Med Area, similar to the Erasmus programme;
- Enable free circulation of researchers from the south to the north, establishing more humane and less arbitrary rules and criteria when it comes to granting visas. In fact they urged to fully apply the already approved European Directive on Scientific Visa

Very important to the creation of a real Euro-Mediterranean Higher Education, Research and Innovation Space, is the setting of strong cooperation agreements between the Med. Countries besides reinforcing their links with the EU. It must be noted the good development of the scientific cooperation agreements between Tunis with Morocco and Libya, with common calls for proposals.

An important point of view to articulate a real integration between Higher Education, Research and Innovation comes from the Euro-Mediterranean Charter for Enterprises, resulting from the Caserta Declaration approved at the Fifth Conference of Euro-Mediterranean Ministers for Industry of 4 October 2004, where a number of possible measures were identified and the Institutions present, Mediterranean region partners, European Union Member States and European institutions, will make every effort to develop

the means, co-ordination structures and co-operation channels (bilateral, multilateral and regional) to reach their common objectives. They will set up the appropriate Euro-Mediterranean mechanisms to discuss progress and performance in implementing this Charter. They will also make every recommendation necessary to maintain the momentum in the implementation of the Charter.

The common challenges for all Mediterranean partners are the following: How to play the globalisation card and make the most of the opportunities offered by the opening up of the Euro-Mediterranean economic area? How to remain competitive and create a sufficient number of jobs for newcomers on the labour market? Which strategies should be implemented to create value added and achieve complementary economic development? How to foster entrepreneurship and attract foreign investment on a durable basis? Enterprise, as an engine for growth and social progress, is at the heart of all these considerations.

The Charter identified a number of issues where the Higher education and Research Systems, must play a key role, particularly in Education and training for entrepreneurship. It is proposed to nurture entrepreneurial spirit from an earlier age. General knowledge about business, entrepreneurial attitudes and entrepreneurship skills need to be taught and developed at all levels. Specific business-related modules should be made an essential ingredient of education schemes at secondary schools, colleges and universities. Entrepreneurial endeavours by young people must be promoted and develop appropriate training schemes for managers of small enterprises. Emphasis will be put on the skills needed to assess business opportunities as well as on the capacity to put together credible business plans. Curricula and training schemes will take gender issues into account. They will be adapted to market needs through a dialogue between the private sector and the educational system. Adequate skills are the main strength of any enterprise. The qualifications of personnel should be improved on a continual basis. Continuous vocational training for workers must be established. Special initiatives will be taken to reconvert workers towards new job opportunities, especially in relation to the use of new technologies. Sector-specific courses focused on international production standards and marketing should be set up. University curricula should be tailored to the needs of innovative companies and promote links between research, universities and industry in

order to make public research a relevant asset in the race for competitiveness. Systematic training aimed at promoting the use of innovation among workers should be encouraged.

Certainly the objectives and initiatives proposed by the Charter are at the core of the purposes for actions. On the other hand, this lucid program of action illustrates the difficulties of the endeavour: it was agreed by the Ministers of Industry, and its translation into practice goes to the initiative of other Ministries and the mobilization of a highly inertial system, such as the Universities, fully engaged in its own difficult functioning and challenges. Nevertheless, as pointed above, the implementation of the ambitious program outlined by the Charter of Enterprise and, even, the provisions of many national laws, depends on the motivation and expectations of beneficiaries of the stakeholders.

RESEARCH STRATEGY TO SUPPORT THE TRANSITION

A strategy to support a transition from a traditional economy to a knowledge base economy must put education at all levels, but particularly Higher Education and continuous education as the focal point of a long term action. However, simply acting on increasing the educational offer could be counterproductive if elements of evaluation and matching socio-economic demand are not taken into account. In short, Higher Education should be directed to the preparation of elites capable to interpret the needs of the country and provide the intellectual leadership to foster innovation in the areas needed, not only economic. Ideological or religious principles cannot direct the strategy, on the contrary, evaluation, as a normal procedure of the entire system including professors and students, and streamlining with the national productive landscape must be the main drivers of the Educational strategy. Little resources devoted to education produces a selection of elites based on economic level, usually educated abroad and, therefore, not connected to the demands of the productive system. These elites tend to monopolize the decision power tending to mimic western approaches in research and innovation. The way how this strategy can be implemented is specific of each country. However, the similarities between the social and economic structures of the Med countries makes it possible a common action to identify measures to be taken and propose a real benchmarking exercise of the results obtained.

The level of salaries in higher education staff should be revised in order to increase the social prestige. Complementary salaries must be established based on educational, scientific and technological transfer performances (up to triple salaries...). Model of fostering increasing concerns of the scientific elites for the problems of the productive system must be created according to the national conditions, and rewarding mechanism at the academic level and in the salaries must be established based on objective indicators of performance and public procedures. Patents and their exploitation, as well as knowledge (consulting) and technological transfer (research contracts) must be considered an element of prestige and a relevant component of the academic curricula. Again, here a mutual knowledge process and benchmarking exercises between countries can provide useful information on the pace of valorisation of the intellectual activity and its impact on the socio-economic system. The international networks of cooperation must be an essential component of the Innovation systems, as they give access to knowledge not available in the country. The networks of expatriates are one of such networks.

Innovation is the results of a non-linear chain of interactions aimed at increasing productivity. The main subject and actor of innovation are the enterprises, not the public powers, even the Academia is a secondary actor. A chain of intermediaries of the type: companies → technological centres → universities should be established. Other intermediaries such as innovation centres, consultants and the like are, perhaps, necessary, but cannot be the dominant stakeholders in the value chain, just facilitators on demand. The Authorities must be very careful in designing Innovation Systems, as a top-down innovation policy and the creation of economic stimuli, could result in the creation of a market of subsidies where learned consultants and other intermediaries, necessary but not central to the process, uses the resources without clear outputs in terms of productive innovation. Moreover, it is very dangerous to establish a rigid top-down structure because it tends to create another bureaucracy that consumes the funding allocated. A “cluster” policy controlled by the industrial sectors should be promoted, incorporating those Universities and research centres competent or interested in the economic area addressed. However, “research driven clusters” resulting from the high quality research activities of Universities and Research centres should be promoted by the public administration in order to promote

new business sectors supported by contrasted high quality research groups. These initiatives could promote the attraction of foreign interested institutions and, even, foreign capitals.

The main conclusion of this analysis is that the transition toward a knowledge base economy can only result from creating the appropriate stimuli in the academic world.

¹ J. E. Stiglitz, "Globalization and its discontents", New York, 2002.

² F. Malerba and F. Montobbio, "Structural Change in Innovative Activities in Four Leading Sectors. An Interpretation of the Stylized Facts", *Revue Economique*, Vol. 55, No. 6, 2004.

³ P. Pasimeni, A. S. Boisard, R. Arvanitis, J. M. Gonzalez-Aranda and R. Rodriguez-Clemente, "Toward a Euro-Mediterranean Innovation Space: Ideas for Research and Policy Making", Contributed paper for the 2007 Conference on Corporate RandD (CONCORD). IPTS-JRC. European Commission.

5.5 *Geopolitics and governance*

by Cilja Harders

POSSIBLE ROAD MAP FOR EUROMED COOPERATION

This paper looks at the main possible transitions of avoiding conflict, win-win and towards a Euro-Med community, offering an overview of the governance and geopolitics insight into the topic. It proposes the integration of the suggested measures under one chapter, rather than dividing them under trends/tensions/transitions approach.¹

Strategic Challenges to the Euro-Med Framework

Is a new general approach towards EuroMed relations necessary or, as Aliboni² holds, did this shift already happen under the rhetoric disguise of “reform” rather than strategic re-orientation? Abis, too, suspects the Euro-Med frame to be outlived by globalization and new emerging powers already and envisions a “Mediterranean without Europe”³. According to Aliboni, 15 years of Euro-Mediterranean relations witnessed major strategic shifts and changes, which might well contradict the main strategic objective of the EU: the creation and stabilization of a “ring of well-governed friendly countries” in its neighbourhood. Whereas the EMP started as an ambitious community-building project, the institutional framework of today seems to be set up as a more conventional project of international cooperation between governments. This represents a major downsizing of an earlier ambition. The strategic shift lies in the movement from cohesion to fragmentation and variable geometry.

The Barcelona project as a community building strategy, based on consent, conviction and incentives rather than power projection, is obviously confronted with some major dilemmas. This is mostly due to the fact that, as opposed to the project of the building of the European Community, it does not offer the prospect of accession to the Union. Without this major incentive for negotiating Common Strategies, even if they imply restrictions on the national

level, it is difficult to overcome the obstacles of competing national interests, two-level games and the costs of cooperation. A quick look at the history of European integration shows that these challenges remain difficult even in the event of actual accession and once that the Community project is put into practice. Thus, I would hold, the current institutional set up is not only an expression of tacit strategic shifts, lack of commitment and efficiency, but also reflects the diverging interests of all actors, i.e. normatively and maybe also strategically some developments are not in the declared interest of certain but it seems that this system of incomplete contracting and multiple exit options serves the short term interests of both sides best⁴.

The current institutional set-up is complex and ambivalent. The ENP is bi-lateral and the UfM multi-lateral but intergovernmental. The regional component, which should be at the heart of a Mediterranean project, is to date reduced to a small portion of funds and activities. EU involvement is focussed on the ENP as is its funding through the ENPI. SEMC governments also seem to prefer this arena for pursuing their aims while at the same time upholding discursive commitment to Barcelona Process as integrated project. The opportunities of the UfM, which lie in a renewed possibility for establishing regime-like structures for shared regional concerns, have so far not been utilized. Political blockades and lack of funding seem to prevail, which produces some dilemmas.

The dilemma of ownership can be visible through the lack of ownership, which constitutes a major problem of the Barcelona Process since its inception and even though ownership is in fact a pre-requisite of any real partnership, increasing ownership has led to a severely reduced reform and democracy agenda as show the UfM and the Action Plans. This severely compromises the achievement of the Barcelona acquis in terms of protection of human rights. On the other hand, one might argue that this situation also reflects the pragmatism of EU policies since 1995, which have been tilted towards stability in the stability-democracy dilemma and there is no reason to think that this will change in the future.

The dilemma of bi-lateralism shows that bi-lateralism was, among others, an answer to the analysis of deficits in efficiency and implementation of EMP policies. It served the interests of the EU in that it could mainstream its foreign relations under the umbrella of one policy being the ENP. It also served the differentiated ambitions of the SEMC, which have a

different degree of interest in deepening their economic and political relations with the EU and grew more sceptical about the regional architecture with Israel, included over time. But bi-lateralism and variable geometry will lead to an even more fragmented matrix of 'special relations and statuses' in the Mediterranean neighbourhood rather than catering to the aim of a 'ring of well-governed friends'. In addition, bi-lateralism might increase tensions between SEMC rather than building trust, support South-South cooperation and conflict resolution.

Finally, the dilemma of the Mediterranean focus is at the heart of the EMP/UfM. This framework served important peace building and conflict management aims with regards to the Arab-Palestinian-Israeli conflict in the 1990's. Today, this setting produces major blockades and has done so whenever the Middle Eastern conflict took a new confrontational turn. The Mediterranean focus is also very important in terms of creating a discourse of shared history, heritage, values and interests on both shores. Giving it up would imply to loose a rather powerful and appealing frame for a complex cooperation process. This would be indeed a revision of the Euro Mediterranean project. But there are strong incentives to do so in order to adapt Europe's policies to the regional realities. This Mediterranean focus does not reflect current regional realities in terms of the conflict system, regional ambitions of major players and regions' economic relations. Turkey and Iran both play important and very different roles as countries with regional geopolitical ambitions. The Gulf countries as well as the BRIC group already play a major role as trade partners with increasingly intensified migration links too. In terms of conflict and security, the Iraqi situation is important for the EU and Turkey. Iranian nuclear ambitions have been a major security issue both for the EU and SEMC in the past years. Taking this situation seriously implies leaving the Mediterranean notion behind, which would produce a major discursive and practical void. Alternative scenarios would then point to flexible sub-regionalism, which would include countries according to policy issues. This could include a strengthened regional and multi-lateral policy tier within the ENP⁵ which would serve as an intermediate structure between the UFM and the ENP.

Is this good or bad for Europe and its relations with the region? Does it help to master the trends and tensions in a cooperative and beneficial way? It would lead to even more fragmentation, but it could enhance smaller multilateral units, which could then, in the long

run, contribute to less fragmentation and to regional cohesion. But so far the Euro-Med experience is not very promising in terms of these indirect spillover effects. Still, sub-regionalism might be more efficient and functional because for example an efficient riverwater or climate change regimes differ importantly from membership perspective or peace-building efforts. Thus, the project-oriented outlook of the UFM could contribute to the development of concrete subregional projects, which will – because of the already broadened membership – create new subregional units, which go beyond the north-south and Maghreb-Mashreq divisions. But at the same time, it multiplies the possibility for political blockade, which would substantially increase the political costs of cooperation or rather the costs of failure. The EU is already neither capable nor willing to take the role of a benevolent hegemon in the current conflicts in the region. Why should this change in the face of an even more complex situation?

Whereas the institutional framework is sufficient in order to avoid violent conflict in the EuroMed area, in order to create win-win scenarios, institutional adaptations will be necessary. So far the UfM did not develop capacities to overcome political rifts and competing interests but tends to be blocked along the lines of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Win-win options should per definitionem entail more cooperation gains than losses. But their implementation, the possible costs and the sharing of responsibilities, taking first steps, and agreeing on conditionality will need an institutional setting in which action and negotiation is going on along policy issues even if there is disagreement in other areas. This can be also pursued in subregional groupings. Fragmentation of involved actors and policy areas will need sustained efforts in order to ensure smooth bureaucratic procedures. It will need a coordinating centre. Based on its bureaucratic capacities, the Commission take on this task efficiently. This in turn challenges the ownership of SEMC again. In addition, institutional competition with the UfM secretariat might arise and produce deadlocks.

Reaching cohesion and deepening cooperation in the EuroMed Community scenario will need a major institutional overhaul. This process basically means that the Barcelona acquis is taken as a roadmap. This roadmap would start with reasserting the shared idea of building a community and not just working for better cooperation. The institutional reform would then take the direction of negotiations and agreeing on a roadmap towards the community including new or reformed institutions. Such a roadmap might build on variable geometry

and subregionalism in the short run. In the long run, the aim should be to close all exit-options and make the project an agreed-upon shared must. This will stop fragmentation and bilateralism.

Policy issues to be tackled on all levels (avoiding conflict /win-win / EuroMed Community)

Four priority areas where action within the Euro-Mediterranean relationship could lead to rapid and tangible improvements on all levels of possible transition are trust-building, migration, visa policy, media and culture and education.

The following measures should be taken:

- 1) Strengthen trust-building endeavours. Trust relies on good and reliable individual and institutional exchanges and the creation of a routine by which these exchanges take place. The transfer and exchange of know-how and the support of educational exchanges (schools, universities, teachers, staff, long-term and short-term visits) will create the future multipliers of the EuroMed community. Mutual understanding and learning should be the spirit of these endeavours. Thus, EU programs and funding should be made accessible for schools between Lithuania and Libya, lobby for co-financing of SEMC and EU governments in order e.g. to sponsor an awareness campaign. This could follow the model of the French-German Friendship Programmes which were very successful in creating tremendous change in the perception from enemy to neighbour and friend.
- 2) Liberalize visa regulation, enhance legal migration, make sure that refugees and asylum seekers are treated according to Human Rights standards, ease mobility in the educational sector
- 3) Stimulate further cooperation between economic actors, not only as a unilateral FDI exercise but also as process of mutual learning and exchange. This will enhance the

business climate and thus reinforce the positive effects already produced by Euro-Med policies.

- 4) Take all measures necessary for integration and cohesion. Keep the process flexible, regular stocktaking and possible re-definition of aims and procedures have to be assured.
- 5) Support all measures that sustain the normative dimensions of EU policies in the region. Shared values are rather the outcome of a long process of cooperation and contact than a precondition for the beginning of a partnership.

Geopolitics and regional security

In an environment in which the emerging drivers are international, intergovernmental and global, the EU may still lead a good policy of conflict prevention on its own and in the ENP framework, but to solve conflicts diplomacy should be based primarily on efforts to strengthen effective multilateralism at the regional and global level. To this end, the UfM must be reinforced and made more effective, relations with the Arab League should be strengthened, the role of the United Nations in the region enhanced and the web of international conventions and agreements magnified. The role of transatlantic cooperation in the Mediterranean must be reconsidered and regional powers need to be involved in conflict management processes as well as diplomatic efforts. Furthermore, the Arab-Israeli/Palestinian-Israeli peace should be made a priority by reviving the Quartet with a new European representative and enhancing the position of the European External Action Service. Finally, the current civil society and cultural spaces, which have been created so far, need to be free from Governance interference. Rather, the transnational cooperation and people-to-people action as a major pre-requisite for changes in perceptions on both shores of the Mediterranean should be strengthened.

Domestic Change in SMECs

- Support of Civil Society, strengthen the building of spaces for (more or less) autonomous action, organization, articulation of interests and ideas.

The fact that the UfM framework is encroaching on existing civil society networks which have been built in the years since 1995 with considerable effort and funding is very alarming. If this pillar of transnational cooperation breaks down, the EuroMed framework will lose a lot of credibility and capacity of stimulating long-term change.

- Support Educational Reform and Exchange.

This will empower future generations, serve the idea of intercultural understanding and dialogue between the two shores of the Mediterranean and thus also contribute to dealing with major European problems in terms of perceptions, racism and violence.

- Support rule of law and institutional reform, empower those looking for change within the bureaucracies in order to support change within regime rather than change of regime as these processes have to be incremental and bottom-up.
- Include Islamists in dialogue and reform activities by cooperating with new social actors, e.g. youth organizing via Facebook and electronic media.

Domestic Change in NMC /EU countries

The securitization and culturalization of 'Muslim Issues' needs to be put to a stop. Matters of integration and migration should be treated in terms of resources, development and win-win scenarios rather than in the framework of 'terrorism' and 'backwardness'. A major awareness campaign about the necessity and positive effects of immigration, the interaction of different traditions, religions and cultures is needed. Migration and its effects on countries are a laboratory for social interventions and innovations (cf. climate change, demographic change, global development gaps), which can in turn create positive effects in

the Arab world through social learning and experience as well as re-migrants, who could challenge current regimes.

MAIN CHALLENGES FOR THE RESEARCH STRATEGY

- Studying the impact of EMP /ENP/UfM on the ground, institutional set-up and practices

There is not much evidence about the concrete impact except for the evaluations of the European Commission.⁶ In depth study of the perception of SEM-partners is completely absent, the current institutional shifts and their implication for political practice and cooperation between governments and societies must be traced, described and explained, theorizing along the lines of current integration and cooperation theories rather than focussing on 'Mediterranean exceptionalism'.

- Transformation without transition in the Arab world

The social and cultural transformations in the Arab world are rapid and widely under-researched. More youth research in comparative perspective is needed, as the institutional and cultural structures of social change differ between Maghreb and Mashreq and according to the regime type. Research about changes in gender relations is needed. New practices of marriage and sexuality, new relations between the generations, and changes in religious practices and perceptions (de-centralization of religious power, mediatization of religious norm-development etc.) are important areas of social transformation. The impact of media on expectations and political mobilization and other issues on the level of perceptions urgently need to be researched. The opinions and experiences of this generation will shape the contents, conflicts and possible forms of cooperation in future EuroMed relations.

- Focus on people rather than regimes

More research of public opinion is needed in spite of a visible strong effort to generate more such data since 9-11. Often these projects have been hindered by authoritarian governments. Still, change in elite formation and elite perceptions on all levels of state

institutions will play a major role in terms of possible reforms and future developments. Thus, apart from the general reasoning behind regime behaviour, it is important to understand the rationales of actors in an authoritarian structure under substantial pressure for change.

- Research of “unintended effects” of institutional reform

Even though it is quite clear that much of the development funding for good governance and institutional reform can be and has been used for authoritarian modernization and adaptation, it is not inconceivable that institutions develop their own dynamics in terms of normative orientation, e.g. the role of MPs. Even though they came to office through flawed elections they might very well try to turn the parliament into an instrument of oversight and control, even though this might not be intended by the ruling elites. This could be especially visible on the local level with more autonomous spaces.

- Research of the civil society/political activism and mobilization of all types, especially Islamist mobilization

There are huge differences amongst Islamic and Islamist groups all over the Arab world, their interactions, their competitions, their change in strategy, their use of media. Even though there is a lot of research about Islamist groups, the debate is too focussed on ideological issues rather than political practices. In addition, the internal dynamics and rifts are often overlooked or simplified. We need a differentiated map of Islamic and Islamist actors in the SEMC as they represent a major political force and will continue to do so. In addition, Islamist mobilization can create unintended effects, such as fostering new types of mobilization by internet and other media. Islamist actors will present their own interpretations of development, democracy, governance and other 'northern discourses' and thus contribute to major cultural negotiations about a possible 'Arab way to modernity' in the sense of multiple modernities.

- Research about Islam in Europe / Migration and Integration / Current discourses and practices

This topic should be envisioned as multi-sited ethnographies, which look at the interdependencies and the interconnectedness of migrants in both sending and receiving countries. It should look at the impact of “Euro-Islam” on the debate about religious reform and change as well as social, political and economic Islamist networks in Europe. Populist developments and perceptions of the clash of civilizations within the European population has to be analyzed in order to change the breeding ground for racism, violence and exclusionary politics.

¹ I will not repeat the differentiated suggestions made there but I would suggest that all measures suggested will be integrated in one chapter rather than mentioning some measures in the trends, tensions and transitions’ sections.

² R. Aliboni, "Security and cooperation on security in current Euro-Mediterranean relations", ISS u. IEMed, 10 papers for Barcelona, No. 3, 2010.

³ S. Abis, "La Méditerranée sans L'Europe", Confluences Méditerranée, No. 74, 2010.

⁴ T. Schumacher, "Die Europäische Union als internationaler Akteur im südlichen Mittelmeerraum", Actor Capability und EU-Mittelmeerpolitik, 2005.

⁵ R. Aliboni, "New as it is, Mediterranean Union needs an overhaul", Europe's world, 2010.

⁶ c.f. reports quoted in R. Aliboni, op. cit.

5.6 Synthesis of experts' proposals

The views presented in these "fiches" are the personal opinions of the experts and do not reflect the positions of the European Commission.

AVOIDING "EMPTY CHAIR"

Objectives / activities	<p><u>Objective 2030:</u> To create an atmosphere of open dialogue and cooperation between all countries of the EuroMed area by promoting mutual understanding and respect based on common and shared values starting by attaining full participation in all formal arenas of EuroMed cooperation.</p> <p><u>Method:</u> Creating mutual trust and respect through promotion of informal dialogues and facilitation of communication between the concerned actors.</p> <p><u>First steps:</u></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none">1) Attaining a common understanding of the advantages of avoiding "empty chair"2) Offering the facilitation of communication and mediation between the concerned actors3) Finding technical solutions to the "empty chair" and seeking innovative political solutions (e.g. substitution, representation)
Timescale	2011-2015: fostering dialogue while identifying possible proposals and technical solutions

	<p>2015-2020: testing technical solutions of country substitution and representation</p> <p>2020-2030: full participation is established in all official meetings of the EuroMed cooperation</p>
<i>Linkage to the transition</i>	First requirement for promoting mutual understanding in the EuroMed area, fostering mutual respect based on common and shared values.
<i>Institutional implications</i>	Need for a common position between the Member States of the EU for a coherent approach towards the "empty chair" situation in the frame of the European External Action Service (EEAS).
<i>Origins of finance /proposal</i>	EEAS and all SEMCs.

REFORM OF IMMIGRATION POLICIES

<p><i>Objectives / activities</i></p>	<p><u>Objective 2030</u>: Real integration of people from immigrant backgrounds in Europe with respect for the fundamental values by the host societies and socio-cultural specificities of immigrant communities.</p> <p><u>Method</u>: Implement policies for employment, education and housing that are proactive and responsive to situations of marginalization and / or exclusion (proactive and inclusive common immigration policy), enlarging the avenues for legal migration.</p> <p><u>First steps</u>:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) Devise more balanced migration policies in the EU inspired in the Global Approach to Migration. 2) Establishment of a European-wide policy of integration of people of immigrant origin. 3) Establishment of a European-wide policy to integrate people of immigrant origin, to provide education (primary, secondary and tertiary) adapted to the socio-cultural, educational and economic development of young immigrant (affirmative action policies). 4) Establishment of European-wide housing policies promoting mixed socio-economic and cultural order to foster understanding and mutual respect
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<p><i>Timescale</i></p>	<p>2011-2012: Sharing European experiences in the field of employment, education and housing vis-à-vis the immigrant communities</p> <p>2013-2020: Development and implementation of employment policies, education and housing at a European level</p> <p>2020-2030: Adjustments, enhancements and reshaping of policies of the previous period in the light of lessons learnt.</p>
<p><i>Linkage to the transition</i></p>	<p>Priority objective in order to reinforce the capacity of people from immigrant backgrounds to contribute to European development. Multiple impacts on the whole dynamic of the EuroMed region. Essential prerequisite for taking advantage of the “migration dividend”.</p>
<p><i>Institutional implications</i></p>	<p>Need to implement, at the level of European countries, innovative approaches with respect to persons of immigrant background.</p>
<p><i>Origins of finance / proposal</i></p>	<p>European Commission, Member States of the EU, private sector.</p>

EUROMED CIRCULATION CARD

<p><i>Objectives / activities</i></p>	<p><u>Objective 2030:</u> Harmonised visa procedures in all EU countries with harmonised application forms, documents required, time-limits for delivery, duration of visas, motivations and reasons for refusal.</p> <p><u>Method:</u> Review of all modalities of visa policies (cf. circular migration, mobility partnerships, multiple-entry visas) at the European level.</p> <p><u>First steps:</u></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) Harmonised visa procedures in all EU countries: application form, documents required, time limits for delivery, duration of visas, motivations and reasons for refusal. 2) Creation of European visas adapted to situations of applicants: eg. business visa, technical visa, scientific visa, visa for journalists. 3) Issuance of long-term visas with multiple entries. 4) Adoption of a EuroMed Circulation card 5) Free circulation of persons
<p><i>Timescale</i></p>	<p>2011-2012: sharing experience at European level in practices for issuing visas</p>

	<p>2013-2015: establishment of harmonised policies for issuing visas</p> <p>2015-2020: implementation of the EuroMed circulation card</p> <p>2020-2030: gradual establishment of a EuroMed area of free movement of persons</p>
<i>Linkage to the transition</i>	<p>Such proposals may seem naïve in present political circumstances, but it is perhaps equally naïve to consider that effective and mutually beneficial cooperation in science, commerce and humanities can occur without some better mobility of people.</p>
<i>Institutional implications</i>	<p>Need for an agreement between European states, first in the Schengen area and subsequently among all Member States of the EU, in coordination with the Mediterranean partner countries. Need for closer cooperation with all countries involved in the process (cooperation between the Ministries of the Interior / Immigration / Foreign Affairs).</p>
<i>Origins of finance / proposal</i>	<p>European Commission; Member states of the EU and SEMCs.</p>

EUROMED-IA

<p>Objectives / activities</p>	<p><u>Objective 2030:</u> Creation of a EuroMed media space</p> <p><u>Method:</u> Stronger affirmative action in favour of better intercultural understanding should be promoted.</p> <p><u>First Steps:</u></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) Creation of a Mediterranean television concept, EuroMed TV, linked to an innovative website, resulting from the pooling of the energy, experience and resources of public and private television in the North and South of the Mediterranean. EuroMed TV should be a multilingual, multi-channel, broadcast over the entire EuroMed Community through satellite, digital and cable channels. Production of joint information, cultural, scientific, entertainment. Connection of EuroMed TV and its website with other media in the EuroMed zone: radio, print, publishing, etc. 2) Support for common cultural productions. 3) Encouragement of the mobility of journalists, designers, artists. 4) Introduction of a label "EuroMed Freedom of Speech" to protect journalists and artists
<p>Timescale</p>	<p>2011-2012: Feasibility study of the concept.</p> <p>2011-2012: Establishment of the label "EuroMed Freedom of Speech."</p> <p>2012-2015: Actions in the field of protection of journalists and artists</p>

	<p>through the label "Euro-Med Freedom of Speech '.</p> <p>2013-2015: Establishment of EuroMed TV.</p> <p>2011-2030: Support for common cultural productions.</p> <p>2011-2030: Promotion of the mobility of journalists and artists</p> <p>2015-2030: Evaluation of the process and redeployment of EuroMed TV according to lessons learnt.</p> <p>2015-2030: Evaluation of the process and redeployment of label according to lessons learnt.</p>
<p><i>Linkage to the transition</i></p>	<p>The intensification of joint initiatives in media and cultural productions would be a positive step to a better perception of other cultures, their characteristics and specificities. A shift of emphasis would be refreshing, towards the factors that unite cultures rather than those that divide, towards what brings together rather than what separates.</p>
<p><i>Institutional implications</i></p>	<p>Need to revise the existing European mechanisms in these areas, to reshape and reconfigure.</p>
<p><i>Origins of finance / proposal</i></p>	<p>European Commission, Member states of the EU and SEMCs ; private sector, Anna Lindh Foundation.</p>

AVICENNA PLAN FOR EDUCATION, CULTURE AND MOBILITY

<p>Objectives / activities</p>	<p><u>Objective 2030:</u> To create a EuroMed Community for education and culture with improved skills. This could be the base of a "common citizenship" taking ground of the common and shared values.</p> <p><u>Method:</u> Putting in place the skills of tomorrow, a better mutual understanding of cultures and societies and their intellectual and artistic creativity.</p> <p><u>First steps:</u></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) Encouraging the mobility of teachers and staff at all levels of education (primary, secondary, tertiary), development and implementation of mechanism for the relocation of teachers for long durations including primary and secondary schools (North→South and South→South: one year minimum) 2) Implementation of opportunities for socio-cultural discovery and familiarisation for schoolchildren, college students, high school and university students by exchange during the holidays (one stay of 15 days in the North / one stay of 15 days in South), with the completion of a joint project during the exchange. 3) Elaboration of a History manual as a shared heritage to be used across the EuroMed area. 4) Language learning and skills upgrading should also be emphasised.
<p>Timescale</p>	<p>2011-2015: mobility of teachers, harmonisation and recognition of</p>

	<p>qualifications, quality control, social inclusion</p> <p>2015-2030: student exchanges, common texts (manual), language learning</p>
<i>Linkage to the transition</i>	<p>Existing initiatives for a better understanding of cultures and societies and of their intellectual and artistic heritage should be significantly strengthened. The respect of others begins with understanding and understanding begins with knowledge and acquaintance.</p>
<i>Institutional implications</i>	<p>Need for a common agreement among European States on supporting such initiatives. Harmonisation of approaches to educational policy at the Ministries of Education of the countries concerned</p>
<i>Origins of finance / proposal</i>	<p>Existing Commission Programmes - Leonardo, Comenius, Erasmus, FP7, Member States of the EU and SEMCs, Anna Lindh Foundation.</p>

A EUROMED AGENCY FOR EDUCATION, RESEARCH AND INNOVATION

Objectives / activities	<p><u>Objective 2030:</u> Set-up of a common EuroMed Agency dedicated to Education, Research and Innovation</p> <p><u>Method:</u> Identification of existing education, research and innovation bodies in SEMCs and links with the European ones with exchange of practises of openness (cultural exchange which does not deny the cultures of origin but is transforming them, removing the pre-conceptions)</p> <p><u>First steps:</u></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none">1) Harmonisation and recognition of qualifications in the EuroMed space (high school diplomas and university degrees).2) Developing quality assessment and assurance, curricula and teaching3) Increasing social inclusion, certification and participation in education4) Improving labour market intelligence and linking it effectively to curricula5) Fostering life-long learning; preparing professional courses and introducing the accumulation of ECTS-Med (European Credit Transfer System dedicated to students in the SEMCs)6) Encouraging South-South interaction in joint research and
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	<p>study programmes</p> <p>7) Fostering programmes of EuroMed studies in North and South</p>
<i>Timescale</i>	<p>2011-2015: Harmonisation of qualifications in the EuroMed space, developing quality assessment and teaching.</p> <p>2015-2025: Improving labour market intelligence, life-long training and South-South interaction, common programmes of studies.</p> <p>2025-2030: Establishment of the Agency with an equal and active role in the countries of the EuroMed area</p>
<i>Linkage to the transition</i>	<p>Much has been done in promoting educational reform and exchanges, but much more is possible and beneficial to both sides.</p>
<i>Institutional implications</i>	<p>The Agency will be the privileged link of national institutional existing bodies in the EuroMed area. It will be one of the consequences of the harmonisation of approaches to educational policy in the Avicenna plan</p>
<i>Origins of finance / proposal</i>	<p>European Commission, Member States of the EU, SEMCs, Cultural foundations, UNESCO.</p>

EUROMED INNOVATION PARTNERSHIP FOR SOLAR ENERGY

Objectives / activities	<p><u>Objective 2030:</u> Mobilisation and strengthening of industrial and technological capacities of SEMCs around a common and significant effort towards large scale deployment of solar energy for local and European markets.</p> <p><u>Method:</u> Continuity with the ongoing Mediterranean Solar Plan (MSP) and the project “Paving the Way for the MSP”, at present being implemented with EuropeAid funding.</p> <p><u>First Steps:</u></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none">1) Implementation of harmonised, robust, stable institutional and regulatory frameworks in SEMCs and the EU to support large-scale deployment of solar energy.2) Identification of centres of excellence that can potentially contribute to innovation in the area and linkage in a technology platform.3) Set-up a credible platform dedicated to training, transfer of knowledge and awareness.4) Development of Strategic Research Plan for large scale bulk supply, small scale distributed projects and associated network technologies and design.5) Establish precise cost-reduction targets for solar components and implement targeted programmes of research to achieve them.
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	<p>6) Identify grid control technologies (smart grid) to absorb distributed sources (wind, small scale solar).</p> <p>7) Demonstration of plant on significant scale (1 GW) within 10 years – technical, commercial, financial aspects</p>
<i>Timescale</i>	<p>2011-2015: Creation of technology platform and SRA including cost and performance targets</p> <p>2011-2015: Development of feasibility studies for large bankable projects and implementation of effective support regime</p> <p>2014-2020: Execution of first research / innovation / training / transfer of knowledge awareness programmes</p> <p>2015-2030: Large plant commissioned</p> <p>2020-2030: Execution of subsequent programmes</p>
<i>Linkage to the transition</i>	<p>It is in the common interest to increase the innovative capacity of the SEMCs. The innovative capacity at present is disturbingly low, but this stands in sharp contradiction to the outstanding performance of many individuals from the SEMCs working abroad.</p>

<p><i>Institutional implications</i></p>	<p>Urgent, creation of Joint EuroMed Technology Platform for Renewable Energy and pertinent Network Technologies (EuroMed Innovation Partnership for Solar Energy), strengthening of national agencies, provision for political support and strong legal framework to make interconnection feasible</p>
<p><i>Origins of finance // proposal</i></p>	<p>EIB, FEMIP, ENP, FP8 and subsequent. MPCs – common commitment of resources essential. Private infrastructure investors – pension funds, sovereign wealth funds.</p>

COMPREHENSIVE EUROMED WATER REGIME

<p><i>Objectives / activities</i></p>	<p><u>Objective 2030:</u> Creation of a comprehensive regime for water in the Mediterranean, covering supply and use, recycling, desalination, research and innovation</p> <p><u>Method:</u> Coordinating of multiple programmes under the Conference of Ministries of Water</p> <p><u>First steps:</u></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none">1) Coordinate policies for management of water resources2) Promotion of use of waste water - big cultural changes required3) Technological development of desalination of brackish water (mapping of resources, development of strategy, improvement of technologies). Establishment of clear targets for component and system performance and cost. Possible creation of an Innovation Partnership.4) Coordination of activities and policies for decontamination of discharges into the Mediterranean sea5) Implementation of effective policies to deal with water poverty6) Development of efficient technologies and practices of water use – socio-economic research on welfare implications of water allocation
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	7) Creation of targets for water efficiency - benchmarking
<i>Timescale</i>	<p>2011-2015: Development of a Strategic Agenda covering the entire range of activities</p> <p>2011-2015: Development of a Strategic Research Agenda for desalination including mapping of all centres of excellence and the capacities</p> <p>2015-2030: Implementation of agenda, with periodic review and adjustment</p> <p>2016-2023: Execution of first research / innovation programmes</p> <p>2024-2030: Execution of subsequent programmes</p>
<i>Linkage to the transition</i>	<p>Improved supply and better use of water could make a huge difference to the agricultural potential of both the northern and southern shores of the Mediterranean. The prospects for desalination of brackish water are especially promising and “Win-win projects” leading to commercial activities are possible. Alleviation of conflicts over water rights could also help to improve relations between countries.</p>
<i>Institutional implications</i>	Through Conference of Ministries of Water
<i>Origins of finance / proposal</i>	FP8, AIDCO, EIB, FEMIP, ENP, private sector and MPCs – common commitment of resources essential.

EUROMED EXTENSION SYSTEM FOR CLIMATE CHANGE

Objectives / activities	<p><u>Objective 2030:</u> A common EuroMed extension programme to combat climate change in arid countries that combines the training of professionals, the creative use of ICT, research and innovation and linking public and private sector initiatives.</p> <p><u>Method:</u> Coordinated actions to increase the capacity of individuals to cope with the impacts of climate change</p> <p><u>First steps:</u></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none">1) Implementation of harmonised, robust political and practical systems in SEMCs and the EU to support coordinated approach to dispersed intervention to manage climate change2) Definition of commercially viable innovative businesses to manage climate change and natural hazards3) Research and financial support to identify and to help innovative start-up businesses4) Create effective multi-disciplinary research especially linking socio-economic and physical sciences5) Create effective mechanisms for linking researchers and citizens across the region (scientists, farmers ...). Use of internet technologies and extension workers to establish and disseminate best practice6) Establishing infrastructure to monitor and exchange data
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<p><i>Timescale</i></p>	<p>2011-2016: Development of political agreements and arrangements for coordination</p> <p>2011-2016: Creation of extension programme, definition of best practices, training of extension workers, creation of ICT tools</p> <p>2011-2016: Definition and execution of research to support the identification and inception of innovative, commercially viable businesses (social innovation) in this area</p> <p>2011-2016: Definition and commissioning of infrastructure to monitor climate change and its impacts on soil, water and ecosystems</p> <p>2017-2030: Updating and strengthening of programmes and activities according to need and acquired experience</p>
<p><i>Linkage to the transition</i></p>	<p>An important “Win-win projects” activity. The two rims of the Mediterranean face a common problem in the management of climate change. There is considerable expertise that combined with expertise from the northern countries and EU funding could create viable businesses and improve quality of life.</p>

<p><i>Institutional implications / operational instruments</i></p>	<p>Many of the implications are agricultural or related. The programme might be managed under the institutions of the CAP</p>
<p><i>Origins of finance/ proposal</i></p>	<p>FP8, AIDCO, EIB, FEMIP, ENP and private sector</p>

GREEN, SUSTAINABLE AGRICULTURE

<p><i>Objectives / activities</i></p>	<p><u>Objective 2030:</u> Creation of a dispersed, but coordinated extension programme to promote green, sustainable agriculture on both sides of the Mediterranean.</p> <p><u>Method:</u> Coordinated actions to increase the capacity of individuals to understand and implement sustainable agricultural practices, exploit biodiversity and revalorise traditional production.</p> <p><u>First steps:</u></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none">1) Mapping of research and practice and definition of best practices2) Definition of commercially viable innovative businesses in sustainable agriculture3) Research and financial support to identify and to help innovative start-up businesses in the field4) Create effective multi-disciplinary research especially linking socio-economic and physical sciences; research into the creation of better marketing opportunities for small farmers offering green products5) Create effective mechanisms for linking researchers and farmers across the region. Use of internet technologies and extension workers to establish and disseminate best practice
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	6) Programme review and restructuring as needed
<i>Timescale</i>	<p>2011-2016: Mapping of research, definition of best practices, training of extension workers, creation of ICT tools</p> <p>2011-2016: Definition of research agenda and execution of research to support the identification and inception of innovative, commercially viable businesses (social innovation) in sustainable agriculture</p> <p>2017-2030: Implementation of extension programmes; review and revision as needed</p> <p>2017-2030: Updating and strengthening of research programmes and activities according to need and acquired experience</p>
<i>Linkage to the transition</i>	An important “Win-win projects” activity. Sustainable agriculture offers protects soil and landscape, contributes to biodiversity, permits better water management and improves diet and health.
<i>Institutional implications / operational instruments</i>	The programme might be managed under the institutions of the CAP, but should involve national research institutes active on sustainable agriculture and multi-lateral agencies such as CIHEAM. It might be combined with the extension programme proposed on climate change to which it has strong structural similarities and content linkages.

<i>Origins of finance / proposal</i>	FP8, AIDCO, EIB, FEMIP, ENP, CAP and private sector (large food companies), MPC countries, IFIs.
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FOUR FREEDOMS IN EUROMED

<p><i>Objectives / activities</i></p>	<p><u>Objective 2030:</u> The four freedoms (free movement of goods- including agricultural products-, services, persons and capital) firmly in place and functioning across the EuroMed</p> <p><u>Method:</u> Identification and progressive removal of barriers through specific country programmes and periodic multilateral review</p> <p><u>First steps:</u></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none">1) Review of relevant policies, regulations, practices and competencies by country2) Definition of necessary adjustments3) Definition of research programmes and technical cooperation to facilitate alignment4) Progressive extension of bi-lateral status of compliant countries5) Creation of a significant (not necessarily complete) free-trade zone for goods and services and agricultural products6) Creation of (not necessarily complete) customs union7) Creation of (not necessarily complete) common market
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<p><i>Timescale</i></p>	<p>2011-2015: Free Trade between the EU and compliant SEMCs by 2015</p> <p>2016-2020: Customs Union with complaint countries by 2020</p> <p>2020-2025: Common Market with complaint countries by 2025</p> <p>2025-2030: Extension to all SEMCs</p>
<p><i>Linkage to the transition</i></p>	<p>The defining initiative for the “Deeper socio-economic integration”</p>
<p><i>Institutional implications</i></p>	<p>Existing EuroMed institutions seem adequate. It is essentially the relaunch of the Barcelona process, but with more variable geometry and a greater understanding of the practice and need for co-ownership.</p>
<p><i>Origins of finance / proposal</i></p>	<p>European Union’s budget after 2013, Mediterranean public budget, private capital, EIB for infrastructures, World Bank.</p>

TERRITORIAL COHESION POLICY

<p><i>Objectives / activities</i></p>	<p><u>Objective 2030:</u> Achieving a territorial economic integration in the EuroMed area. This integration will be the basis of the market and the convergence of interests.</p> <p><u>Method:</u> Identification and progressive removal of regional imbalances, implementation of European financial instruments such as Structural and Cohesion Funds to the SEMCs. Integration policies, as well as those of convergence: the priority should be given to interventions aimed at the regional, meso-regional or sub-regional levels</p> <p><u>First steps:</u></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) Identification and reduction of regional imbalances 2) Enlargement to the SEMCs of the Structural and Cohesion Funds into a "Convergence Fund" 3) Catching-up of SEMCs and regions
<p><i>Timescale</i></p>	<p>2011-2020: Identification of imbalances; decision-making process, institutions.</p> <p>2020-2030: Implementation of financial instruments</p>

<i>Linkage to the transition</i>	If the political will exists genuinely to move towards a territorial economic integration in the EuroMed area then a territorial cohesion policy will be needed.
<i>Institutional implications</i>	This could be at the basis of a "EuroMed Community/Alliance" which could pave the way towards the EuroMed Community.
<i>Origins of finance / proposal</i>	European Union's budget after 2013, private and public capital, EIB for infrastructures, World Bank, IMF.

SEMCs IN AN ENLARGED COUNCIL OF EUROPE

<p><i>Objectives / activities</i></p>	<p><u>Objective 2030:</u> The enlargement of the Council of Europe to SEMCs.</p> <p><u>Method:</u> Progressive implementation of the European Convention on Human Rights in the most advanced SEMCs. Common interest in establishing a system of shared social and civil rules will be materialised by the extension of the Council of Europe to SEMCs.</p> <p><u>First steps:</u></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) Building a common basis, through the alliance of values sharing history of civilisation changes around the Mediterranean and its environment (Africa, Middle East, Asia). 2) This common basis could be made through the strengthening of civil societies in the South, and the interaction between them and European civil societies (NGOs) 3) Solving the issues related to the post-colonisation
<p><i>Timescale</i></p>	<p>2011-2020: building of the common value basis through the strengthening of civil societies in the South</p> <p>2020-2030: Establishment of the Enlarged Council of Europe</p>

<p><i>Linkage to the transition</i></p>	<p>Initiative linked to the "EuroMed Community/Alliance". The common interest in establishing a system of shared social and civil rules will build a basis of shared values around the Mediterranean and its environment (Africa, Middle East, Asia); to strengthen civil societies in the South; to foster interaction between them and European civil societies (NGOs) and to address some of the issues related to post-colonisation.</p>
<p><i>Institutional implications</i></p>	<p>EU-SEMCS collaboration on legal and judicial matters, sharing of best-practices coming from the European Court of Human Rights</p>
<p><i>Origins of finance / proposal</i></p>	<p>EU, European and Mediterranean Member States, Council of Europe</p>

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Annex 1: Programmes of the Group of Experts' meetings

FIRST MEETING of the Expert Group

Representation of the European Commission in Barcelona

Thursday, 14 January 2010

12.00 *Registration, administrative aspects and lunch*

13.30 *Welcome*

Manel Camos Grau, Head of the Representation of the European Commission in Barcelona

13.35 *Objectives, methodology and tasks of the Expert Group*

Jean-Michel Baer, Director, European Commission, DG Research

14.00 *Tour de Table*

14.20 *State of play of the Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean*

Angeles Rodriguez-Peña, Deputy Director General, Spanish Ministry for Science and Innovation

14.40 *Role of Forward looking activities at the European Commission*

Vasco Cal, Adviser, European Commission, Bureau of European Policy Advisers

14.50 *Methods and results of recent Mediterranean Forward looking exercises*

Nigel Lucas, Professor and consultant, Rapporteur of the Expert Group

15.30 *Discussion*

16.00 *Coffee*

16.30 *Macro-economic and demographic perspectives in the Southern and Eastern*

Mediterranean countries (SEMC)

Andrea Amato, Director, Mediterranean Institute (Imed)

17.00 *Discussion on the main drivers/challenges in this field by 2030*

17.30 *Energy and climate change perspectives in the SEMC*

Houda Allal, Senior Researcher, Observatoire Méditerranéen de l'Energie (OME)

18.00 *Discussion on the main drivers/challenges in this field by 2030*

20.00 *Working dinner at Restaurant "Costa Gallega" (Passeig de Gràcia, 71)*

Friday, 15 January 2010

08.45 *Registration and finalization of administrative aspects*

09.00 Water and environmental perspectives in the SEMC

Rafael Rodriguez-Clemente, Professor, Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas (CSIC)

09.30 Discussion on the main drivers/challenges in this field by 2030

10.00 Education and science perspectives in the SEMC

Baruch Raz, Professor, Institute for Policy and Strategy (IPS)

10.30 Discussion on the main drivers/challenges in this field by 2030

11.00 *Coffee*

11.30 Cultural and religious perspectives in the SEMC

Mohamed Tozy, Professor, Université de Provence (IEP)

12.00 Discussion on the main drivers/challenges in this field by 2030

12.30 *Lunch*

13.30 Geopolitics and governance perspectives in the SEMC

Amine Ait-Challal, Professor, Université catholique de Louvain (UCL)

14.00 Discussion on the main potential drivers/challenges in this field by 2030

14.30 Wrap-up session

Pierre Valette, European Commission and *Nigel Lucas*, Rapporteur

14.50 Next steps, questions and answers

Domenico Rossetti, European Commission, DG Research

15.20 Conclusions

Jean-Michel Baer, Director, European Commission, DG Research

15.30 *End of the meeting*

SECOND MEETING of the Expert Group *Delegation of the European Union in Rabat*

Thursday, 11 March 2010

12.00 *Registration, administrative aspects and lunch*

13.30 State of the art and perspectives of the EU neighbouring policy in the Mediterranean area

Eneko Landaburu, Head of the EU Delegation in Rabat (tbc)

13.45 EuroMed "trends, tensions and transitions" up to 2030

Jean-Michel Baer, Director, European Commission, DG Research

14.00 Europe 2020 strategy and its implications for the Mediterranean area

Vasco Cal, Adviser, European Commission, Bureau of European Policy Advisers

14.15 EuroMed "Trends" up to 2030 (results of the Barcelona meeting)

Nigel Lucas, Professor and consultant, Rapporteur of the Expert Group

14.40 Discussion and proposals on the draft report on "Trends"

15.30 *Coffee and Tea*

16.00 Tension "Economic growth- Sustainability"

Houda Allal, Observatoire Méditerranéen de l'Energie (OME)

16.30 Discussion and comments by the experts

17.00 Tension "Self reliance – Dependency"

Sébastien Abis, International Centre for Advanced Mediterranean Agronomic Studies (CIHEAM)

17.30 Discussion and comments by the experts

18.00 Tension "Innovation – Conservatism"

Ibrahim Saif, Secretary General of the Economic and Social Council, Jordan

18.30 Discussion and comments by the experts

20.00 Working dinner at Restaurant "Villa Mandarine", 19 Rue Ouled Bousbaa, Souissi

Friday, 12 March 2010

08.45 *Registration and finalization of administrative aspects*

09.00 Tension "Jobs – Migration"

Joaquin Arango, Professor, Complutense University of Madrid

09.30 Discussion and comments by the experts

10.00 Tension "Autocracy – Democracy"

Saloua Zerhouny, Assistant Professor at Mohammed V University

10.30 Discussion and comments by the experts

11.00 *Coffee and Tea*

11.30 Tension "Europe – Alternatives"

Bahari Yilmaz, Professor, Sabanci university

12.00 Discussion and comments by the experts

12.30 *Lunch*

13.30 Tension "Military – Diplomacy"

Roberto Aliboni, Vice-President at the International Affairs Institute (IAI)

14.00 Discussion and comments by the experts

14.30 Tension "Moral – Legal rights"

Abdelrahman Tamimi, Director of Palestinian hydrology group for water and environment

15.00 Discussion and comments by the experts

15.30 Conclusions and next steps

Pierre Valette and Domenico Rossetti, European Commission, DG Research

15.45 *End of the meeting*

THIRD MEETING of the Expert Group

European Commission regional Representation in Marseille

Thursday, 3 June 2010

12.00 *Registration, administrative aspects and lunch*

13.30 **Welcome**

Blandine Pellistrandi, Head of the European Commission representation in Marseille

13.40 **EuroMed-2030 – Trends, tensions and transitions: State of play**

Jean-Michel Baer, European Commission, DG Research

Filling the gaps on "Trends" and "Tensions" (from 14.00 to 18.30)

14.00 **Mutual benefits and institutional needs in higher education**

Nada Trunk Širca, Euro-Mediterranean University, Slovenia

14.20 **Upgrading educational systems**

Mireia Montané, Ministry of Education, Catalonia-Spain

14.40 **Discussion and comments by the experts**

15.00 **Research and innovation**

Baruch Raz, Institute for Policy and Strategy

15.20 **Cultural values and identity**

Nouria Benghabrit-Remaoun, CRASC Oran –Centre National de Recherche en Anthropologie Sociale et Culturelle

15.40 **Discussion and comments by the experts**

16.00 *Coffee and Tea*

16.30 **Proof-reading and fine-tuning of the report on "Trends"**

Comments by the experts

16.50 **EuroMed "Tensions" up to 2030 (results of the Rabat meeting)**

Nigel Lucas, Rapporteur of the Expert Group

17.10 **Discussion and comments by the experts on "Tensions"**

18.30 **End of the meeting**

19.30 **Working dinner at Restaurant "Les Arcenaulx", 25 Cours d'Estienne d'Orves**

Friday, 4 June 2010

- 08.45** *Registration and finalization of administrative aspects*
- 09.00** Transition "Avoiding a conflict scenario"
Amine Ait-Chaalal, Université Catholique de Louvain (UCL)
- 09.30** Discussion and comments by the experts
- 10.00** Transition "Win-win solutions"
Rafael Rodriguez-Clemente, Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas
- 10.30** Discussion and comments by the experts
- 11.00** *Coffee and Tea*
- 11.30** Transition "Deeper EuroMed cooperation"
Ibrahim Saif, Secretary General of the Economic and Social Council, Jordan
- 12.00** Discussion and comments by the experts
- 12.30** Working lunch
- 13.30** Transition "Towards a EuroMed Community"
Cilja Harders, Professor, Freie Universität Berlin
- 14.00** Discussion and comments by the experts
- 14.30** Overall policy view: between realism and ambition
Vasco Cal, European Commission, Bureau of European Policy Advisers (BEPA)
- 14.45** Conclusions and next steps
Pierre Valette and Domenico Rossetti, European Commission, DG Research
- 15.00** End of the meeting

FOURTH MEETING of the Expert Group

The Communication Center of Sabanci University, Istanbul

Thursday, 16 September 2010

12.00 *Registration, administrative aspects and lunch*

13.30 EU-Turkey and the Euro-Mediterranean area

Marc Pierini, Head of the European Union Delegation in Ankara

13.45 EuroMed-2030 – State of play on the work of the Expert Group up to now

Jean-Michel Baer, European Commission, DG Research

14.00 Discussion and comments by the experts on the draft report on "Transitions"

All the experts (3' each), Tour de table

15.15 EuroMed outcome: Recommendations of the experts

Nigel Lucas, Rapporteur of the Expert Group

15.30 *Coffee and Tea*

16.00 Proposals on "Demographic changes and economic development"

Joaquin Arango, Professor, Complutense University of Madrid

16.20 Discussion and comments by the experts

16.40 Proposals on "Sustainability" (water, agriculture, energy; environment)

Sébastien Abis, International Centre for Advanced Mediterranean Agronomic Studies (CIHEAM)

17.00 Discussion and comments by the experts

17.20 Proposals on "Values and religion"

Saloua Zerhouny, Assistant Professor at Mohammed V University

17.40 Discussion and comments by the experts

18.00 Proposals on "Geopolitics and governance"

Cilja Harders, Professor, Freie Universität Berlin

18.20 Discussion and comments by the experts

18.40 Wrap-up session on the Expert's proposals

Domenico Rossetti and Nigel Lucas, European Commission, DG Research and Rapporteur

19.00 Discussion and comments by the experts

19.30 Working dinner at Restaurant "Hamdi"

Friday, 17 September 2010

08.45 *Registration and finalization of administrative aspects*

09.00 The EU-Mediterranean partner countries international cooperation in Research (FP7)

Claudio Bogliotti, European Commission, DG Research

09.30 Discussion and comments by the experts

10.00 Proposals on "Education, science, technology and innovation"

Rafael Rodriguez-Clemente, Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas

10.30 Coffee and Tea

11.00 Discussion and prioritization of EuroMed cooperation topics (education, S&T and innovation)

Rafael Rodriguez-Clemente, CSIC and Nigel Lucas, Rapporteur of the Expert Group

12.30 Working lunch

13.30 The final report and the EU Presidency / European Commission final conference

Domenico Rossetti, European Commission, DG Research

14.00 Discussion and comments by the experts

14.30 Overall policy view on the EuroMed-2030 exercise

Vasco Cal, European Commission, BEPA and DG Research

14.45 Conclusions of the plenary session

Jean-Michel Baer, European Commission, DG Research

15.00 Working groups on "Proposals" for the four scenarios

16.30 End of the working groups

FIFTH MEETING of the Expert Group (Stakeholders' conference)
European Commission, Charlemagne building, Brussels

Thursday, 16 December 2010

08.45 Registration and Coffee

9.00 – 9.45 Session I – Policy context

Chair person: *Jean-Michel Baer*, Director, European Commission, DG Research

09.15 Global dimension of research and innovation: The case of the Mediterranean
Máire Geoghegan-Quinn, Commissioner in charge of Research and Innovation (tbc)

09.30 International cooperation: The role of R&D and innovation
Benoît Cerexhe, Minister for economy, employment and research (tbc)

9.45 – 13.00 Session II – Trends and tensions in the region up to 2030

Chair person: *Gerhard Sabathil*, Director, European Commission, DG RELEX

09.45 Demographic and macro-economic trends and tensions
Joaquín Arango, Complutense University of Madrid and Instituto Ortega y Gasset

10.10 Sustainability issues (water, energy, agriculture and climate change)
Houda Allal, Observatoire Méditerranéen de l'Energie (OME)

10.40 Comments from stakeholders and decision-makers

11.00 Coffee break

11.30 Geopolitics and governance
Roberto Aliboni, International Affairs Institute (IAI)

12.00 Culture, values and religions
Nouria Benghabrit-Remaoun, CRASC Oran –Centre National de Recherche en Anthropologie Sociale et Culturelle

12.30 Comments from stakeholders and decision-makers

13.00 Lunch

14.00 – 16.00 Session III – Tensions in the EuroMed area

Chair person: *Jean-Claude Thébault*, Director General, European Commission, BEPA (tbc)

14.00 Managing conflict

Amine Ait-Chaalal, Université Catholique de Louvain (UCL)

14.20 Win-win solutions

Sébastien Abis, International Centre for Advanced Mediterranean Agronomic Studies (CIHEAM)

14.40 Deeper EuroMed socio-economic integration

Ibrahim Saif, Secretary General of the Economic and Social Council of Jordan

15.00 Towards a EuroMed Community/Alliance

Cilja Harders, Freie Universität Berlin and *Andrea Amato*, Istituto per il Mediterraneo (IMED)

15.20 Comments from stakeholders and decision-makers

15.40 Coffee break

16.00 – 17.30 Session IV – Questions and perspectives on EuroMed

Chair person: *Jean-Michel Baer*, Director, European Commission, DG Research

16.00 Towards an Avicenna Plan for education and mobility of researchers?

Nada Trunk Širca and *Joseph Mifsud*, Euro-Mediterranean University (EMUNI)

16.20 Towards a EuroMed science, technology and innovation Union?

Rafael Rodriguez Clemente, Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas (CSIC)

16.40 Comments from stakeholders and decision-makers

17.00 Perspectives on the EU research and innovation activities in the EuroMed area

Pierre Valette and *Domenico Rossetti*, European Commission, DG Research

17.20 Conclusions

Jean-Michel Baer, European Commission, DG Research

Annex 2: List of participants at the Stakeholders' conference

Last name	First name	Organisation	Country/Region
ABIS	Sébastien	International Centre for Advanced Mediterranean Agronomic Studies (CIHEAM)	FRANCE
AIT-CHAALAL	Amine	Université Catholique de Louvain (UCL)	BELGIUM
ALIBONI	Roberto	International Affairs Institute (IAI)	ITALY
ALLAL	Houda	Observatoire Méditerranéen de l'Energie (OME)	FRANCE
AMATO	Andrea	Istituto per il Mediterraneo (IMED)	ITALY
ANASTASIA	Silvia	Moverim Consulting	EU
ANASTOPOULOU	Louisa	European Commission, DG Research (RTD)	EU
ARANGO	Joaquín	Complutense University of Madrid and Instituto Ortega y Gasset	SPAIN
ARCURI	Eleonora	Unioncamere del Veneto - Bruxelles Office	ITALY

AYADI	Rym	Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS)	EU
BADIA	José	Mission de Monaco auprès de l'Union européenne	MONACO
BAER	Jean-Michel	European Commission, DG Research (RTD)	EU
BAMYA	Majed	General Delegation of Palestine to the EU	PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY
BARBONE	Silvia	Jlag Ltd	EU
BASSO	Giuliano	European Commission DG Energy (ENER)	EU
B'CHIR	Fathi	Agence Europe	EU
BECHT	Barbara	EU-turn	EU
BENGHABRIT-REMAOUN	Nouria	Centre national de recherche en anthropologie sociale et culturelle (CRASC, Oran)	ALGERIA
BENMARRAZE	Simon	Solar Euromed	FRANCE
BLACKBURN	Alexander	International Energy Agency	FRANCE
BONNET	Angès	Représentation de la Région Provence-Alpes-Côte d'Azur	FRANCE
BOSSEILA	Manal	Cairo University	EGYPT
BOUATOU	Mohamed	MB Holding	MOROCCO

CAL	Vasco	European Commission, BEPA	EU
CALABRO	Alessandro	Spazio Europa UPI – TECLA	ITALY
CARACOSTAS	Paraskevas	European Commission, DG Research (RTD)	EU
CARNEVALE	Matteo	Ministry for the Environment, Land and Sea	ITALY
CARPANO	Roberto	Team Europe	ITALY
CEREXHE	Benoît	Brussels Minister of Economy, Employment and Research	BELGIUM
CHASSERIAUX	Jean-Michel	Lysios Public Affairs	EU
CHEVALLARD	Giancarlo	Paralleli - Istituto Euromediterraneo del Nord Ovest	ITALY
CHIAPPINI	Barbara	Ministry for the Environment, Land and Sea	ITALY
CIVICO	Francisco Saverio	Rappresentanza Permanente d'Italia presso l'UE	ITALY
CORMAN	Marie	European Commission, DG Enterprise and Industry (ENTR)	EU
DÄUMER	Michael	European Commission, DG External Relations (RELEX)	EU
DE LABRA AGUIRRE	Carmen	European Commission, DG Translation (DGT)	EU

DE LAROUSSILHE	Olivier	European Commission, DG Trade (TRADE)	EU
de POTTER d'INDOYE	Nic	Networking Academy and Giving Back Foundation	BELGIUM
DE TURSI	Barbara	EUC Group CEERNT	EU
DE TURSI	Giuseppe	Masseria De Tursi group	ITALY
DEBOMY	Daniel	OPTEM	FRANCE
DELICADO	Begoña	ESL Network	EU
DERBAL	Abdelouahab	Mission Permanente de la Ligue des Etats Arabes	EU
DI GENOVA	Maurizio	UNIONCAMERE Brussels Office	ITALY
DONMEZ	Mustafa	Faculté des Sciences Islamiques de Bruxelles	BELGIUM
DONNINI	Raffaella	Intesa Sanpaolo S.p.A.	ITALY
DORANGRICCHIA	Ana	Programme Italy/Tunisia	ITALY
DUEZ	Jean		BELGIUM
EDGERTON	Elvina	Audit Green Energy	EU
ELAHI	Shirin	Scenarios Architecture	UNITED KINGDOM
EL-ZOHEIRY	A. Hamid	University of Cairo	EGYPT
ENCISO Y BERGE	Laure	European Parliament, Committee on Foreign Affairs	EU

FABRE	Thierry	Maison méditerranéenne des sciences de l'homme de Marseille	FRANCE
FARAJIAN	Aline	Chamber of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture of Beirut and Mount Lebanon	LEBANON
FERNANDEZ GARCIA	Eugenio	European Commission, DG Agriculture and Rural Development (AGRI)	EU
FERRE GAVARRO	Josep	European Institute of the Mediterranean (IEMed)	Spain
FEUDO	Fabio	Laboratorio di scienze della cittadinanza	ITALY
FICARELLI	Giorgio	European Commission, DG Development (DEV)	EU
FISCH	Ruth	Hebrew University of Jerusalem	ISRAEL
FLORENSA	Senén	European Institute of the Mediterranean (IEMed)	SPAIN
FRANZONI	Simona	University of Brescia	ITALY
FUNERED	Ulrika	Permanent Representation of Sweden to the EU	SWEDEN
GABAY-NEISSE	Judith	Mediana sprl	EU

GALLUCCIO	Giulia	Euro-Mediterranean Center for Climate Change	ITALY
GARCIA CURRELI	Cristina	CERI - Centro Europeo per la Ricerca Italiana	ITALY
GISLEV	Magnus	European Commission, DG Environment (ENV)	EU
GOERGEN	Pascal	Délégué de la Région de Bruxelles-Capitale auprès de l'UE	BELGIUM
GÖKGÖZ	Mehmet	Turkish Research & Business Organizations, Public & Private Partnership (TuR&Bo - ppp)	EU
GOKMEN	H. Haluk	Arcelik A.S.	TURKEY
GRAZIOSI	Adriano	Former Secretary General of the European Economic and Social Committee	EU
HARDERS	Cilja	Freie Universität Berlin	GERMANY
HAVERBEKE	David	Lydian Lawyers	BELGIUM
HOICHEIMY HAJJ	Nayla	Saint-Joseph University in Beirut	LEBANON
IBANEZ VILA	Carolina	European Commission, DG External Relations (RELEX)	EU
JAWAD	Kerdoudi	Moroccan Institute of International Relations (IMRI)	MOROCCO

JERING	Dietlind	European Commission, DG Research (RTD)	EU
JOLLY	Cecile	Centre d'analyse stratégique	FRANCE
KOBZA	Piotr	Ministry of Foreign Affairs	POLAND
KOCHER	Névine	Cemagref	FRANCE
KOPP	Andreas	World Bank	USA
KORANY	Bahgat	American University in Cairo (AUC)	EGYPT
KOVAČIČ	Damir	University of Split	CROATIA
KRENGEL	Robert	European Commission DG External Relations (RELEX) Tel Aviv	EU
KUTTENEH	Rania	Euromed Civil Society Programme (ENPI-SOUTH)	EU
LADJANE	Anissa	Euro-Mediterranean Women Lawyers (Womedlaw)	FRANCE
LAGRANGE	Alain	Institut français de recherche pour l'exploitation de la mer (IFREMER)	FRANCE
LAPUCCI	Alessio	European Commission, DG Research (RTD)	EU
LAUTIZI	Valeria	Moverim Consulting	EU

LAVAGNO	Evasio	Politecnico di Torino	ITALY
LEQUEUX	Gilles	European Commission, DG Research (RTD)	EU
LERAY	René	Euradvice and Facultés Saint-Louis	EU
LOSA	Ivana	Euro-Mediterranean Center for Climate Change	ITALY
LUCAS	Nigel	Consultant	UNITED KINGDOM
LUKAS-EDER	Karin	Brussels office of the Bavarian Research Alliance	GERMANY
MABROUK	Ghazi	CLAN Public Affairs	TUNISIA
MAGRIONE	Fabio	Assistant of MEP Angelilli	EU
MAJCEN	Špela	European Commission, DG Research (RTD)	EU
MARDER	Gesine	Arab Women's Solidarity Association Belgium (AWSA-Be)	EU
MARIAN	Martina	Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei	ITALY
MARTIN JIMENEZ	Ignacio	Spanish Office for Science and Technology (SOST)	SPAIN
MAZZAI	Alessandra	Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei	ITALY

MAZZONE	Chiara	Représentation de la Région Provence-Alpes-Côte d'Azur	FRANCE
MAZZUCA	Silvia	Cestec SpA Brussels Office	EU
MERINDOL	Magali	Digitaleurope	EU
MICHELIER	Christine	KfW Bankengruppe, Liaison Office to the EU	EU
MIFSUD	Joseph	Euro-Mediterranean University (EMUNI)	SLOVENIA
MONTANE	Mireia	Ministry of Education, Catalonia	SPAIN
MOUHIB	Leila	Université Libre de Bruxelles	BELGIUM
NIKlasson	Elisabeth	EACEA	EU
NUÑO	Macarena	Institut de Prospective Économique du monde Méditerranéen (IPEMED)	FRANCE
OLIVÉ I SERRET	Enric	EuroMed Permanent Universtiy Forum	SPAIN
OLIVEIRA	Teresa	European Commission, DG Education and Culture (EAC)	EU
PANTEA	Raluca	European Commission, DG Development (DEV)	EU

PAPAGEORGIU	Georges	European Commission, DG External Relations (RELEX) Cairo	EU
PASS	Eric	NITTO Europe	BELGIUM
PEDRINI	Gabriele	BBJ Consult AG	EU
PELIZZI	Rosalba	Azienda agricola fasana	ITALY
PÉREZ LATORRE	Mariàngels	European Solar Thermal Electricity Association (ESTELA)	EU
PETRUCCI	Federica	Development Researchers' Network (DRN)	ITALY
PIEDRA DE FURUNDARENA	Rodolfo	Spanish Office for Science and Technology (SOST)	SPAIN
PIEROTTI	Jennifer	Japan Bank for International Cooperation	FRANCE
PIETROPAOLO	Silvia	INNOVA Europe	EU
PIOTROWSKA	Kamila	Free University of Brussels	BELGIUM
PIPIKAITE	Algirde	Intrend Consult	EU
PISTONE	Andrea	Becario de la Delegación de la Junta de Andalucía en Bruxelles	SPAIN
POMMIER	Thierry	European Solar Thermal Electricity Association (ESTELA)	EU

PRICE	David	Schuman Project	EU
RADWAN	Azza Saleh	Theodor Bilharz Research Institute (TBRI)	EGYPT
RAZ	Baruch	Institute for Policy and Strategy	ISRAEL
RIAHI	Sabri	World Trade Center Schiphol Amsterdam	THE NETHERLANDS
RING	Gerladine	Université Libre de Bruxelles	BELGIUM
ROCA I CORTES	Immaculada	European Commission, DG External Relations (RELEX)	EU
RODRIGUEZ CLEMENTE	Rafael	Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas (CSIC)	SPAIN
ROFFI	Giuseppe	Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche (CNR)	ITALY
ROMBI	Flavia	Assistant of MEP Angelilli	EU
ROSSANO	Marilena	Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche (CNR)	ITALY
ROSSETTI	Domenico	European Commission, DG Research (RTD)	EU
RUYSSSEN	Olivier	Facultés Saint-Louis	BELGIUM
SABATHIL	Gerhard	European Commission, DG External Relations (RELEX)	EU

SAELENS	Christian	Wallonie-Bruxelles international	BELGIUM
SAIF	Ibrahim	Economic and Social Council of Jordan	JORDAN
SALHI	Slah	Ambassade de Tunisie à Bruxelles	TUNISIA
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This EuroMed-2030 report collects the individual contributions of the Expert Group that met five times in 2010 to discuss the main Trends, Tensions and potential Transitions in the Euro-Mediterranean region. In the Trends, the experts first look at the economic and social transformation, at water and environment, at political reforms and socio-economic instability factors. The Tensions in the Mediterranean area range from conflict/diplomacy and self reliance/dependency to economic growth/sustainable development and jobs/migration. The four proposed Transitions are entitled "Managing conflicts", "Engaging in win-win projects", "Deeper economic integration" and "Towards a EuroMed Community".